The Rudolf Steiner Archive

Nothing could have inflicted deeper wounds on the Roman Catholic Church than the rigidity with which Pope Pius IX opposed any understanding with the currents of our time. The light that had come upon the nations was to be extinguished by all means; the head of the Church considered it possible to impose the beliefs of the darkest Middle Ages on modern mankind. The teachings of the modern age were not to be refuted, but the curse alone was the means that Pius IX used against them. Leo XIII recognized that this was a grave error, even from the pope's point of view. That is why his attitude towards the achievements of the time was essentially different. In his view, the spirit should beat the spirit. The teachers of the Gospel should not stubbornly reject what modern science and modern life hold against them, but rather take it into themselves, on the one hand to utilize it, as far as possible, in the spirit of Catholicism, and on the other hand to be able to refute it effectively from the standpoint of the Church. This is why the Pope recommended that his priesthood study Christian philosophy in order to turn it into a weapon against modern science. He does not dislike it when Darwinian and similar theories are presented at theological faculties and illuminated from the point of view of Catholic science, something that his predecessor would have condemned in the strongest terms.

The calm tone of objective debate that characterizes Leo XIII's encyclicals also stems from this attitude of the Pope. He not only condemned modern beliefs, he examined them and sought to refute them objectively. For Catholicism, this changed method of struggle is a great advantage, but for modern culture it is an equally significant disadvantage. The voluntary rejection of all modern cultural achievements and the closure to the trends of the time would have enabled the latter to progress more quickly. If there had been nothing at all of the ideas of the present in the church and only narrow-minded dogmatism, then everything that is called spirit would have had to be expelled from it of its own accord.

These are the points of view on which the government of Leo XIII is based. His latest encyclical is further proof of this. He seeks to counter liberalism in a factual manner and the liberalism of the whole trend of the time. For those who are still in the bonds of faith, the sentences of the circular letter, presented with sophistical acumen, will not remain without a profound impression. This should be openly admitted. Nor should it be denied that with the liberal principle the central point of modern culture has been correctly struck. The barometer of progress in the development of mankind is, in fact, the conception one has of freedom and the practical realization of this conception. We are convinced that recent times have seen a progress in this concept that is just as significant as that brought about by the teachings of Christ: "Let there be neither Jew, nor Greek, nor Barbarian, nor Scythian, but let all be brothers in Christ". Just as at that time the equality of all men before God and their equals was recognized, so in the last century the conviction increasingly took hold of people that our task could not consist in submission to the commandments of an external authority, that everything we believe, that the guiding principle of our actions should only come from the light of reason within ourselves. To consider as true only that which our own thinking compels us to, to move only within those social and state forms which we give ourselves, that is the great principle of the time.

Like any principle that is correct in itself, this one can of course also be interpreted incorrectly and thus cause untold harm. Indeed, not much can be said about the introduction of the true form of this principle into practical life. For it is easy to make the mistake that by establishing the maxim of following only one's own inner self, any assertion of subjective arbitrariness, of purely individual striving, is justified. But this necessarily leads to arbitrariness standing against arbitrariness, subjective interests against subjective interests, and finally to a struggle of all against all, a "struggle for existence", in which not only the stronger wins against the weaker, but the dishonest against the honest, the dishonest against the friend of truth. This is what the principle of freedom has really come to in recent decades, and what is commonly referred to today as liberalism is this distorted image of the modern spirit. It is sad, but unfortunately only too true, that here an originally correct view has led to the hideous system of exploitation of the individual by the individual. It is only a pity that this stock market liberalism has been so long at large, for it is only because it has blinded the minds to everything that truly bears the name of freedom that many otherwise not insignificant men have turned away from the liberal movement and thrown themselves into the arms of reaction. Now, fortunately, the death knell of that pseudo-liberalism no longer seems far away.

Man is not just an individual being, but belongs to a larger whole, a nation. What is otherwise called a species is the nation for man. And just as what is of equal value also proves to be similar in its expressions, so too the voice of reason, if man really listens to it objectively, will not speak one way in this individual and differently in that one. And even if reason is numerically different in many people, it is nevertheless the same in content; if the individual truly places himself under its spell and not under that of subjective arbitrariness and egoism, the will of one cannot exclude that of the other, but will meet with it, complement it and support it. Thus the aspirations of a number of individuals who belong together as a state will form a reasonably ordered system within which the individual can really move freely. In this system each will fulfill his task without being restricted, opposed or exploited by the others; he will be restricted in his freedom neither by an authority, as in the Catholic world view, nor by the egoism of others, as in the modern pseudo-liberal state. This is a state order that corresponds to true liberalism and at the same time can be described as truly state socialist.

Events are showing ever more clearly that this view of our way of life is working its way up into reality. It represents true progress compared to the old ecclesiastical order. It is what will establish a new era; papal circulars will be powerless against it. It is a historical necessity, just as Christianity once was. Pseudo-liberalism is not, and therefore the apparent truth of the sentences of the encyclical. It is fighting against a stillborn child.

The deep contradiction that exists between the external and internal politics of our monarchy emerges at every opportunity in political life, and it is often noticeable to those who know how to observe from seemingly minor occurrences. In our opinion, however, to characterize the contradiction merely as one of pro-Slav internal policy and decidedly pro-German external policy is to treat the matter too narrowly. The contradiction is actually a different one, and it is best expressed by comparing Kalnoky's, in our opinion, significant statement with the repeatedly expressed government principles as we have heard them from the mouth of the spokesman of our government, Mr. von Dunajewski. The head of our foreign policy said: "The concerns (for peace) arise not only from the conditions on the Balkan peninsula, but rather from the general European situation, from ... the profound differences of opinion not so much of the cabinets as of the populations." We call the statement significant because it shows that the time has now decisively ended when the will of the highest power factors alone was decisive for the direction of the foreign policy of the states and the voice of the people was regarded as non-existent. These words clearly indicate that negotiations by diplomats without taking the interests of the people into account have become impossible. And applied to our case, this means that no state that is serious about European civilization and the cultural interests of the peoples of Western and Central Europe can pursue a policy other than one that is directed against the Russian colossus, which is hostile to culture, and against the Greater Slavic tendencies emanating from it. The course of our external policy is simply the expression of a European necessity. It is demanded not only by the Germans, but by the entire population of Western Europe. It is in sharp contrast to this when Minister Dunayevsky believes that Austria can be governed without the Germans.

If the Germans are to stop shaping this state, which they founded and to which they gave its life's work, then this state will also cease to play the role intended for it by historical development in Western European cultural life. And a policy that alienates the state from its historical foundation in this sense cannot be described as education-friendly, least of all one that expresses the will of the people. Such governance may be opportune at the moment, may be suitable to help overcome the difficulties of the immediate present; it is not contemporary in the deeper sense of the word. One should only try once to incorporate a drop of these principles into foreign policy, and it would immediately become apparent how they run decidedly counter to the course of European development. Internally, it will work for a time, because the factors and conditions on which the state rests still retain the spirit that the Germans have implanted in them, and the compulsion to change will only arise when this spirit has been completely destroyed. For let there be no mistake about it: the leading statesmen can only govern with the principles learned and borrowed from the Germans, and the terrible success is due to the fact that the spirit that springs from the people is misunderstood, even deliberately applied in an un-German sense. Thus the Germans are fought with the weapons they have received. From this alone one will recognize that the present internal current is not a historically necessary one, but one brought about by diplomatic arts. While external politics is turning away from diplomatic arts and towards the will of the people, internal politics is taking the opposite course. And that is the contrast. The Slavs would be allowed to be Slavs if certain reactionary desires were not more easily satisfied with them than with the Germans.

