Riddles of the Soul
GA 21
6. The Physical and Spiritual Dependencies of Man's Being
[ 1 ] I would also like now to sketch out what I have discovered about the relations of the soul element to the physical-bodily element. I can indeed state that I am describing here the results of a thirty-year-long spiritual-scientific investigation. Only in recent years has it become possible for me to grasp the pertinent elements in thoughts expressible in words in such a way that I could bring what I was striving for to a provisional conclusion. I would also like to allow myself to present the results of my investigation in the form of indications only. It is fully possible to substantiate these results with the scientific means available today. This would be the subject of a lengthy book, which circumstances do not allow me to write at this time.
[ 2 ] If one is seeking the relation of the soul element to the bodily element, one cannot base oneself upon Brentano's division of our soul experiences—described on page 69ff. of this book—into mental picturing, judging, and the phenomena of loving and hating. In the search for the pertinent relations, this division leads to such a skewing of the relevant circumstances that one cannot obtain results that accord with the facts. In an investigation like ours, one must take one's start from the division rejected by Brentano: into mental picturing,1Vorstellen here is virtually synonymous with “thinking.” Ed. feeling, and willing. If one now draws together all of the soul element that is experienced as mental picturing, and seeks the bodily processes with which this soul element is related, one finds the appropriate connection by being able to link up, to a considerable extent, with the results of today's physiological psychology. The bodily counterparts of the soul element of mental picturing are to be found in the processes of the nervous system, with its extensions into the sense organs on the one hand and into the internal organization of the body on the other. No matter how much, from the anthroposophical viewpoint, one will have to think many things differently than modern science does, this science does provide an excellent foundation.
This is not the case when one wishes to determine the bodily counterparts of feeling and willing. With respect to them one must first pave the right path within the realm of the findings of today's physiology. If one has achieved the right path, one finds that just as one must relate mental picturing to nerve activity, so one must also relate feeling to that life rhythm which is centered in the breathing activity and is connected with it. In doing so one must bear in mind that, for our purposes, one must follow the breathing rhythm, with all that is connected with it, right into the most peripheral parts of our organization. In order to achieve concrete results in this region, the results of physiological research must be pursued in a direction that is still quite unusual today. Only when one accomplishes this will all those contradictions disappear which result at first when feeling and the breathing rhythm are brought together. What at first inspires contradiction turns out, upon deeper study, to be a proof of this relation.
Let us just take one example from the extensive region that must be explored here. The experience of music is based on feeling. The content of musical configurations, however, lives in our mental picturing,2In German, Vorstellen. Please recall that this means “a placing before oneself inwardly,” not necessarily as a visual image. Ed. which is transmitted through the perceptions of hearing. Through what does the musical feeling experience arise? The mental picture of the tone configuration, which is based on the organ of hearing and on a nerve process, is not yet this musical experience. This latter arises through the fact that in the brain the breathing rhythm—in its extension up into this organ—encounters what is accomplished by the ear and nervous system. And the soul lives then not merely in what is heard and pictured; it lives in the breathing rhythm; it experiences what is released in the breathing rhythm through the fact that what is occurring in the nervous system strikes upon this rhythmical life, so to speak. One need only see the physiology of the breathing rhythm in the right light and one will arrive at a comprehensive recognition of the statement: The soul has feeling experiences by basing itself upon the breathing rhythm in the same way it bases itself, in mental picturing, upon nerve processes.
And relative to willing one finds that it is based, in a similar way, upon metabolic processes. Here again, one must include in one's study all the pertinent ramifications and extensions of the metabolic processes within the entire organism. Just as, when something is mentally pictured, a nerve process occurs upon which the soul becomes conscious of its mental picturing, and just as, when something is felt, a modification of the breathing rhythm takes place through which a feeling arises in the soul: so, when something is willed, a metabolic process happens, which is the bodily foundation for what is experienced in the soul as willing.
Now, in the soul a fully conscious, wakeful experience is present only with respect to the mental picturing mediated by our nervous system. What is mediated by the breathing rhythm lives in ordinary consciousness with about the same intensity as dream pictures. To this belongs everything of a feeling nature: all emotions, passions, and so on. Our willing, which is based on metabolic processes, is experienced in a degree of consciousness no higher than that present in the completely dim consciousness of our sleeping state. A more detailed study of the pertinent facts will show that we experience our willing in a completely different way than our mental picturing. We experience the latter the way one sees a colored surface, as it were; we experience willing as a kind of black area upon a colored field. We see something within the area where no color is, in fact, because, in contrast with its surroundings from which color impressions go forth, no such impressions come to meet us: We can picture willing mentally because, within the soul's experiences of mental pictures, at certain places, a non-picturing inserts itself that places itself into our fully conscious experience the same way, in sleep, interruptions of consciousness place themselves into the conscious course of life. The manifoldness in our soul experience—in mental picturing, feeling, and willing—results from these different kinds of conscious experience.
In his book Guidelines of Physiological Psychology, Theodor Ziehen is led to significant characterizations of feeling and willing. In many ways, this book is a prime example of today's natural-scientific way of regarding the connection between the physical and the psychic elements in man. Mental picturing, in all its different forms, is brought into the same connection with the nervous system that the anthroposophical viewpoint also must recognize. About feeling, however, Ziehen says:
Almost without exception, earlier psychology regarded the emotions as the manifestations of a particular independent soul capacity. Kant placed the feeling of pleasure and pain, as a particular soul faculty, between the capacity for knowledge and the capacity for desire, and emphasized explicitly that any further tracing of these three soul capacities back to a common ground was not possible. In contrast to this view, our previous discussions have already shown that feelings of pleasure and pain do not exist at all in this kind of independence, but rather arise only as characteristics or traits—as the so-called nuances of feeling—of sensations and mental pictures.
