The Renewal of the Social Organism
GA 24
13. Social Spirit and Socialist Superstition
[ 1 ] In discussing the causes of the modern social movement, people commonly refer to the fact that neither the owner of the means of production nor the worker is in a position to give the product anything based on a direct personal interest in it. The owner has goods produced because they bring him profits; the worker produces them because he is obliged to earn a living. A personal satisfaction in the finished product itself is felt by neither. In fact, one touches a very essential part of the social question when pointing to the lack of any personal relationship between the producers and the goods produced in the modern industrial system. However, one must also be clear that this lack of a personal relation-ship is a necessary consequence of modern technology and the attendant mechanization of labor. It cannot be removed from the economic life itself. Goods produced by extensive division of labor in large industries cannot possibly be as closely associated with the producer as were the products of the medieval craftsman. One will have to accept the fact that, regarding a large part of human labor, the kind of interest that previously existed is past and gone. However, one should also be clear that without interest, a man cannot work; if life compels him to do so, he feels his whole existence to be dreary and unsatisfying.
[ 2 ] Whoever is honestly disposed toward the social movement must think of finding some other interest to replace the one that is gone. He will not be in a position to do so, however, if he insists on making the economic process the single main substance of the social organism, and on making the legal system and the cultural life a sort of appendage of the economy. An enormous economic conglomerate regulated according to the Marxist plan with the political and cultural orders as “ideological superstructure,” would make human life a torment because of the ensuing lack of interest in any sort of work. Those who want to introduce an enormous conglomerate of this kind do not reflect on the fact that, while one can arouse a certain amount of enthusiasm for such an aim through the excitement of the struggle to attain it, the excitement ends as soon as this aim is realized, and people thus fitted into the wheels of an impersonal social machine are inevitably drained of everything resembling a will to live. That such an aim is able to arouse enthusiasm in wide masses of the populace is merely a result of the waning interest in the products of labor that has not been replaced by the growth of any other interest.
To arouse such an interest should be the special business of those who presently, through their inherited share in spiritual culture, remain in a position to think beyond merely economic interests to those things that constitute the social good. These people must teach themselves to see that there are two spheres of interest that must take the place of the old interest in the actual work. In a social order based on division of labor, the work one performs, while affording no satisfaction for its own sake, may nevertheless satisfy through the interest one takes in those for whom one per-forms it. Such an interest must, however, be developed in living community. A legal system in which every individual stands as an equal among equals arouses one's interest in one's fellows. One works in such a system for the others because one gives to this relationship between oneself and others a Iiving foundation. From the economic order one learns only what others demand of one. Within a vital legal and political life, the value one man has for the other springs from the depths of human nature itself, and goes beyond our merely needing each other in order to produce commodities meeting various needs.
[ 3 ] This is one sphere of interest that arises from a legal system independent of economic life. To this must be added a second. A human existence that must derive the substance of its cultural life from the economic system will prove unsatisfying when there is insufficient interest in the products of the work—even though people's interest in one another is suitably fostered within the sphere of rights. For in the end it must dawn upon people that they commerce with one another only for the sake of commerce. Commerce acquires a meaning only when it is seen to serve something in human life that extends beyond economics, something quite independent of all commerce. Work that gives no intrinsic satisfaction will acquire worth if performed by one of whom it can be said, when viewed from a higher spiritual standpoint, that he is striving toward ends of which his economic activity is only the means. This view of life from a spiritual stand-point can be acquired only within a self-subsistent spiritual-cultural branch of the social organism. A spiritual-cultural life that is a “superstructure” erected upon the economy, manifests itself merely as a means to economic ends.
[ 4 ] The complicated form of modern industry, with its mechanization of human labor, requires a free, self-subsistent spiritual-cultural life as a necessary counterbalance. Earlier epochs in human history could bear the fusion of economic interests and cultural impulses because industry had not yet fallen prey to mechanization. If human nature is not to succumb to this mechanization, whenever human beings stand within the mechanized system of labor, their souls must always be able to rise freely into communion with the higher worlds into which they feel themselves transported by a free spiritual-cultural life.
[ 5 ] It would be short-sighted to reply to the proposal of a free spiritual-cultural life and the independent sphere of rights demanded by human equality that neither would over-come economic inequalities, which are the most oppressive of all. For the modern economic system has led to these in-equalities because it has never, as yet, allowed to develop apart from it the legal system and the cultivation of the spirit that it requires. The Marxist mind believes that each form of economic production prepares the way for the next and higher one, and that when this preparatory process is concluded, then through “evolution” the higher form must necessarily replace the lower one. Actually, the modern form of production did not evolve from old economic methods, but rather from the legal forms and the cultural perspectives of an earlier age. However, while giving a new form to economic life, these latter have themselves grown old and need to be rejuvenated. Of all forms of superstition the worst is to declare that rights and culture can be conjured out of the forms of economic production. Such a superstition darkens not only the human mind, but life itself. It diverts our spirit from its own source by offering an illusory source in the nonspiritual. We are all too ready to be deluded by those who tell us that spirit arises of itself out of nonspirit; for we fancy by this delusion to save ourselves the exertions we must acknowledge to be necessary when we perceive that the spirit is only to he won by toil of spirit.