Of course, we have come far enough this way. The demands made on us Germans from the Slavic side are outrageous. One hears voices saying that the German Bohemians should approach the majority of the Bohemian Parliament with a view to initiating new negotiations for a settlement. Do we really want to ask the German people in Bohemia to beg the Czechs for their right to live according to the cultural level to which the Germans have brought them?

The Slavs still have a long way to go before they understand the tasks incumbent on the German people, and it is outrageous cultural hostility to throw blows at every opportunity at the feet of the tribe from which one receives the spiritual light without which European education must remain a closed book.

But it is even more outrageous when the Czechs announce through their organs that the Bohemian Compromise should be achieved now in order to celebrate the anniversary of our Emperor's reign in a worthy manner. So we Germans are being asked to do the impossible so that we can once again be portrayed as the people in Austria who are hostile to the state and dynasty when the occasion arises. This borders on the extreme: because we do not want to break with our traditions, with our history, indeed with our own "I", we are to be suspected before the crown, to which we have always been as loyal as the Slavs.

And so, blow after blow is being struck by our opponents to drive us Germans out of our rightful positions. We must therefore be all the less reluctant to do everything we can to regain our influence. It is therefore to be severely criticized that in recent times the gratifying political agitation, which was already noticeable among the Germans at least in some areas, has suffered a setback. The voice of the people must be heard clearly, and it cannot be ignored for long. That is why we consider the idea of a German party conference, which has just emerged, to be a very good one. However, the side from which it comes does not seem to us to be the right one. Today it should not be the German liberals, who once lost their living contact with the people, who set the tone at such a unification festival; today it should be the exclusively national elements of the German people in Austria. But of course, the former should not stay away. They pursue a very peculiar tactic: if a core German sentiment can be heard anywhere and insists on emphasizing the German idea, then these "men of progress" and their particularly clean organ, the "Neue Freie Presse", complain about the impossibility of reaching an agreement with the Germans. As if these gentlemen had a patent on the fact that unification could only be achieved in the name of their aspirations. May they for once show the selflessness necessary to put personal interests in the background and put themselves at the service of the common cause. Why is it that the German Nationals are required to completely abandon their convictions before they are allowed to enter the temple of this "free-minded" movement? The most natural thing would be for both sides to come together. Of course, this will not be the case as long as the right wing of our opposition sees something illicit in every stirring of our national sentiment and a loss of its "ability to govern" in every manifestation of sympathy with the nationalists. Away with this chimera of governability. If we are to be governed in an un-German way, then at least it should not be done by fellow tribesmen. Our hands should remain clean. A German party congress, convened by truly national men, should proclaim the next tasks of the Germans as their resolute will before the whole world. Now the idea of German withdrawal from parliamentary life is resurfacing. It even seems to be gaining supporters among the people. So long! Stick to it! Explain the decisive factors that you no longer want to sit in the people's house, to be active in the people's representation, in which you are in fact regarded as an unwelcome troublemaker and finally ignored. After all, it can be foreseen with all certainty that one will only govern without the Germans as long as they quietly take their seats. And if the parliamentary machine really did go on for a while without the cooperation of the Germans, it would finally prove to be impossible. The Germans could hardly lose if they ceased their unfruitful parliamentary activity and threw themselves all the more into organizing the people in the national sense. Apart from the German School Association, however, not the slightest attempt has been made at a national organization. The national associations all have a local character, and their view does not extend beyond the confines of the city in which they are located. These associations must gain a unified organization, they must have contact with each other. Then their rallies will make the right impression wherever necessary. Our national opponents can undoubtedly do us great harm. But it will always be insignificant compared to the wounds we inflict on ourselves if we delay our work of national unification. For the edifice of cards that our opponents are building has no sustaining power, it lacks the right spirit of life. One day it will collapse, and then the Germans will have to be called upon to resume the work where they were forced to stop it. Woe to us now if we are not equipped then, if we approach our task divided into factions and disunited. Only an opposition that never thinks about getting its hands on the reins can allow itself the luxury of party division; one that must necessarily think about it is committing a grave injustice that nothing can atone for.

This year's General Assembly of the Goethe Society on May 8, 1891 was a particularly solemn one, as it took place in the middle of the festive week dedicated to the commemoration of that momentous moment in German art when the Weimar Court Theatre was opened under Goethe's direction one hundred years ago. The connection between the two celebrations also found special expression in the fact that Prof. Suphan, the director of the Goethe Archive, was able to report on an important discovery of documents relating to Goethe's management of the theater. The meeting was extremely well attended. Their Royal Highnesses, the Grand Duke, the Grand Duchess, the Hereditary Grand Duke and the Hereditary Grand Duchess as well as the Princesses Auguste and Olga of Saxe-Weimar honored the meeting with their visit. The following foreign guests were present: Minister von Goßler, Privy Councillor von Loeper, Wildenbruch, Bodenstedt, Spielhagen, Julius Wolff, W. Freiherr von Biedermann, Privy Councillor Freiherr von Bezecny, Lud. Aug. von Frankl, Erich Schmidt, Jul. Rodenberg and many others. The meeting was chaired by Privy Councillor von Loeper, who welcomed the society and expressed his regret that President von Simson was unable to attend due to health reasons. Privy Councillor Dr. Ruland then presented the annual report, which showed that the number of members on December 31, 1890 was 2988; the Society's assets on that day amounted to 37,289 marks, of which 21,396 marks served as a reserve fund. As a Christmas gift for the members of the Goethe Society, a publication on Goethe's relationship to the Weimar theater was promised on the basis of the above-mentioned discovery of files by Dr. C. A. H. Burkhardt and Dr. Julius Wahle. Prof. Dr. Valentin from Frankfurt a.M. gave the keynote speech "On the classical Walpurgis Night". The lecturer endeavored to refute those views that want to see contradictions everywhere in Goethe's "Faust" and deficiencies in its unified composition. Despite some gaps and unevenness in the progression of the plot, "Faust" is a consistent, unified poem. It is the counterpart to Wilhelm Meister. But while in the latter work the poet allows his hero to find the goal of his striving in the real world, he places such a powerful urge for human perfection in Faust's soul that it becomes impossible to grant it satisfaction in this finite world. Faust's striving is for something infinite and eternal. But one that not only represents the sum of all that is finite, but goes into the depths of all being. Mephistopheles cannot understand the latter. He only knows the former infinity. Therefore he leads Faust from pleasure to pleasure. But what Faust seeks, he cannot grant him. This is why the role of Mephistopheles changes in the course of the play. From Faust's guide, which he was in the first part, he becomes in the second part the henchman who procures the external means for Faust's higher purposes, the latter of which he no longer even suspects. He gives Faust the key to the Mothers' apartments, but remains completely unaware of his fate in this spirit realm. In Mephistopheles' "Nothing", Faust finds the symbol of all beauty, Helena, and brings her to the upper world, but initially only as a dream image, as a shadow. She needs to be embodied, to exist in the flesh. This can only be achieved if a germ of humanity is produced from the forces of nature that is capable of cloaking the shadow of beauty with real life. This is the homunculus. It becomes Faust's guide into classical antiquity, where it dissolves in order to continue to act as the force that forms Helena's body from the elements of nature around her spirit. Thus Faust is in possession of this only one of the women; but he still cannot be satisfied, for no finite thing, whether it is in the past or the present, can satisfy him. Only when he wants to banish all magic from his path through life, when he renounces all finite, selfish pleasure and lives only in the anticipation of a happiness that he has created but no longer enjoys, does he reach that supreme moment when he wants to say: "Linger on, you are so beautiful". Faust's soul is lost to Mephistopheles, who believed he could hold on to it in his final enjoyment.