So this way of thinking ascribes to feeling no independence in our soul life; it sees in feeling only a trait of mental picturing. The result is that it regards not only our life in mental picturing but also our feeling life as being founded upon nerve processes. For it, the nervous system is that part of the body to which the whole soul element is assigned. But this way of thinking, after all, is based on the fact that unconsciously it has already thought up in advance what it wants its findings to be. It grants the status of "soul element" only to what is related to nerve processes, and therefore must regard what cannot be assigned to the nervous system—feeling—as having no independent existence, as being a mere attribute of mental picturing. Anyone who does not set off in the wrong direction with his concepts in this manner and is unbiased in his soul observations will recognize the independence of our feeling life in the most definite way; and secondly, the unbiased evaluation of physiological knowledge will give the insight that feeling must be assigned to the breathing rhythm in the way described above.
The natural-scientific way of thinking denies to will any independent being within our soul life. Will does not even have the status—as feeling does—of being an attribute of mental picturing. But this denial is also based only on the fact that one wants to assign everything of a real soul nature to nerve processes. Now one cannot, however, relate willing in its own particular nature to actual nerve processes. Precisely when one works this through with exemplary clarity as Theodore Ziehen does, can one be impelled to the view that the analysis of soul processes in their relation to the life of the body “offers no cause to assume any separate will capacity.” And yet: unbiased observation of the soul compels one to recognize an independent life of will; and a realistic insight into physiological findings shows that willing as such must not be brought into relation to nerve processes but rather to metabolic processes.
If one wishes to create clear concepts in this realm, one must view physiological and psychological findings in the light demanded by reality; but not in the way this occurs in today's physiology and psychology, where light is shed from preconceptions, definitions, and even in fact from theoretical sympathies and antipathies. Above all, we must take a hard look at the interrelations of nerve activity, breathing rhythm, and metabolic activity. For, these forms of activity do not lie side by side; they lie in one another; they interpenetrate; they go over into each other. MetaboUc activity is present in the entire organism; it permeates the organs of rhythm and of nerve activity. But it is not the bodily foundation of feeling in rhythm; in nerve activity, it is not the basis of mental picturing; rather in both of them, the working will that permeates rhythm and nerves is to be assigned to the metabolic activity. Only a materialistic bias can make a connection between what exists in the nerve as metabolic activity and mental picturing. A study rooted in reality says something completely different. It must recognize that metabolism is present in the nerve insofar as will permeates it. Likewise, metabolism is present in the bodily apparatus of rhythm. The metabolic activity in this apparatus has to do with the will present in this organ. One must connect willing with metabolic activity and feeling with rhythmical occurrences, no matter which organ it is in which metabolism or rhythm appears. In the nerves, however, something completely different from metabolism and rhythm is occurring. The bodily processes in the nervous system that provide the basis of mental picturing are difficult to grasp physiologically. For, where nerve activity occurs, there the mental picturing of ordinary consciousness is present. The reverse is also true, however: where mental picturing is not being done, there no nerve activity is ever to be found, but only metabolic activity in the nerve and a nuance of rhythmical function. Physiology will never arrive at concepts that are in accordance with reality in the study of the nerves as long as it does not understand that true nerve activity absolutely cannot be an object of physiological sense observation. Anatomy and physiology must arrive at the knowledge that they can discover nerve activity only through a method of exclusion. What is not sense-perceptible in the life of the nerve, but whose presence—and even its characteristic way of working—-is proved necessary by what is sense-perceptible: that is nerve activity. One arrives at a positive picture of nerve activity if one looks into that material happening by which the purely soul-spiritual being of a living content of our mental picturing—as described in the first essay of this book—is lamed down into the lifeless mental picturing of ordinary consciousness. Without this concept, which one must introduce into physiology, there is no possibility in that science of stating what nerve activity is. Physiology has developed methods for itself that at present conceal rather than reveal this concept. And even psychology has blocked its own path in this region. Just look, for example, at how Herbartian psychology has worked in this direction. It has turned its gaze only upon the life of our mental picturing, and sees in feeling and willing only effects of our life in mental picturing. But these effects melt away before the approach of knowledge, if at the same time one does not direct one's gaze in an unbiased way upon the reality of feeling and willing. Through such melting away one cannot arrive at any realistic coordinating of feeling and willing with bodily processes.
The body as a whole, not merely the nerve activity included in it, is the physical basis of our soul life. And just as for ordinary consciousness our soul life can be transcribed as mental picturing, feeling, and willing, so can our bodily life as nerve activity, rhythmical function, and metabolic processes.
Immediately the question arises: How does our actual sense perception—which is only an extension of nerve activity— integrate itself into the organism, on the one hand; and on the other hand, how does our ability to move—to which willing leads—integrate itself? Unbiased observation shows that neither belong to the organism in the same sense as nerve activity, rhythmical function, and metabolic processes. What occurs in a sense organ is something that does not belong directly to the organism at all. With our senses we have the outer world stretching like gulfs into the being of the organism. While the soul is encompassing in a sense organ an outer happening, the soul is not taking part in an inner organic happening, but rather in the continuation of the outer happening into the organism. (I mentioned these inner connections epistemologically in a lecture to the Bologna Philosophy Conference in 1911.) 3Published as Seeing with the Soul, Mercury Press, 1996.
In a process of movement we also do not have to do physically with something whose essential being lies inside the organism, but rather with a working of the organism in relationships of balance and forces in which the organism is placed with respect to the outer world. Within the organism, the will is only assigned the role of a metabolic process; but the happening caused by this process is at the same time an actuality within the outer world's interrelation of balance and forces; and by being active in willing, the soul transcends the realm of the organism and participates with its deeds in the happenings of the outer world.