Sozialer Geist und sozialistischer Aberglaube
[ 1 ] Wenn die Ursachen der modernen sozialen Bewegung besprochen werden, so weist man unter anderem darauf hin, daß weder der Besitzer der Produktionsmittel noch der Arbeiter an denselben in der Lage ist, dem Erzeugnis etwas mitzuteilen, was aus einem unmittelbaren persönlichen Interesse an demselben stammt. Der Besitzer der Produktionsmittel läßt die Erzeugnisse herstellen, weil sie ihm Gewinn bringen; der Arbeiter, weil er seinen Lebensunterhalt verdienen muß. Eine Befriedigung an dem hergestellten Produkte als solchem hat weder der eine noch der andere. Man trifft in der Tat einen wesentlichen Teil der sozialen Frage, indem man in dieser Art auf den Mangel eines persönlichen Verhältnisses der Erzeuger zu ihren Erzeugnissen in der modernen Wirtschaftsordnung hindeutet. Aber man wird sich auch bewußt werden müssen, daß dieser Mangel die notwendige Folge der neueren Technik und der damit verbundenen Mechanisierung der Arbeitsweise ist. Er kann innerhalb des Wirtschaftslebens selbst nicht beseitigt werden. Was im Großbetrieb bei weitgehender Arbeitsteilung hergestellt wird, kann dem Hersteller nicht so nahe liegen wie dem mittelalterlichen Handwerker sein Produkt. Man wird sich damit abfinden müssen, daß für einen großen Teil der menschlichen Arbeit die Art des Interesses, die früher vorhanden war, dahin ist. Man sollte aber auch darüber sich klar sein, daß der Mensch nicht ohne Interesse arbeiten kann. Zwingt ihn das Leben dazu, so fühlt er sein Dasein als öde und unbefriedigend.
[ 2 ] Wer es ehrlich mit der sozialen Bewegung meinen will, der muß daran denken, für das hingeschwundene Interesse ein anderes zu finden. Man wird dazu aber nicht imstande sein, wenn man den Wirtschaffsprozeß zum alleinigen Inhalt des sozialen Organismus und die rechtliche Ordnung und das geistige Leben zu einer Art Anhang desselben machen will. In einer marxistisch geregelten wirtschaftlichen Großgenossenschaft mit Rechtsordnung und Geistesleben als «ideologischen Überbau» müßte die völlige Interesselosigkeit an aller Arbeit das Menschenleben zur Qual machen. Die eine solche Großgenossenschaft herbeiführen wollen, bedenken nicht, daß zwar einige Begeisterung erweckt werden kann, durch den Reiz des Strebens nach einem solchen Ziele, daß aber, sobald es verwirklicht ist, dieser Reiz aufhört und das Eingespanntsein in einen unpersönlichen Gesellschaftsmechanismus alles aus den Menschen auspumpen müßte, das im Lebenswillen sich offenbart. Daß ein derartiges Ziel breite Volksmassen begeistern kann, ist nur ein Ergebnis davon, daß mit dem Schwinden des Interesses an den Arbeitsprodukten nicht das Wachstum eines anderen Interesses Platz gegriffen hat. - Die Erweckung eines solchen Interesses müßten sich diejenigen zur Aufgabe machen, die gegenwärtig durch ihren vererbten Anteil an der Geistesbildung noch in der Lage sind, über die bloß wirtschaftlichen Bedürfnisse des Menschen hinaus an gesellschaftliche Güter denken zu können. Diese müßten zur Einsicht sich bequemen, daß zwei Interessenkreise an die Stelle des alten - an der Arbeit treten müssen. In einer auf Arbeitsteilung beruhenden Gesellschaftsordnung kann die Arbeit auch dann, wenn sie um ihrer selbst willen nicht befriedigt, dies dadurch, daß man sie verrichtet um des Interesses willen, das man an denen hat, für welche man sie leistet. Dieses Interesse aber muß in lebendiger Gemeinschaft entwickelt werden. Eine Rechtsordnung, in welcher der einzelne Mensch als gleicher unter gleichen darinnen steht, erweckt das Interesse für die Mitmenschen. Man arbeitet in einer solchen Ordnung für die andern, weil man das Verhältnis seiner selbst zu ihnen lebendig begründet. Aus der Wirtschaftsordnung heraus wird man nur gewahr, was die andern von einem verlangen; in der lebendigen Rechtsordnung wird der eine dem andern wertvoll aus Quellen der Menschennatur heraus, die sich damit nicht erschöpfen, daß die Menschen einander brauchen, um für die Bedürfnisse die entsprechenden Güter zu schaffen.