This keynote speech was followed by Prof. Suphan's presentation of the files he had found. These represent a large part of the old theater archive. They were found in a barely accessible corner of the part of the palace known in Weimar as the "Bastille" and were donated to the Goethe and Schiller Archive by His Royal Highness the Grand Duke on December 24, 1890. There are seventy-eight volumes and fascicles. One part consists of the so-called DirektionsAkten, i.e. those documents from the management of the Court Theater Commission set up in 1797. This commission consisted of Goethe, von Luck and Kirms, later Goethe, Kirms and Rat Kruse. The second part consists of the files of the branch theaters where the members of the Weimar theater performed during the summer season. 35 of the volumes in this section relate to the Lauchstadt theater and are from the years 1791 to 1814. This series contains the documents relating to the famous Leipzig guest performance of 1807. Three volumes concern the theater in Halle since 1811, seven Erfurt (1791-95 and 1815), ten Rudolstadt (1794-1805), one Jena, three Naumburg. Goethe dictated and reviewed a large number of these plays. A manuscript of the prelude "Was wir bringen" (from the hand of the scribe Geist) is among the files, as well as 44 letters from Goethe to Kirms and 34 to other people. In addition to purely business matters, the former also deal with matters of literary and artistic interest. The collection also includes letters from Schiller, such as one in which he expresses his approval of the Wallenstein performance in Lauchstädt. Karl August's relationship to the theater is evident from many of the documents. Of particular importance are those sheets that show the care with which Goethe managed the theater and how nothing was too small for him to concern himself with it.¹

After these announcements, Prof. Suphan gave a special report on the Goethe Archive and the Goethe Library. With regard to the former, it was emphasized that Goethe's natural science estate had also recently been viewed and processed for the edition. The work of Prof. Bardeleben from Jena and the writer of these lines has progressed so far that readers of the Weimar Goethe edition will probably be able to see a larger part of the discovered estate in the course of this year. It will make a significant contribution to finally making Goethe's pioneering work in the scientific field clear to even the greatest doubters. Goethe tackled morphology in such a way that he has not yet been caught up with by specialist science; in the field of osteology, there are works on the skull of mammals and the shape of animals, which introduce a method into anatomy that was only recognized as the correct one decades later by Merkel and others.

The library was augmented by purchases of valuable items, particularly of older literature, and by numerous donations. The Grand Duke donated 106 letters by Wieland to the archive, which was significantly enriched by the acquisition of Otto Ludwig's manuscript estate, which is being edited by Erich Schmidt.

Geheimrat Hofrat Ruland now presented the report on the Goethe National Museum. The museum is continuing to organize its collections, in particular Goethe's library.

The General Assembly was followed by a communal lunch, during which Minister Groß made toasts to the Emperor, Privy Councillor von Loeper to the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess, Erich Schmidt to the Weimar Theater and Minister von Gossler to the Goethe Society. Ludw. Aug. von Frankl brought a festive greeting from Vienna. The festival concluded with a performance of Paul Heyse's new play "Die schlimmen Brüder" in the court theater.

• 1. The aforementioned publication of the Goethe-Gesellschaft, which will be sent to members as this year's Christmas gift, is to be entitled: "Documents on the History of Goethe's Theater Management 1791 to 1817", by C. A. H. Burkhardt and J. Wahle.

It is always of particular interest to hear important people, whose sphere of life and work is far removed from the field of theoretical world observation, speak about the great mysteries of our existence and about the ultimate causes of world development. And even a man like Moltke, who was repeatedly in a position to see the course of fate for entire states determined by his personality. The significance of such a relationship can only be recognized by those who understand what great, deeply penetrating experiences mean for our whole being, how they suddenly spread a different hue over a large number of our ideas. How many people are suddenly changed in their whole character by an experience of overwhelming impact! And worthless are the doctrinaire circles of thought of those people into whose course of life blows of fate, high joys and deep disappointments have never intervened.

What might have been going on in the mind of Chief of Staff Moltke in the hours before the important decisive battles with Austria and later with France! At such moments, the spirit of the world evidently pokes something very special into a person's ear; words that are difficult to understand for people with everyday worldly experience.

The German reading world now has a printed version of Moltke's thoughts on the world context and human destiny.

Let us try to clarify the main features of his world view. Moltke is convinced of the universal lawfulness of the entire universe. He also believes that the laws which bring about the smallest and greatest events here on our earth are valid in every part of the universe. What happens on Sirius is no less essentially subject to the same reasons as the phenomena that take place before our eyes every day. And Moltke imagines all human activity to be enclosed within the circle of this lawfulness. But our reason must also have this world lawfulness within itself; for only on this condition can it find reasonableness everywhere in the world outside. For Moltke, the concordance of reason and reality is a postulate of his views.

In the end, our philosophizing commander sees the entire harmony of the world as an outflow of the divine spirit, which has also arranged for the world and human reason to be in harmony.

Although these views correspond exactly with the mathematical-mechanical world view prevailing in the circles of contemporary natural scientists - Du Bois-Reymond must be delighted with this alliance - the idea nevertheless seems correct that the reason for their emergence must be sought in Moltke's profession as an army commander.

The commander's decisions are, in the strictest sense of the word, the result of considerations based on mathematical and dynamic premises. Just as for the mathematician and mechanic there is only one calculation result from given calculation approaches, so also for the commander only a very specific action can appear as the necessary consequence of given facts. He carries this out with a necessity similar to that with which a stone falls to the ground. The activity of the human spirit appears here completely integrated into the mathematical-mechanical world event, as a mere continuation of it. And man emerges as the executor of eternal, iron world laws.