The division of nerves into sensory and motor nerves has created terrible confusion in the study of all these things. No matter how deeply rooted this division may seem to be in today's physiological picture of things, it is not based on unbiased observation. What physiology presents on the basis of nerve severance or of pathological elimination of certain nerves does not prove what appears upon the foundation of experiment or outer experience; it proves something completely different. It proves that the difference is not there at all which one assumes to exist between sensory and motor nerves. On the contrary, both kinds of nerves are of the same nature. The so-called motor nerve does not serve movement in the sense assumed in the teachings of the division theory; rather, as the bearer of nerve activity it serves the inner perception of that metabolic process that underlies our willing, in just the same way as the sensory nerve serves the perception of what takes place in the sense organ. Until the study of the nerves works with clear concepts in this regard, a correct relation of our soul life to the life of the body will not come about.
[ 3 ] In the same way that psycho-physiologically one can seek the relation to the body's life of the soul life that runs its course in mental picturing, feeling, and willing, so one can also strive anthroposophically for knowledge of the relation which the soul element of ordinary consciousness has to spiritual life. And there one discovers through the anthroposophical methods described in this and in my other books, that just as our mental picturing finds a bodily foundation in our nerve activity, so it also finds a basis in the spiritual realm. In the other direction—on the side turned away from the body—the soul stands in a relation to a spiritually real element that is the foundation for the mental picturing of ordinary consciousness. This spiritual element, however, can only be experienced by a seeing cognition. And it is experienced through its content being presented to seeing consciousness as differentiated Imaginations. Just as, toward the body, our mental picturing is based on nerve activity, so from the other side, it streams toward us out of a spiritually real element, revealing itself in Imaginations. This spiritually real element is what is called in my books the etheric or life body. (In speaking about the etheric body I always emphasize expressly that one should take exception neither to the word “body” nor to the word “etheric”; for, what I present shows clearly that one should not interpret the matter in a materialistic sense.) And this life body (in the fourth volume of the first year of the periodical, “Das Reich,” I also used the expression "body of formative forces") is the spiritual element from which our ordinary consciousness' life of mental picturing flows from birth (or conception, as it were) until death.
The feeling in our ordinary consciousness is based, on the bodily side, upon the rhythmical function. From the spiritual side it flows from a spiritually real element that is discovered in anthroposophical research by methods that I call "Inspiration" in my writings. (Again, it should be noted that by this concept I mean only what I have paraphrased in my work; so one should not confuse this term with what lay people understand by this word.) To the seeing consciousness the spiritually real being underlying the soul and attainable to Inspiration is his own spiritual being, transcending birth and death. This is the region where anthroposophy undertakes its spiritual-scientific investigations into the question of human immortality. Just as in the body, through the rhythmic function, the mortal part of man's feeling nature manifests itself, so, in the content of Inspiration of seeing consciousness, does the immortal spiritual core of our soul being manifest.
For seeing consciousness, our willing, which toward the body is based on metabolic processes, streams from the spirit through what in my writings I call “Intuition.” What manifests in the body through the—in a certain way—lowest activity of the metabolism corresponds in the spirit to the highest: what expresses itself through Intuitions. Therefore, mental picturing, which is based on nerve activity, comes almost to full expression in the body; willing shows only a weak reflection in the metabolic processes oriented toward it in the body. Our real mental picturing is the living one; the mental picturing determined by the body is the lamed one. The content is the same. Real willing, even that which realizes itself in the physical world, runs its course in regions accessible only to Intuitive vision; its bodily counterpart has almost nothing to do with this content. Within that spiritually real being that manifests itself to Intuition is contained what extends over from previous earth lives into the following ones. And it is in the realm that comes into consideration here that anthroposophy approaches the questions of repeated earth lives and of destiny.
As the body lives itself out in nerve activity, rhythmical function, and metabolic processes, so the spirit of man lives in what manifests itself in Imaginations, Inspirations, and Intuitions. And as in its realm the body allows for an experience of the nature of its outer world in two directions—in sensory processes, namely, and in processes of movement— so the spirit also: in one direction through the fact that it experiences Imaginatively our mentally picturing soul life, even in ordinary consciousness, and in the other direction through the fact that in willing it unfolds Intuitive impulses that realize themselves in metabolic processes. If one looks toward the body, one finds the nerve activity that lives as the element of mental picturing; if one looks toward the spirit, one becomes aware of the spirit content of Imaginations that flows into this very element of mental picturing. Brentano feels at first the spiritual side of the mental picturing life of the soul; he therefore characterizes this life as a picture life (an imaginative happening). When not merely one's own inner soul life is experienced, however, but also—through judgment—an element of acceptance or rejection, then there is added to our mental picturing a soul experience, flowing from the spirit, whose content remains unconscious as long as we are dealing only with ordinary consciousness, because this content consists of Imaginations of a spiritually real element that underlies the physical object and that only adds to the mental picture the fact that its content exists.
It is for this reason that in his classification Brentano splits our life of mental pictures into mere mental picturing, which only experiences imaginatively an inwardly existing element, and into judging, which experiences imaginatively something given from without, but which brings the experience to consciousness only as an acceptance or rejection. With respect to feeling, Brentano does not look at all at its bodily foundation, the rhythmical function; he only brings into the realm of his attention what arises from Inspirations (that remain unconscious) as loving and hating within the region of ordinary consciousness. Willing escapes his attention completely, however, because his attention wishes to direct itself only upon phenomena in the soul, whereas in willing there lies something that is not enclosed within the soul, something through which the soul experiences also an outer world. Brentano's classification of soul phenomena, therefore, is based on the fact that he divides them according to viewpoints that can be seen in their true light only when one turns one's gaze upon the spiritual core of the soul, and on the fact that he wants to apply his classification only to the phenomena of ordinary consciousness. With what is said here about Brentano I only wished to supplement what was said on this subject on page 74ff.