[ 3 ] Zu diesem Interessenkreis, der aus einer gegenüber dem Wirtschaftsleben selbständigen Rechtsordnung sich ergibt, muß noch ein anderer treten. Ein Menschendasein, dessen geistiger Inhalt aus der Wirtschaftsordnung sich ergeben soll, kann bei mangelndem Interesse an den Arbeitsprodukten auch dann noch nicht befriedigen, wenn das Interesse des einen Menschen an dem andern durch die Rechtsordnung gepflegt wird. Denn es müßte zuletzt doch die Erkenntnis aufdämmern, daß man gegenseitig für einander bloß um des Wirtschaftens wirtschafte. Das Wirtschaften erhält seinen Sinn nur, wenn es sich dienstbar zeigt einem Inhalt des Menschenlebens, der über das Wirtschaften hinaus liegt, und welcher von dem Wirtschaften ganz unabhängig sich offenbart. Die Arbeit, die um ihrer selbst willen nicht befriedigt, wird wertvoll, wenn sie in einem Leben verrichtet wird, das von einem höheren geistigen Gesichtspunkte aus so aufgefaßt werden kann, daß der Mensch Zielen zustrebt, zu denen dasWirtschaftsleben nur das Mittel ist. Ein solcher geistiger Gesichtspunkt ist nur aus einem selbständigen Geistesgliede des sozialen Organismus heraus zu gewinnen. Ein Geistesleben, das der «Überbau» der Wirtschaftsordnung ist, erscheint nur als das Mittel des Wirtschaftslebens.
[ 4 ] Die Kompliziertheit des modernen Wirtschaftens mit seiner Mechanisierung der menschlichen Arbeit macht als Gegenpol das freie selbständige Geistesleben notwendig. Frühere Lebensepochen der Menschheit vertrugen die Verschmelzung von Wirtschaftsinteressen mit geistigen Antrieben, weil die Wirtschaft der Mechanisierung noch nicht verfallen war. Soll der Mensch in dieser Mechanisierung nicht untergehen, so muß seine Seele sich jederzeit, während er in der mechanischen Arbeitsordnung drinnen steht, frei erheben können zu den Zusammenhängen, in die er aus einem freien Geistesleben heraus sich versetzt fühlt.
[ 5 ] Kurzsichtig ist, wer dem Hinweis auf das freie Geistesleben und die von der Menschengleichheit geforderte selbständige Rechtsordnung die Meinung entgegenstellt: diese beiden können doch die vor allem bedrückende wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit nicht überwinden. Denn die Wirtschaftsordnung der neueren Zeit hat zu dieser Ungleichheit dadurch geführt, daß sie die Rechtsordnung und die Geistespflege, auf die sie angewiesen ist, noch nicht zur Seite gehabt hat. Das marxistische Denken glaubt, daß jede wirtschaftliche Produktionsform durch sich selbst die folgende als die höhere vorbereitet, und daß, wenn dieser Vorbereitungsprozeß abgeschlossen ist, durch die «Entwickelung» diese höhere an die Stelle der niederen treten müsse. In Wahrheit hat die neuere Produktionsform sich nicht aus dem alten Wirtschaften heraus entwickelt, sondern aus den Rechtsformen und den geistigen Vorstellungsarten einer alten Zeit. Diese selbst aber sind, während sie die Wirtschaftsform erneuert haben, veraltet und bedürfen der Verjüngung. Von allen Arten des Aberglaubens ist derjenige der schlimmste, der behauptet, man könne Recht und Geist aus der wirtschaftlichen Produktionsform hervorzaubern. Denn er verdunkelt nicht bloß das menschliche Vorstellen, sondern das Leben selbst. Er verhindert, daß der Geist sich zu seinem Quell wende, weil er ihm einen Scheinquell in dem Ungeistigen entdecken will. Der Mensch aber läßt sich nur allzu leicht täuschen, wenn man ihm davon spricht, daß der Geist aus dem Ungeist von selbst entstehe; denn durch diese Täuschung glaubt er sich von der Anstrengung befreit, die er als notwendig anerkennen muß, wenn er einsieht, daß der Geist nur durch den Geist erarbeitet werden kann.