What must necessarily suffer from such a view, however, is the feeling for individuality and for the personal freedom of man. Without question, the individual must take a back seat in military leadership: Firstly, in relation to the laws of military knowledge and secondly, in relation to the organization of a multi-limbed body. Anyone who draws a conclusion about the general nature of all being from such an area must be one-sided in his convictions. The psychologist, however, knows that every person who has a certain occupation makes the latter the center of his assessment of the world. Everyone has the need to constantly draw on concrete examples from his experience to supplement the general views that fill his mind. These are not merely to confirm the general, but to make it all the more evident to him. It is now natural for the general to regard as general those laws for which he finds examples within his world of experience. But these are precisely the mathematical-mechanical ones.

What is decidedly neglected in such a conclusion, however, is the world of freedom. Within Moltke's views there is just as little room for the latter as there is within the mechanical world view of the current theory of nature. In the former, the one-sided focus on external events and the mathematical side of nature's existence causes the latter to become involved in military life and activity. Moltke views the universe as a great body of troops, the contemporary teachers of nature as a many-limbed machine. The former generalizes the laws of the art of war, the latter the rules of mechanics. In both ways the result is a one-sidedness in the fullest sense of the word, which is psychologically understandable, but which cannot exist in the forum of an all-round view of the world and of life. How necessary it is to measure each thing by its own standard and not to bring in experiences from another area is one of the highest insights of the human spirit. Many people will understand it theoretically, will find it comprehensible, but there is still a long way to go before we reach the innermost essence of our psychic organism. Before you get there, you have to have many experiences. Experiences which, however, do not take place on the scene of great world events, but in the depths of our inner being. A philosopher is not someone who knows the sum of the existing philosophical teachings and has perhaps added a few new ones, but only someone who has gone through the difficult struggles of the soul, through which truths are not learned, nor conceived, but experienced. Now what can least of all be learned and conceived, but what must be experienced, is the principle that every thing is to be considered according to its inherent individuality. This latter consideration is the necessary counterpart to Moltke's view that a lawfulness runs through all world beings. Within this one lawfulness, however, countless types of laws are possible, which need to be carefully considered in particular.

As interesting as the views of the great commander are for the psychologist, they show how strict immersion in a sphere allows the basic characteristics of the latter to be recognized as the leitmotifs of an entire human life, and that no other activity can lead to an all-round satisfying grasp of life than a life of the thinker that is not particularly committed to details and is equally warm and equally cool to everything.

For decades, our educated people were in love with a brittle beauty. She had serious features, a somewhat pale complexion, dark hair, was without fullness; and only rarely was there anything like passion to be seen in her face. No one could really warm to her presence. Nor did people always like to be with her. Only at the big markets, where public opinion was offered for sale, did people appear proudly at her side. If you wanted to spend a leisurely hour, if you lived only for yourself and your immediate surroundings and didn't need to add that tone to your words that made them seem suggestive to the crowd, then you got rid of your companion. But they also acted grandly and duly boasted of their chaste relationship.

The woman is called "loyalty to principle".

We have left behind us a time that has driven the worship of "principle" to the point of disgust. Original feelings and individual judgment counted for nothing; life was to be lived by a few principles that were repeatedly put forward and by which everything was judged. People counted for little, the principles they swore by counted for everything. People didn't care about the individual, but they did care about whether they were liberal or conservative, national or cosmopolitan, materialistic or idealistic.

There are signs that things are getting better. There are still plenty of latecomers to be seen, latecomers who are still singing the old song. But you can see how the understanding of the individual is on the increase. Nothing can prove this more clearly than the success of Maximilian Harden's two "Apostata" volumes. They contain the essays that Harden has published in recent years in various German journals on contemporary events and contemporaries. People were always looking for these articles in the places where they could hope to find them. People were curious to know what Harden had to say about an event, because they appreciated the writer's unique personality. And you never felt disappointed, because Harden knew something to say that no one else would have thought of. And another thing: Harden is not satisfied with simply stating his opinion. He knows that although food is nourishing without the addition of spices, it tastes better with them. Harden is distinguished enough to present his opinions only in such a guise that not only the content but also the cover is of interest. We like it better when someone stimulates us than when he wants to convince us. I don't like them who write thin and thick books to convince the people around them. I find that kind of thing simply tactless. It always presupposes stupid readers who are supposed to be instructed. Most of our fellow writers don't want to talk to us about their subject matter, they want us to be instructed by them. It is only because this attitude is unfortunately so widespread that so much is written which the Graces do not even want to look at with a contemptuous sideways glance. We like reading Harden so much because he has not a trace of such an attitude. Reading his writings makes you feel like a human being. And that's not something you're used to with authors. He doesn't impose his convictions on anyone, but he expresses his opinion; and that will interest others, even if they don't share it. Indeed, it will be much more useful to him than the one he can immediately subscribe to in full. This will usually only be the case with the most trivial things. The unconscious respect that Harden has for his reader characterizes him as the type of a distinguished writer. As such, however, there is another thing that is peculiar to him. This is the boldness of his judgment and the self-confident way in which he presents himself to the world. Harden's judgment is never tinged with that leaden timidity which dares to express itself only "modestly" or "with reservation" or "intemperately", but is firm, sharp, unreserved. The mind of a right person does not react indeterminately, vaguely, unclearly to anything that comes to him, but fiercely, sharply. He who does not put this vehemence and sharpness into the expression of his views does not deserve that his fellow men should be interested in him. He remains uninteresting to us. For he lacks that high sense of truth which is the characteristic of a noble man. He who is true always speaks more or less paradoxically. Nor can we demand of any of our sayings that they be absolutely true, for the whole truth will probably only come to light by considering an infinite number of one-sidednesses in their context. He who is afraid to say something paradoxical, and therefore weakens the points of his statements as much as possible, will produce nothing but more or less bland, banal talk. Harden's assertions are now as pointed as possible. In any case, he does not use a file to blunt the sharp points, but probably a very sharp instrument to sharpen what you can still run your finger over without cutting yourself. We are dealing with a writer who we often agree with enthusiastically, and who often annoys us beyond measure. But writers are also the most miserable creatures that we should never get angry with. The only exception, of course, is when you are merely annoyed by their stupidity.

The article that opens the second collection of the "Apostata" shows how fine Harden's opinion is. It is about Harden's visit to Prince Bismarck, which took place a few weeks ago. We get a picture of the overwhelming individuality of this monumental personality that we could not wish for better. This is the true art of characterization: to apply precisely those lines in a picture that best reflect the individuality portrayed. And Harden is a master of this. Incidentally, other passages in his "Apostata" volumes also show how he knows how to appreciate the great chancellor. Harden knows that man acts according to individual principles and the Philistine according to principles. And his hatred of all philistinism is not slight. Eugen Richter comes off badly. Worst of all in the final article of the second volume: "Ententeich". How could Harden, the idolizer of the individual, hate anyone who wants to erect a tyranny of abstract principles in the place of human tyranny? That Richter could never understand that everything useful must come from the will of the personality, and that one can never come to grips with reality with general principles, made him the enemy of the greatest statesman, whom he should otherwise have regarded as the greatest happiness to stand opposite as a political comrade-in-arms. Bismatck, on the other hand, could justifiably only look with resentment at a man who had no feeling for reality, but who repeatedly and repeatedly came out with "liberal principles".