IV-6. Die physischen und die geistigen Abhängigkeiten der Menschen-Wesenheit
[ 1 ] Skizzenhaft möchte ich nun auch darstellen, was sich mir ergeben hat über die Beziehungen des Seelischen zu dem Physisch-Leiblichen. Ich darf wohl sagen, daß ich damit die Ergebnisse einer dreißig Jahre währenden geisteswissenschaftlichen Forschung verzeichne. Erst in den letzten Jahren ist es mir möglich geworden, das in Frage Kommende so in durch Worte ausdrückbare Gedanken zu fassen, daß ich das Erstrebte zu einer Art vorläufigen Abschlusses bringen konnte Auch davon möchte ich mir gestatten, die Ergebnisse hier nur andeutend darzulegen. Ihre Begründung kann durchaus mit den heute vorhandenen wissenschaftlichen Mitteln gegeben werden. Dies würde der Gegenstand eines umfangreichen Buches sein, das in diesem Augenblicke zu schreiben, mir die Verhältnisse nicht gestatten.
[ 2 ] Sucht man nach der Beziehung des Seelischen zum Leiblichen, dann kann man nicht die von Brentano gegebene auf Seite 86 ff. dieser Schrift gekennzeichnete Gliederung des seelischen Erlebens in Vorstellen, Urteilen und in die Erscheinungen des Liebens und Hassens zugrunde legen. Diese Gliederung führt beim Aufsuchen dieser Beziehungen zu einer solchen Verschiebung aller in Betracht kommenden Verhältnisse, daß man nicht zu sachgemäßen Ergebnissen gelangen kann. Man muß bei einer derartigen Betrachtung von der von Brentano abgewiesenen Gliederung in Vorstellen, Fühlen und Wollen ausgehen. Faßt man nun zusammen alles dasjenige Seelische, das als Vorstellen erlebt wird und sucht man nach den leiblichen Vorgängen, mit denen dieses Seelische in Beziehung zu setzen ist, so findet man den entsprechenden Zusammenhang, indem man dabei in weitgehendem Maße den Ergebnissen der gegenwärtigen physiologischen Psychologie sich anschließen kann. Die körperlichen Gegenstücke zum Seelischen des Vorstellens hat man in den Vorgängen des Nervensystems mit ihrem Auslaufen in die Sinnesorgane einerseits und in die leibliche Innenorganisation andrerseits zu sehen. So sehr man vom anthroposophischen Gesichtspunkte aus manches wird anders zu denken haben, als es die gegenwärtige Wissenschaft tut: eine Grundlage vorzüglicher Art ist in dieser Wissenschaft vorhanden. Nicht so steht es, wenn man die leiblichen Gegenstücke für das Fühlen und Wollen bestimmen will. In bezug darauf muß man sich innerhalb der Ergebnisse gegenwärtiger Physiologie erst den richtigen Weg bahnen. Ist man auf denselben gelangt, so findet man, daß man wie das Vorstellen zur Nerventätigkeit so das Fühlen in Beziehung bringen muß zu demjenigen Lebensrhythmus, der in der Atmungstätigkeit seine Mitte hat und mit ihr zusammenhängt. Man hat dabei zu berücksichtigen, daß man zu dem angestrebten Ziele den Atmungsrhythmus mit allem, was mit ihm zusammenhängt, bis in die äußersten peripherischen Teile der Organisation verfolgen muß. Um auf diesem Gebiete zu konkreten Ergebnissen zu gelangen, müssen die Erfahrungen der physiologischen Forschung in einer Richtung verfolgt werden, welche heute noch vielfach ungewohnt ist. Erst wenn man dies vollbringt, werden alle Widersprüche verschwinden, die sich zunächst ergeben, wenn Fühlen und Atmungsrhythmus zusammengebracht werden. Was zunächst zum Widerspruch herausfordert, wird bei näherem Eingehen zum Beweise für diese Beziehung.
Aus dem weiten Gebiet, das hier verfolgt werden muß, sei nur ein einziges Beispiel herausgehoben. Das Erleben des Musikalischen beruht auf einem Fühlen. Der Inhalt des musikalischen Gebildes aber lebt in dem Vorstellen, das durch die Wahrnehmungen des Gehörs vermittelt wird. Wodurch entsteht das musikalische Gefühls-Erlebnis? Die Vorstellung des Tongebildes, die auf Gehörorgan und Nervenvorgang beruht, ist noch nicht dieses musikalische Erlebnis. Das letztere entsteht, indem im Gehirn der Atmungsrhythmus in seiner Fortsetzung bis in dieses Organ hinein, sich begegnet mit dem, was durch Ohr und Nervensystem vollbracht wird. Und die Seele lebt nun nicht in dem bloß Gehörten und Vorgestellten, sondern sie lebt in dem Atmungsrhythmus; sie erlebt dasjenige, was im Atmungsrhythmus ausgelöst wird dadurch, daß gewissermaßen das im Nervensystem Vorgehende heranstößt an dieses rhythmische Leben. Man muß nur die Physiologie des Atmungsrhythmus im rechten Lichte sehen, so wird man umfänglich zur Anerkennung des Satzes kommen: die Seele erlebt fühlend, indem sie sich dabei ähnlich auf den Atmungsrhythmus stützt wie im Vorstellen auf die Nervenvorgänge.