Social spirit and socialist superstition
[ 1 ] When the causes of the modern social movement are discussed, it is pointed out, among other things, that neither the owner of the means of production nor the worker on the same is in a position to impart to the product anything that derives from a direct personal interest in it. The owner of the means of production has the products manufactured because they bring him profit; the worker because he has to earn his living. Neither the one nor the other derives satisfaction from the manufactured product as such. In fact, an essential part of the social question is met by pointing in this way to the lack of a personal relationship between the producers and their products in the modern economic order. But one must also be aware that this lack is the necessary consequence of the newer technology and the mechanization of the way of working connected with it. It cannot be eliminated within economic life itself. What is produced in a large company with an extensive division of labor cannot be as close to the manufacturer as the medieval craftsman was to his product. We will have to accept the fact that for a large part of human labor the kind of interest that used to exist is gone. But we should also realize that man cannot work without interest. If life forces him to do so, he feels that his existence is dull and unsatisfactory.
[ 2 ] Whoever wants to be honest with the social movement must think of finding another interest for the one that has disappeared. But one will not be able to do so if one wants to make the economic process the sole content of the social organism and the legal order and intellectual life a kind of appendix to it. In a Marxist-regulated large-scale economic cooperative with legal order and spiritual life as an "ideological superstructure", the complete lack of interest in all work would have to turn human life into torture. Those who want to bring about such a large-scale cooperative do not consider that, although some enthusiasm can be aroused by the attraction of striving for such a goal, as soon as it is realized this attraction ceases and being locked into an impersonal social mechanism would have to pump out of people everything that reveals itself in the will to live. That such a goal can inspire broad masses of people is only a result of the fact that with the waning of interest in the products of labor, the growth of another interest has not taken hold. - The awakening of such an interest should be the task of those who, through their inherited share of intellectual education, are still in a position to think of social goods beyond the mere economic needs of man. They would have to come to the realization that two circles of interest must take the place of the old one - in work. In a social order based on the division of labor, work, even if it does not satisfy for its own sake, can do so by being performed for the sake of the interest one has in those for whom one performs it. This interest, however, must be developed in a living community. A legal system in which the individual stands as an equal among equals awakens interest in his fellow human beings. In such an order, one works for others because one establishes one's own relationship to them in a living way. In the economic order, one is only aware of what others demand of one; in the living legal order, one becomes valuable to another from sources of human nature that are not limited to the fact that people need each other in order to create the corresponding goods for their needs.
[ 3 ] In addition to this circle of interests, which arises from a legal system that is independent of economic life, there must be another. A human existence whose spiritual content is to result from the economic order cannot satisfy a lack of interest in the products of labor even if the interest of one person in another is cultivated by the legal order. For in the end the realization would have to dawn that people do business for each other merely for the sake of doing business. Economic activity acquires its meaning only when it shows itself to be of service to a content of human life which lies beyond economic activity, and which reveals itself quite independently of economic activity. Work, which is not satisfying for its own sake, becomes valuable when it is performed in a life that can be understood from a higher spiritual point of view in such a way that man strives towards goals to which economic life is only the means. Such a spiritual point of view can only be gained from an independent spiritual life of the social organism. A spiritual life, which is the "superstructure" of the economic order, appears only as the means of economic life.
[ 4 ] The complexity of the modern economy with its mechanization of human labour makes the free, independent spiritual life necessary as a counterbalance. Earlier epochs of human life tolerated the fusion of economic interests with spiritual drives because the economy had not yet succumbed to mechanization. If man is not to perish in this mechanization, his soul must be able to rise free to the contexts into which he feels himself transported from a free spiritual life at all times while he is inside the mechanical order of work.
[ 5 ] Short-sighted is he who opposes the reference to the free spiritual life and the independent legal order demanded by human equality with the opinion that these two cannot overcome the above all oppressive economic inequality. For the economic order of modern times has led to this inequality by the fact that it has not yet had the legal order and the cultivation of the mind, on which it depends, at its side. Marxist thought believes that each economic form of production prepares by itself the next as the higher, and that, when this preparatory process is completed, this higher must take the place of the lower through "development". In truth, the newer form of production has not developed out of the old economy, but out of the legal forms and the mental conceptions of an old age. These themselves, however, while they have renewed the economic form, are obsolete and need rejuvenation. Of all superstitions, the worst is that which claims that law and spirit can be conjured out of the economic form of production. For it darkens not merely the human imagination, but life itself. It prevents the spirit from turning to its source, because it wants to discover a pseudo-source for it in the unspiritual. But man is all too easily deceived when he is told that the spirit arises of its own accord from the unspiritual; for through this deception he believes himself freed from the effort which he must acknowledge as necessary when he realizes that the spirit can only be worked out through the spirit.