Harden's understanding of the individual also makes him a subtle psychologist. All those who rebel and claim to want to look at everything psychologically could learn a lot from Harden. Just read his article on Guy de Maupassant. Our youngest Germans also want to write psychological essays, but they don't really work because they are full of dogmas and arbitrary assumptions. And the real cannot be dictated, it can only be observed. No one can judge an artist if he approaches the latter with artistic demands. Only those who are under the impression of full reality, without prejudice, are able to see purely. But very few people can think of anything when they look at an individual piece of reality without prejudice. They have a recipe in their pocket, and their judgment consists in saying whether reality agrees with their recipe or not. But that is not Harden's way. His way of looking at things is without a recipe, entirely subjective, from case to case. Of course, the recipe people have it easier. They don't always have to make a new effort to come to a judgment.

Rarely will a judgment as subjective as Harden's coincide with the state or social norm. What everyone says should not actually be written down. But it is not always entirely safe to defy the "norm", and the accusations of all kinds that have rained down on Harden's innocent head over the past year have officially testified to the fact that something is stirring that could cause too much excitement among the general public.

Where everyone was complaining about the shamefulness of a woman, Harden was looking for deeper social forces; and what he contributed to the Prager-Schweitzer trial should be recommended to the attention of wider circles for the assessment of similar incidents.

I do not ask a writer whether he has "right" or "wrong" principles. For I know how little there is in such "rightness" or "wrongness"; but I ask whether he is a whole man, a right man, who, even if he errs, must still be heeded. What many can tell me, I do not listen to, for I can usually tell myself; but what only a few can tell me, that is what I ask for. Many are happy when they only hear or read what is quite clear to them. Others say to such things: lost time. The latter will reach for Harden's "Apostata" volumes.

We can no longer go on as we have done up to now. Morality, which has been trampled deep into the dust, must be revived! So thought a number of well-meaning people, and they founded an "Association for Ethical Culture". The news has just gone out from Berlin that this new institution for the salvation of mankind has come into being, and the invitation to join. And among the founders we find many a name that belongs to a personality we admire. The purpose of the association should be to emphasize the general humanity of all religious and moral characteristics of the individual religions and cultures and to make this the carrier of its world view and way of life. This is to be achieved through literary (lectures, discussions and the publication of writings) and practical (acts of charity and efforts to improve the situation of the suffering population) association activities. In view of the first part of the program, a discussion of this association probably belongs in this section of a literary journal.

The basic error at the root of this is the belief in a general human morality. As little as "man in general" is possible, but only a conceptual fiction, so little can we speak of ethics in general. Every people, every age, indeed every individual has their own morality. The thinker can then seek out what all these moral views have in common, he can search for the driving forces that are equally effective in all of them. But the result obtained in this way has only theoretical value. It is infinitely important for the realization of man's ethical nature, his moral essence; it can never be made the basis for the conduct of life. And there can be nothing more satisfying than that this is not possible. Otherwise, the individual expression of national and human natures, of ages and individuals would be replaced by the template-like actions of moral puppets, which would always be strung up on the strings of the general human moral doctrine.

Nowhere more than in moral life can the principle apply: Live and let live! The respective morality of a person or an age is the unconscious result of his view of the world and life. According to a certain way of thinking and feeling, action acquires an individual character; and there can never be any thought of a separate cultivation of the latter. Today, an elite of educated people is working on a reorganization of our view of life, both in terms of science as well as religion and art. Everyone is doing their bit. What comes out of this will determine our actions. The cultivation of knowledge, truth and artistic views can be the content of common endeavors. It will then automatically lead to a common ethic in many areas. If everyone openly presents what he knows, if he puts on the public agenda what he has achieved; in short, if he expresses himself in every direction: then he will be more to the whole than if he approaches it with the pretension of being able to tell it how it should behave. Many of our contemporaries have finally had enough of all the talk about what we should and should not do. They want insight into the workings of the world. If they have this, then they also know how to behave in the world they recognize. And anyone who does not have this insight and yet approaches them with good teachings for our actions is considered a moral philosopher. Our task within humanity results simply from our realization of the nature of that part of it to which we belong. For those who recognize the truth of these propositions, aspirations such as those underlying the "Association for Ethical Culture" are considered unfashionable and backward.

We have other things to do than think about how we should behave. Our whole life is in a period of transition because our old views are no longer adequate for modern consciousness, and because the materialism that the natural sciences want to put in its place is only a view for flatheads. We may soon be at the point where someone speaks the redeeming word that solves the riddle of the world from the side from which mankind of the present has posed it. We are again suffering from the great questions of knowledge and the highest problems of art. The old has become rotten. And when the great solution is found, in which many people will be able to believe for some time, when the new gospel is there, then, as always in this case, the new custom will also arise of its own accord as a necessary consequence. New world views bring forth new moral teachings all by themselves. The Messiah of truth is always also the Messiah of morality. We have no use for popular educators who have a lot for our hearts but nothing for our heads. The heart follows the head if the latter only has a certain direction.

If efforts such as those of the "Association for Ethical Culture" have long been the order of the day in America, we Germans have no reason to imitate them. Among peoples with predominantly practical, materialistic tendencies, a certain slackness has set in with regard to questions of knowledge. They do not have the lively interest in questions of knowledge and truth that is still native to us in Germany. It is therefore convenient for them to be able to make themselves comfortable on the resting bed of a general human moral doctrine. The stereotypical morality does not hinder them in what they think about. They do not know the torments of the thinker, not those of the artist. At least not those who belong to the societies for ethical culture. But whoever, like the German, has ideal life in him, whoever wants to advance spiritually, the path must be free and open for him, not obstructed by moral rules and popular education measures. To repeat an often-used expression, everyone must be able to be happy in his own way. Therefore, no modern thinker can join the association in question or approve of its tendencies. I have no doubt that the word "tolerance", which the association has written on its banner, will exert its talmigold-like effect on broad sections of society. It will certainly achieve just as much as the other, no less abused, words: Liberalism and humanity. Goethe said that he wanted nothing to do with liberal ideas; only attitudes and feelings could be liberal. A sworn liberal, when I once quoted the great poet's view to him, was soon finished with his judgment: it was just one of the many weaknesses that Goethe had in himself. To me, however, it seems like one of the many views that Goethe has in common with all people who are energetically active in the intellectual field: the ruthless advocacy of what is recognized and understood as true, which is at the same time combined with the highest respect for the individuality of others. Only those who are something themselves can also recognize the other, who likewise means something. The average person, who wants to be everything and therefore nothing, demands the same kind of nothingness alongside his own. Those who live according to the template themselves also want to shape others according to it. That is why all people who have something to say are also interested in others. But those who really have nothing to say speak of tolerance and liberalism. But by this they mean nothing more than that a general home should be created for everything that is insignificant and shallow. But they should not count on those who have tasks in the world. For them it is hurtful if they are expected to bend under the yoke of any generality, be it that of a general standard of art or that of a general morality. They want to be free, to have free movement of their individuality. The rejection of any norm is the main characteristic of modern consciousness. Kant's principle: Live in such a way that the maxim of your actions can become universal, has been dismissed. It must be replaced by: Live in the way that best corresponds to your inner being; live yourself fully, completely. It is precisely when each individual gives to the whole what no one else can give, but only he, that he does the most for it. Kant's principle, however, demands the performance of what all can do equally. However, the right person is not interested in this. The "Society for Ethical Culture" has a poor understanding of our times. Their program proves that.