Und bezüglich des Wollens findet man, daß dieses sich in ähnlicher Art stützt auf Stoffwechselvorgänge. Wieder muß da in Betracht gezogen werden, was alles an Verzweigungen und Ausläufern der Stoffwechselvorgänge im ganzen Organismus in Betracht kommt. Wie dann, wenn etwas «vorgestellt» wird, sich ein Nervenvorgang abspielt, auf Grund dessen die Seele sich ihres Vorgestellten bewußt wird, wie ferner dann, wenn etwas «gefühlt» wird, eine Modifikation des Atmungsrhythmus verläuft, durch die der Seele ein Gefühl auflebt: so geht, wenn etwas «gewollt» wird, ein Stoffwechselvorgang vor sich, der die leibliche Grundlage ist für das als Wollen in der Seele Erlebte.
Nun ist in der Seele ein vollbewußtes waches Erleben nur für das vom Nervensystem vermittelte Vorstellen vorhanden. Was durch den Atmungsrhythmus vermittelt wird, das lebt im gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein in jener Stärke, welche die Traumvorstellungen haben. Dazu gehört alles Gefühlsartige, auch alle Affekte, alle Leidenschaften und so weiter. Das Wollen, das auf Stoffwechselvorgänge gestützt ist, wird in keinem höheren Grade bewußt erlebt als in jenem ganz dumpfen, der im Schlafe vorhanden ist. Man wird bei genauer Betrachtung des hier in Frage Kommenden bemerken, daß man das Wollen ganz anders erlebt als das Vorstellen. Das letztere erlebt man wie man etwa eine von Farbe bestrichene Fläche sieht; das Wollen so, wie eine schwarze Fläche innerhalb eines farbigen Feldes. Man «sieht» innerhalb der Fläche, auf der keine Farbe ist, eben deshalb etwas, weil im Gegensatz zu der Umgebung, von der Farben-Eindrücke ausgehen, von dieser Fläche keine solchen Eindrücke kommen: man «stellt das Wollen vor», weil innerhalb der Vorstellungs-Erlebnisse der Seele an gewissen Stellen sich ein Nicht-Vorstellen einfügt, das sich in das vollbewußte Erleben hineinstellt ähnlich wie die im Schlafe zugebrachten Unterbrechungen des Bewußtseins in den bewußten Lebenslauf. Aus diesen verschiedenen Arten des bewußten Erlebens ergibt sich die Mannigfaltigkeit des seelischen Erfahrens in Vorstellen, Fühlen und Wollen.
Theodor Ziehen wird in seinem Buche «Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie» zu bedeutungsvollen Kennzeichnungen des Gefühls und des Wollens geführt. Dies Buch ist in mancher Beziehung mustergiltig für die gegenwärtige naturwissenschaftliche Betrachtungsart des Zusammenhanges von Physischem und Psychischem. Das Vorstellen in seinen verschiedenen Gestaltungen wird zu dem Nervenleben in die Beziehung gesetzt, die man auch vom anthroposophischen Gesichtspunkte anerkennen muß. Doch über das Gefühl sagt Ziehen (vergleiche 9. Vorlesung in seinem genannten Buche): «Die ältere Psychologie betrachtet fast ausnahmslos die Affekte als die Kundgebungen eines besonderen, selbständigen Seelenvermögens. Kant stellte das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust als besondere Seelenfähigkeit zwischen das Erkenntnisvermögen und das Begehrungsvermögen und betonte ausdrücklich, daß eine weitere Ableitung dieser drei Seelenvermögen aus einem gemeinschaftlichen Grunde nicht möglich sei. Demgegenüber haben unsere bisherigen Erörterungen uns bereits gelehrt, daß die Gefühle der Lust und Unlust in dieser Selbständigkeit gar nicht existieren, daß sie vielmehr nur als Eigenschaften oder Merkmale von Empfindungen und Vorstellungen als sogenannte Gefühlstöne auftreten.»
Diese Denkungsart gesteht also dem Fühlen keine Selbständigkeit im Seelenleben zu; sie sieht in ihm nur eine Eigenschaft des Vorstellens. Die Folge davon ist, daß sie nicht nur das Vorstellungsleben, sondern auch das Gefühlsleben von den Nervenvorgängen gestützt sein läßt. Für sie ist das Nervenleben das Leibliche, dem das gesamte Seelische zugeeignet wird. Doch beruht diese Denkungsart im Grunde darauf, daß sie in unbewußter Art schon das vorausdenkt, was sie finden will. Sie läßt als Seelisches nur dasjenige gelten, was zu Nervenvorgängen in Beziehung steht, und muß aus diesem Grunde dasjenige, was nicht dem Nervenleben sich zueignen läßt, das Fühlen, als nicht selbständig existierend ansehen, als bloßes Merkmal des Vorstellens.
Wer sich nicht in dieser Weise mit seinen Begriffen in eine falsche Richtung bringt, dem wird erstens eine unbefangene Seelenbeobachtung die Selbständigkeit des Gefühlslebens in der bestimmtesten Art ergeben, zweitens wird ihm die vorurteilslose Verwertung der physiologischen Erkenntnisse die Einsicht verschaffen, daß das Fühlen in der oben angedeuteten Weise dem Atmungsrhythmus zuzueignen ist.