Why did Friedrich Nietzsche think himself mad about the big questions of human morality? It would have been much easier to listen to the philosophy professor from America Felix Adler on the "morality common to all good people" and proclaim what he heard to the German people as a doctrine of salvation. This is what an elite of German educated people did and founded a "Society for Ethical Culture", whose purpose is to make this "commonality" the mainstay of the lives of educated people. I note from the outset that the founders of the society include men whom I hold in high esteem. But the foundation itself stems from a backward view of life. Official philosophers, who today still regurgitate the old Kant concept-cripple, Nietzsche calls him-stand firmly on the standpoint of believing that there is such a thing as a morality "common to all good men"; modern thinking, which grasps its time and looks a little into the future, is beyond that. "Act in such a way that the principles of your actions can apply to all people"; that is the core sentence of Kant's moral doctrine. And this little saying rings in our ears in every key from the confessions of those who call themselves freethinkers, liberals, apostles of humanity etc.. But today there is also a circle of people who know that this sentence is the death of all individual life, and that all cultural progress is based on living out individuality. What is special in every human being must emerge from him and become part of the development process. If one disregards this special something that everyone has for himself, then all that remains is a very banal "general" that cannot advance humanity by a single step. A few rules of expediency for mutual intercourse, that is all that can emerge as something "common to all good people". But the ethical life of man in the true sense of the word only begins where these laws based on utility end. And this life can only come from the center of the personality and will never be the result of implanted doctrines. There is no such thing as general human ethics. Modern feeling must reply to the Kantian proposition with the exact opposite: Act as, according to your particular individuality, only you can act; then you will contribute most to the whole, for you will accomplish what another cannot. This is how all the people of whom history tells us have acted. That is why there are as many different moral concepts as there have been and are peoples, ages, indeed basically as many as there are individuals. And if this natural law were to be replaced by that which is considered correct by moral philosophers who think in the Kantian sense: a bland uniformity of all human action would be the necessary consequence. Such "general" moral principles have often been established; but no human being has ever organized his life according to them. And the realization that this is a business for idle minds should be the hallmark of all modern thinking.

But it is lamentable to hear that these dreary moral maxims are to be inculcated into the education of young people. Mr. von Gizycki has spoken the harshest words about the pedagogically reprehensible influence of purely confessional education. Hardly any modern thinker will argue with him about this. But what the denominations do with their moral principles is what the "ethical society" wants to imitate with general human principles. There and here, however, nothing is achieved but the killing of the individual and the subjugation of life through lifeless, rigid laws. The priests of religion are to be replaced by the priests of general human morality. But things are even worse with the latter than with the former. The denominational moral doctrines are the results of certain world views, which after all constitute the legitimate cultural content of mankind; the general human moral doctrine is a sum of commonplaces; they are scraps gathered from all possible moral views, which do not stand out from the background of a great contemporary view. Anyone who considers such things to be viable or even suitable for reforming the ethical content of our culture is giving a poor testimony to their psychological insight.

Among the statutes of the "Society for Ethical Culture" are also some that will have a favorable effect. The initiation of a more lively discussion of religious issues, the striving to improve the living conditions of the poorer sections of the population are all things that deserve recognition. But all this has nothing to do with the basic tendencies of society, which want to push back all conceptions of ethical life to a level that has been overcome by modern consciousness. The spread of these basic ideas could only hinder the development of truly modern views.

The word "modern" is on everyone's lips today. Every moment a "new thing" is discovered in this or that area of human creativity, or at least a promising attempt at it is noticed. Most of these discoveries, however, do not lead the discerning person pursuing the matter to something really new, but simply to the lack of historical education of the discoverers. If those who currently influence public opinion through speech and writing had the same degree of knowledge and discernment as they do hubris and boldness in their claims, ninety-eight times out of a hundred they would use terms that have something to do with the matter itself where the words "new" and "modern" now have to stand in.

I don't want to join in the wild cries of the uneducated and immature standard-bearers of "modernity" when I speak here of a "new" morality in contrast to the old. But I am convinced that our time imperatively demands that we accelerate the change in views and ways of life that has been taking place very slowly for a long time. Some branches of culture are already imbued with the spirit that expresses itself in this demand; a clear awareness of the main characteristics of the change is not often to be found.

I find a simple expression for the basic trait of a truly future-worthy striving in the following sentence: Today we seek to replace all otherworldly and extra-worldly driving forces with those that lie within the world. In the past, transcendental powers were sought to explain the phenomena of existence. Revelation, mystical vision or metaphysical speculation were supposed to lead to knowledge of higher beings. At present, we strive to find the means to explain the world in the world itself.

It is only ever necessary to interpret these propositions in the right way, and one will find that they indicate the characteristic feature of a spiritual revolution that is in full swing. Science is increasingly turning away from the metaphysical approach and seeking its explanatory principles within the realm of reality. Art strives to offer in its creations only that which is derived from nature and renounces the embodiment of supernatural ideas. However, in science as in art, this endeavor is associated with the danger of going astray. Some of our contemporaries have not escaped this danger. Instead of pursuing the traces of the spirit, which they once erroneously sought outside reality, they have now lost sight of everything ideal; and we must see how science is content with a mindless observation and recording of facts, art often with mere imitation of nature.

However, these are excesses that must be overcome by what is healthy in the whole direction. The significance of the movement lies in the rejection of that world view which regarded spirit and nature as two completely separate entities, and in the recognition of the proposition that both are only two sides, two manifestations of one entity. Replacing the two-world theory with the unified worldview is the signature of the new age.