Dem Wollen spricht die naturwissenschaftliche Denkungsart alles selbständig Wesenhafte im Seelenleben ab. Dieses gilt ihr nicht einmal wie das Fühlen als Merkmal des Vorstellens. Aber dieses Absprechen beruht auch nur darauf, daß man alles Wesenhaft-Seelische den Nervenvorgängen zueignen will (vergleiche die 15. Vorlesung in Theodor Ziehens «Physiologischer Psychologie»). Nun kann man aber das Wollen in seiner besonderen Eigenart nicht auf eigentliche Nervenvorgänge beziehen. Gerade wenn man dies mit der musterhaften Klarheit herausarbeitet, wie es Theodor Ziehen tut, kann man zu der Ansicht hingedrängt werden, die Analyse der Seelenvorgänge in ihrer Beziehung zum Leibesleben «ergibt keinen Anlaß zur Annahme eines besonderen Willensvermögens». Und doch: die unbefangene Seelenbetrachtung erzwingt die Anerkennung des selbständigen Willenlebens; und die sachgemäße Einsicht in die physiologischen Ergebnisse zeigt, daß das Wollen als solches nicht zu Nervenvorgängen, sondern zu Stoffwechselvorgängen in Beziehung gesetzt werden muß.
Wenn man auf diesem Gebiete klare Begriffe schaffen will, dann muß man die physiologischen und psychologischen Ergebnisse in dem Lichte sehen, das durch die Wirklichkeit gefordert wird; nicht aber so, wie es in der gegenwärtigen Physiologie und Psychologie vielfach geschieht, in einer Beleuchtung, welche aus vorgefaßten Meinungen, Definitionen, ja sogar theoretischen Sympathien und Antipathien stammt. Vor allem ist scharf ins Auge zu fassen das Verhältnis von Nerventätigkeit, Atmungsrhythinus und Stoffwechseltätigkeit. Denn diese Tätigkeitsformen liegen nicht neben-, sondern ineinander, durchdringen sich, gehen ineinander über. Stoffwechseltätigkeit ist im ganzen Organismus vorhanden; sie durchdringt die Organe des Rhythmus und diejenigen der Nerventätigkeit. Aber im Rhythmus ist sie nicht die leibliche Grundlage des Fühlens, in der Nerventätigkeit nicht diejenige des Vorstellens; sondern in beiden ist ihr die den Rhythmus und die Nerven durchdringende Willenswirksamkeit zuzueignen. Was im Nerv als Stoffwechseltätigkeit existiert, kann nur ein materialistisches Vorurteil mit dem Vorstellen in eine Beziehung setzen. Die in der Wirklichkeit wurzelnde Betrachtung sagt etwas ganz anderes. Sie muß anerkennen, daß im Nerv Stoffwechsel vorhanden ist, insofern ihn das Wollen durchdringt. Ebenso ist es in dem leiblichen Apparat für den Rhythmus. Was in ihm Stoffwechseltätigkeit ist, hat mit dem in diesem Organ vorhandenen Wollen zu tun. Man muß mit der Stoffwechseltätigkeit das Wollen, mit dem rhythmischen Geschehen das Fühlen in Zusammenhang bringen, gleichgiltig, in welchen Organen sich Stoffwechsel oder Rhythmus offenbaren. In den Nerven aber geht noch etwas ganz anderes vor sich als Stoffwechsel und Rhythmus. Die leiblichen Vorgänge im Nervensystem, welche dem Vorstellen die Grundlage geben, sind physiologisch schwer zu fassen. Denn, wo Nerventätigkeit stattfindet, da ist Vorstellen des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins vorhanden. Der Satz gilt aber auch umgekehrt: wo nicht vorgestellt wird, da kann nie Nerventätigkeit gefunden werden, sondern nur Stoffwechseltätigkeit im Nerven, und andeutungsweise rhythmisches Geschehen.
Die Physiologie wird nie zu Begriffen kommen, die für die Nervenlehre wirklichkeitsgemäß sind, solange sie nicht einsieht, daß die wahrhaftige Nerventätigkeit überhaupt nicht Gegenstand der physiologischen Sinnesbeobachtung sein kann. Anatomie und Physiologie müssen zu der Erkenntnis kommen, daß sie die Nerventätigkeit nur durch eine Methode der Ausschließung finden können. Was im Nervenleben nicht sinnlich beobachtbar ist, wovon aber das Sinnesgemäße die Notwendigkeit seines Vorhandenseins ergibt und auch die Eigenheit seiner Wirksamkeit, das ist Nerventätigkeit. Zu einer positiven Vorstellung über die Nerventätigkeit kommt man, wenn man in ihr dasjenige materielle Geschehen sieht, durch das im Sinne des ersten Kapitels dieser Schrift die rein geistig-seelische Wesenhaftigkeit des lebendigen Vorstellungsinhaltes zu dem unlebendigen Vorstellen des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins herabgelähmt wird. Ohne diesen Begriff, den man in die Physiologie einführen muß, wird in dieser keine Möglichkeit bestehen, zu sagen, was Nerventätigkeit ist. Die Physiologie hat Methoden sich ausgebildet, welche gegenwärtig diesen Begriff eher verdecken als ihn offenbaren. Und auch die Psychologie hat sich auf diesem Gebiete den Weg versperrt. Man sehe nur, wie zum Beispiel die Herbartsche Psychologie in dieser Richtung gewirkt hat. Sie hat den Blick nur auf das Vorstellungsleben geworfen, und sieht in Fühlen und Wollen nur Wirksamkeiten des Vorstellungslebens. Aber diese Wirksamkeiten zerrinnen vor der Erkenntnis, wenn man nicht zu gleicher Zeit den Blick unbefangen auf die Wirklichkeit des Fühlens und Wollens richtet. Man kommt durch solches 158 Zerrinnen zu keiner wirklichkeitsgemäßen Zuordnung des Fühlens und Wollens zu den leiblichen Vorgängen.