The area where this view seems to encounter the most serious prejudices is that of human action. While some natural scientists are already wholeheartedly committed to it, and some aesthetes and art critics are more or less imbued with it, ethicists want nothing to do with it. Here, the belief in norms that are supposed to govern life like an otherworldly power still prevails, in laws that are not created within human nature, but that are given to our actions as a ready-made guideline. If one goes far enough, one admits that we do not owe these laws to the revelation of a supernatural power, but that they are innate to our soul. They are then not called divine commandments, but categorical imperatives. In any case, the human personality is conceived as consisting of two independent entities: the sensual nature with a sum of instincts and passions, and the spiritual principle that penetrates to the realization of moral ideas, through which the sensual element is to be controlled and restrained. This basic ethical view has found its harshest expression in Kant's philosophy. Just think of the well-known apostrophe to duty! "Duty! thou sublime great name, who dost not grasp in thyself anything popular that leads to ingratiation, but dost demand submission", who dost "merely set up a law that finds its way into the mind of its own accord and yet acquires reverence for itself against its will, before which all inclinations fall silent, even if they secretly work against it". In these words lies an autonomization of the moral commandments into a special power to which everything individual in man simply has to submit. Even if this power announces itself within the human personality, it has its origin outside. The commandments of this power are the moral ideals that can be codified as a system of duties. The followers of this school of thought regard those who base their actions on these ideals as good people. This doctrine can be called the ethics of motives. It has many followers among German philosophers. We encounter it in a very diluted form in the work of the Americans Coit and Salter. Coit says ("The Ethical Movement in Religion", translated by G. von Gizycki, p.7): "Every duty is to be done with the fervor of enthusiasm, with the feeling of its absolute and supreme value"; and Salter ("The Religion of Morals", translated by G. von Gizycki, p. 79): "A moral act must have been done out of principle". In addition to this ethic, there is another that takes into account not so much the motives as the results of our actions. Its followers ask about the greater or lesser benefit that an action brings and accordingly describe it as better or worse. They either look at the benefit for the individual or for the social whole. Accordingly, a distinction is made between individualistic and socialistic utilitarians. If the former refrain from establishing general principles, the observance of which should make the individual happy, they present themselves as one-sided representatives of individualistic ethics. They must be called one-sided because their own benefit is by no means the only goal of the active human individuality. It can also be in their nature to act selflessly. But when these individualistic or socialistic utilitarians derive norms to be followed from the nature of the individual or a group, they make the same mistake as the advocates of the concept of duty: they overlook the fact that all general rules and laws immediately prove to be a worthless phantom when man finds himself within living reality. Laws are abstractions, but actions always take place under very specific concrete conditions. Weighing up the various possibilities and choosing the most practical one in a given case is what we should do when it comes to action. An individual personality is always faced with a very specific situation and will make a decision according to the circumstances. In this case, a selfish action will be the right one, in another a selfless one; sometimes the interests of the individual will have to be taken into account, sometimes those of the whole. Those who unilaterally pay homage to egoism are just as wrong as those who praise compassion. For what is more important than the perception of one's own good or the good of others is the consideration of whether one or the other is more important under the given circumstances. When acting, it is not primarily a matter of feelings, not of selfish, not of selfless ones, but of the right judgment about what is to be done. It can happen that someone sees an action as right and carries it out while suppressing the strongest impulses of his compassion. But since there is no absolutely right judgment, but all truth is only conditionally valid, depending on the point of view of the person who pronounces it, a person's judgment about what to do in a particular case is also conditioned by his particular relationship to the world. In exactly the same situation, two people will act differently because, depending on their character, experience and education, they have different concepts of what their task is in a given case.

Anyone who understands that the judgment of a specific case is the decisive factor in an action can only advocate an individualistic view of ethics. Only the right view in a given situation and no fixed norm helps to form such a judgment. General laws can only be derived from the facts, but facts are only created through the action of man. These are the prerequisites of abstract rules.

If we derive certain general characteristics of individuals, peoples and ages from the common and lawful nature of human action, we obtain ethics, not as a science of moral norms, but as a natural doctrine of morality. The laws derived from this relate to individual human action in exactly the same way as the laws of nature relate to a particular phenomenon in nature.

To present ethics as a normative science is to completely misjudge the nature of a science. Natural science sees its progress in the fact that it has overcome the view that general norms, types, are realized in individual phenomena according to the principle of expediency. It investigates the real foundations of phenomena. Only when ethics has reached the point where it asks not about general moral ideals, but about the real facts of action that lie in the concrete individuality of man, only then can it be regarded as a science on a par with natural science.

In the history of German literary research, Grand Duchess Sophie of Saxony, who died on March 23, 1897, deserves a place of honour. Goethe's last grandson appointed her heiress to his grandfather's entire manuscript estate. He could not have entrusted the valuable treasures to anyone better than her. In April 1885, Goethe's papers passed into her possession. From then on, she regarded the administration of the legacy as a sacred and dear duty. She wanted to make it as fruitful as possible for science. She carefully discussed with men whom she considered to be good Goethe experts, Herman Grimm, Wilhelm Scherer, Gustav von Loeper and Erich Schmidt, how the property entrusted to her should be used for literary-historical research. She founded the "Goethe Archive" and appointed Erich Schmidt as its director. She believed that she could best serve the knowledge of Goethe and his time by publishing a Goethe edition that met all the scholarly requirements of the time. She invited a large number of scholars to collaborate on this edition. It was her heart's desire to see the completion of this monumental work. Unfortunately, it did not come true. Only half of the planned number of volumes have been published to date. The Grand Duchess took the most active part in the work of her archive. The current director of this institution, Bernhard Suphan, could only ever speak in terms of the greatest enthusiasm when he spoke of this interest. She went into all the details of the work.

Goethe's estate acted like a magnet on the papers left behind by other German poets and writers. In May 1889, Schiller's descendants made a gift of their ancestor's manuscripts to the Grand Duchess. The "Goethe Archive" thus expanded to become the "Goethe and Schiller Archive".

The plan emerged to gradually develop this into a German literary archive. Much has already been done to realize this plan. The estates of Otto Ludwig, Friedrich Hebbel, Eduard Mörike and others are already in the Goethe and Schiller Archive. In order to complete her creation, the Grand Duchess decided to build her own house to house the treasures. On June 28, 1896, the magnificent building on the Ilm, near the Residenzschloss, was officially opened. Anyone who was present at the ceremonial opening of this literary archive could observe the seriousness and love with which the Grand Duchess spoke of her creation. You could see how happy she felt to be able to serve science.

The Grand Duchess Sophie had a clear eye and a sure sense of what was great and important. She possessed a sharp power of judgment that allowed her to make the right decisions on the most difficult issues. Her indomitable energy and rare prudence enabled her to devote her attention to even the smallest details connected with her work. What she did for the cultivation of art, for the education of the youth in Weimar, for the material welfare of her country, cannot be overlooked today. It was in her nature to set herself beautiful tasks and to carry them out with a strong will. She is greatly revered in Weimar. She is held in high esteem by the members of the Goethe Society, the Shakespeare Society and the Schiller Foundation, who were able to see at their meetings in Weimar how great the interest this woman took in intellectual endeavors was and how great the understanding she had for cultural tasks. Her wish was that everyone should spend pleasant days in Weimar when they visited this place in order to revive the memory of great times of the past. It has often been said in recent times that people in Weimar live from the past. That is true. But this life of great memories is best understood. And it is hardly to be regretted that there is such a place where people gather from time to time who otherwise live only in the present. It is nice to see the past come alive in front of you from time to time, as if in a dream. The fact that Weimar is such a place today, which many people like to visit again and again to celebrate the great dead, and that they take good impressions home with them from their visits, is something to which the late Grand Duchess contributed a great deal.