Der Leib als Ganzes, nicht bloß die in ihm eingeschlossene Nerventätigkeit ist physische Grundlage des Seelenlebens. Und wie das letztere für das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein sich umschreiben läßt durch Vorstellen, Fühlen und Wollen, so das leibliche Leben durch Nerventätigkeit, rhythmisches Geschehen und Stoffwechselvorgänge.
Sogleich entsteht da die Frage: wie ordnen sich in den Organismus ein auf der einen Seite die eigentliche Sinneswahrnehmung, in welche die Nerventätigkeit nur ausläuft, und wie die Bewegungsfähigkeit auf der andern Seite, in welche das Wollen mündet? Unbefangene Beobachtung zeigt, daß beides nicht in demselben Sinne zum Organismus gehört wie Nerventätigkeit, rhythmisches Geschehen und Stoffwechselvorgänge. Was im Sinn geschieht ist etwas, das gar nicht unmittelbar dem Organismus angehört. In die Sinne erstreckt sich die Außenwelt wie in Golfen hinein in das Wesen des Organismus. Indem die Seele das im Sinne vor sich gehende Geschehen umspannt, nimmt sie nicht an einem inneren organischen Geschehen teil, sondern an der Fortsetzung des äußeren Geschehens in den Organismus hinein. (Ich habe diese Verhältnisse erkenntnis kritisch in einem Vortrag für den Bologner Philosophen-Kongreß des Jahres 1911 erörtert.)
Und in einem Bewegungsvorgang hat man es physisch auch nicht mit etwas zu tun, dessen Wesenhaftes innerhalb des Organismus liegt, sondern mit einer Wirksamkeit des Organismus in den Gleichgewichts- und Kräfteverhältnissen, in die der Organismus gegenüber der Außenwelt hineingestellt ist. Innerhalb des Organismus ist dem Wollen nur ein Stoffwechselvorgang zuzueignen; aber das durch diesen Vorgang ausgelöste Geschehen ist zugleich ein Wesenhaftes innerhalb der Gleichgewichts- und Kräfteverhältnisse der Außenwelt; und die Seele übergreift, indem sie sich wollend betätigt, den Bereich des Organismus und lebt mit ihrem Tun das Geschehen der Außenwelt mit. Eine große Verwirrung hat für die Betrachtung aller dieser Dinge die Gliederung der Nerven in Empfindungs- und motorische Nerven angerichtet. So fest verankert diese Gliederung in den gegenwärtigen physiologischen Vorstellungen erscheint: sie ist nicht in der unbefangenen Beobachtung begründet. Was die Physiologie vorbringt auf Grund der Zerschneidung der Nerven, oder der krankhaften Ausschaltung gewisser Nerven beweist nicht, was auf Grundlage des Versuches oder der Erfahrung sich ergibt, sondern etwas ganz anderes. Es beweist, daß der Unterschied gar nicht besteht, den man zwischen Empfindungs- und motorischen Nerven annimmt. Beide Nervenarten sind vielmehr Wesensgleich. Der sogenannte motorische Nerv dient nicht in dem Sinne der Bewegung wie die Lehre von dieser Gliederung es annimmt, sondern als Träger der Nerventätigkeit dient er der inneren Wahrnehmung desjenigen Stoffwechselvorganges, der dem Wollen zugrunde liegt, geradeso wie der Empfindungsnerv der Wahrnehmung desjenigen dient, was im Sinnesorgan sich abspielt. Bevor die Nervenlehre in dieser Beziehung mit klaren Begriffen arbeitet, wird eine richtige Zuordnung des Seelenlebens zum Leibesleben nicht zustand kommen.
[ 3 ] In ähnlicher Art, wie man psycho-physiologisch die Beziehungen des in Vorstellen, Fühlen und Wollen verlaufenden Seelenlebens zum Leibesleben suchen kann, so kann man anthroposophisch nach Erkenntnis der Beziehungen streben, welche das Seelische des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins zum Geistesleben hat. Und da findet man durch die in dieser und in meinen anderen Schriften geschilderten anthroposophischen Methoden, daß sich für das Vorstellen wie im Leibe die Nerventätigkeit, so im Geistigen eine Grundlage findet. Die Seele steht nach der anderen, vom Leibe abgewandten, Seite in Beziehung zu einem geistig Wesenhaften, das die Grundlage ist für das Vorstellen des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins. Dieses geistig Wesenhafte kann aber nur durch schauendes Erkennen erlebt werden. Und es wird so erlebt, indem sich sein Inhalt als gegliederte Imaginationen dem schauenden Bewußtsein darstellt. Wie nach dem Leibe hin das Vorstellen auf der Nerventätigkeit ruht, so strömt es von der andern Seite her aus einem geistig Wesenhaften, das in Imaginationen sich enthüllt. Dieses geistig Wesenhafte ist, was in meinen Schriften der Äther- oder Lebensleib genannt wird. (Wobei, wenn ich es bespreche, ich immer darauf aufmerksam mache, daß man sich an dem Ausdruck «Leib» ebensowenig wie an dem andern «Äther» stoßen solle, denn, was ich ausführe, zeigt klar, daß man das Gemeinte nicht im materialistischen Sinne deuten soll.) Und dieser Lebensleib (in dem 4. Buch des 1. Jahrganges der Zeitschrift «Das Reich» habe ich auch den Ausdruck «Bildekräfteleib» gebraucht) ist das Geistige, aus dem das Vorstellungsleben des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins von der Geburt (beziehungsweise Empfängnis) bis zum Tode erfließt.