The Würzburg professor of theology Dr. Herman Schell published a book entitled "Catholicism as a principle of progress" (Würzburg 1897). This title struck me as a protest against ideas to which I had become accustomed many years before. I remember that in my youth a sentence uttered by the famous Cardinal Rauscher in the Austrian Herrenhaus made a lasting impression on me. He said: "The Church knows no progress". This sentence always seemed to me to be inspired by a truly religious spirit. And it still seems so to me today. If I were a devout Catholic, I would probably take every opportunity to prove and defend this sentence. I would then say, like the Church Father Tertullian, that man no longer needs to be inquisitive after divine truth has been revealed to him through Jesus Christ. I would swear by the words of St. Thomas Aquinas that the doctrine of salvation is contained in Holy Scripture, and that reason can do nothing but use its powers to find human evidence for these eternal truths of Scripture. I would consider the freedom of thought to be a paradoxical idea, for I could hardly associate any meaning with the idea of free thought if I had to assume that reason must ultimately end up in revelation. I must confess that a believing Catholic who does things differently initially appears to me as a problem, as a big question mark. Professor Herman Schell was also such a question mark for me at first. While I was reading his book, the problem took on a more definite form. It became a psychological task. I found that in the professor's mind ideas were in perfect harmony which I had hitherto assumed to be a complete contradiction. Thus our author says: "Freedom of thought is really an ideal in so far as it means freedom from all prejudices, and remains an ideal as long as the greatest danger to judgment and to progress is the bias of prejudice. Freedom of thought means nothing other than the endeavor to break and keep out all those influences on thought which have no right to truth, because they are not facts or not actually founded, because they are only imaginations, habits of thought, false and superficial interpretations of sensory impressions or other communications, such as historical documents or religious source writings." The professor knows quite well what conclusions must be drawn from this sentence of his when it comes to different modern world views. He proves to materialism, to monism, that they are based on judgments that the mind does not examine because it has become accustomed to them, because it has become biased by living in them. "Materialism has no sense for the factual world of inner experience and the spirit; only the tangible is considered a fact. Monism does not want to accept any cause of the world that is distinct from the world and a supramundane personality: that is its dogma."

But I would now like to ask the Catholic professor what he would say if it turned out in the forum of free thought that any of the basic Christian dogmas had to be dropped? It seems to me, recalling the contents of the book, that the author has no sense of such a possibility. It is as if he were of the opinion that thought cannot arrive at anything other than the Christian truths of salvation. He wants to promote knowledge, but he is convinced that this promotion cannot consist in abandoning the essential doctrines of the Church, "beginning with the personality of the Creator and the personal immortality of the soul and ending with the historical revelation of God". If thought is to be truly free, it must also have the opportunity to penetrate to a world view which derives the order of things from powers other than a personal God, and which knows nothing of personal immortality and historical revelation. Whoever presents these doctrines of faith from the outset as goals to which thinking must come, speaks as a Catholic; but he cannot possibly make himself the defender of free thinking. This can only be its own guideline and set its own goal. For even if it is hindered by the recognition of the facts from an arbitrary flight into the fantastic, the interpretation, the explanation of the facts still depends on it. Thought is the ultimate determining factor. For Christian theology, however, it must be important to interpret the phenomena of the world in such a way that the interpretation agrees with the content of revelation. As our author also says: "The ideal that guides theological research is the conviction that the equation between correctly understood revelation and correctly interpreted reality can be established." Free thinking sails out into the unknown when it sets out in search of the truth. It does not know where the boat will drift. It only feels within itself the strength and courage to arrive at a satisfying view on its own. Catholic theology knows exactly what the realization is that thinking must arrive at. Schell knows this, because he says: "The ideal of theological science is to trace faith back to demonstrable facts and to convincing principles and reasons for proof."

The question now arises for me: How is it possible that a logically trained person like Herman Schell can unite the two assertions: thinking must be free, and: this free thinking must provide the proof that the Catholic belief in revelation is unconditionally true? This question seems to me to be a psychological one. I would like to solve it in the following way. The modern theologian is educated in the belief in divine revelation. His upbringing makes it impossible for him to doubt the truth of revelation. But alongside the divine truth of salvation, he also learns about modern science with its fruitful research methods. He gains respect for this fruitfulness. At the same time, he feels weak in the face of the achievements of the modern spirit. Only strong minds will presume to fight against this feeling; and they will also succeed in suppressing it. They will remain faithful to the true faith, to the true sentiments of their fathers, namely the Fathers of the Church, and will speak out courageously: The Church knows no progress. The others will unite black and white and, like Schell, say: "Catholicism means the covenant of peace between reason and faith, between research and revelation, without degrading and humiliating the Logos: For Christianity is the religion of the Spirit and the Logos! The true spirit of religion and holiness is only that spirit which proceeds from the word of truth." This is how those who feel a sense of shame - perhaps dormant in their unconscious - when they are seen as an opponent of progress speak.

The word "progress" has a suggestive effect on today's educated people, be they theologians, scholars, politicians, etc. How rare are the people who are proud to think "anti-progressively". Friedrich Nietzsche was one of the opponents of progress: "Progress is merely a modern idea, that is, a false idea. The European of today remains in his values deeply inferior to the European of the Renaissance; further development is by no means with any necessity increase, intensification, intensification." These sentences are found in one of the most anti-Christian books that has ever been written. But they are in a book written by a truly independent spirit. The book "Catholicism as a Principle of Progress", however, was devised by a mind that is dependent on two sides: on the spirit of true Catholicism and on a false shame that prevents it from denying the claims of anti-Catholic science. It must be described as Catholic in the true sense of the word when the author says: "Catholic is a name that does not merely designate the central church and conservative Christianity in its firmly organized world existence from time-honoured tradition, but a name that expresses a high principle, a God-given task: To realize the kingdom of God in spirit and in truth among all peoples, and indeed through all peoples and national characters, and thus to carry out Christianity in the Church really whole and full,genuine and true. " UnCatholic, however, and only out of reverence for anti-Catholic science, it is said: "The concept of God of arbitrary omnipotence, which manifests its supreme ruling power precisely in the most frequent possible breaking of the laws of nature and the mad chaos of uncontrollable forces, has no basis in reason and cannot be scientifically proven. Only God as the omnipotent realization of the perfect spiritual life, as the eternal omnipotence of infinite wisdom and holiness itself, can be proven to be an indispensable truth in the face of unbelief and makes all superstition unacceptable from the ground up." This sentence strikes me as if it had been spoken by a Haeckelian, not a professor of Catholic theology in Würzburg. A God as the realization of the perfect spiritual life, as the epitome of wisdom and holiness, is something quite different from the personal God of the Catholic, who can, however, break through the laws of nature. This is what the Gospels teach. And a completely anti-Catholic spirit speaks from the words: "Is there any need for a separate principle that everything concerning faith and the goal of life must be mediated by the personal reason and freedom of a reasonable man, by his serious examination of conscience? That is self-evident!" Yes, it is self-evident. But for an unchristian way of thinking. Anyone who takes these words seriously must refuse to bind his thinking with doctrines of faith that are fixed from the outset. But in doing so, he ceases to think catholic.

For the modern thinker, minds like Professor Schell only have a psychological interest. You can learn from them how the most contradictory ideas can live side by side in one head. The example given is particularly instructive because it is typical of a large number of modern theologians and because it shows how little logical training is able to combat the power of human emotions. The mind of the Catholic theologian is certainly trained logically. But what good is all logic if contradictory feelings and emotions develop their power from two sides. Logical thinking then becomes sophistry, which deludes the thinker into believing that things that are eternally hostile to each other can live side by side in the deepest peace.