Das Fühlen des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins ruht nach der Leibesseite hin auf dem rhythmischen Geschehen. Von der geistigen Seite her erfließt es aus einem Geistig-Wesenhaften, das innerhalb der anthroposophischen Forschung durch Methoden gefunden wird, welche ich in meinen Schriften als diejenigen der Inspiration kennzeichne. (Wobei man wieder berücksichtigen möge, daß ich innerhalb dieses Begriffes nur das von mir Umschriebene verstehe, so daß man meine Bezeichnung nicht verwechseln sollte mit dem, was oft vom Laien bei diesem Worte verstanden wird.) Dem schauenden Bewußtsein offenbart sich in dem der Seele zugrunde liegenden, durch Inspirationen zu erfassenden geistig Wesenhaften dasjenige, was dem Menschen als Geistwesen eigen ist über Geburt und Tod hinaus. Auf diesem Gebiete ist es, wo die Anthroposophie ihre geisteswissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen über die Unsterblichkeitsfrage anstellt. So wie im Leibe durch das rhythmische Geschehen sich der sterbliche Teil des fühlenden Menschenwesens offenbart, so in dem Inspirations-Inhalt des schauenden Bewußtseins der unsterbliche geistige Seelenwesenskern.
Das Wollen, das nach dem Leibe hin auf den Stoffwechselvorgängen beruht, erströmt aus dem Geiste für das schauende Bewußtsein durch dasjenige, was ich in meinen Schriften die wahrhaftigen Intuitionen nenne. Was im Leibe durch die gewissermaßen niederste Betätigung des Stoffwechsels sich offenbart, dem entspricht im Geiste ein Höchstes: dasjenige, was durch Intuitionen sich ausspricht. Daher kommt das Vorstellen, das auf der Nerventätigkeit beruht, leiblich fast vollkommen zur Darstellung; das Wollen hat in den ihm leiblich zugeordneten Stoffwechselvorgängen nur einen schwachen Abglanz. Das wirkliche Vorstellen ist das lebendige; das leiblich bedingte ist das abgelähmte. Der Inhalt ist derselbe. Das wirkliche Wollen, auch das in der physischen Welt sich verwirklichende, verläuft in den Regionen, die nur dem intuitiven Schauen zugänglich sind; sein leibliches Gegenstück hat mit seinem Inhalte fast gar nichts zu tun. In demjenigen geistig Wesenhaften, das der Intuition sich offenbart, ist enthalten, was sich aus vorangegangenen Erdenleben in die folgenden hinübererstreckt. Und auf dem hier in Betracht kommenden Gebiet ist es, wo die Anthroposophie sich den Fragen der wiederholten Erdenleben und der Schicksalsfrage nähert. Wie der Leib in Nerventätigkeit, rhythmischem Geschehen und Stoffwechselvorgängen sich auslebt, so der Geist des Menschen in demjenigen, was in Imaginationen, Inspirationen, Intuitionen sich offenbart. Und wie der Leib in seinem Bereich nach zwei Seiten das Wesen seiner Außenwelt miterleben läßt, nämlich in den Sinnes- und den Bewegungsvorgängen, so der Geist nach der einen Seite hin, indem er das vorstellende Seelenleben auch im gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein imaginativ erlebt; und nach der andern Seite hin, indem er im Wollen intuitive Impulse ausgestaltet, die sich durch Stoffwechselvorgänge verwirklichen. Sieht man nach dem Leibe hin, so findet man die Nerventätigkeit, die als Vorstellungswesen lebt; sieht man nach dem Geiste hin, so gewahrt man den Geist-Inhalt der Imaginationen, der in eben dieses Vorstellungswesen einfließt.
Brentano empfindet zunächst die geistige Seite am vorstellenden Seelenleben; daher charakterisiert er dieses Leben als Bildleben (imaginatives Geschehen). Aber wenn nicht bloß ein eigenes Seelen-Inneres erlebt wird, sondern durch das Urteil ein Anzuerkennendes oder zu Verwerfendes, so kommt zum Vorstellen hinzu ein aus dem Geiste fließendes Seelenerlebnis, dessen Inhalt unbewußt bleibt, so lange es sich nur um das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein handelt, weil er in den Imaginationen von einer dem physischen Objekte zugrunde liegenden geistigen Wesenhaftigkeit besteht, die zu der Vorstellung nur das hinzufügen, daß deren Inhalt existiert. Aus diesem Grunde ist es, daß Brentano das Vorstellungsleben in seiner Klassifikation spaltet, in das bloße Vorstellen, das nur innerlich Daseiendes imaginativ erlebt; und in das Urteilen, das von außen Gegebenes imaginativ erlebt, aber das Erlebnis nur als Anerkennung oder Verwerfung sich zum Bewußtsein bringt. Gegenüber dem Fühlen blickt Brentano gar nicht nach der Leibes-Grundlage, dem rhythmischen Geschehen hin, sondern er versetzt nur dasjenige in den Bereich seiner Aufmerksamkeit, was aus unbewußt bleibenden Inspirationen im Gebiet des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins als Lieben und Hassen auftritt. Das Wollen aber entfällt ganz seiner Aufmerksamkeit, weil dieses sich nur auf Erscheinungen in der Seele richten will, in dem Wollen aber etwas liegt, was nicht in der Seele beschlossen ist, sondern mit dem die Seele eine Außenwelt miterlebt. Die Brentanosche Klassifikation der Seelenphänomene beruht also darauf, daß er diese nach Gesichtspunkten gliedert, die ihre wahre Beleuchtung erfahren, wenn man den Blick nach dem Geist-Kerne der Seele lenkt, und daß er doch damit treffen will die Phänomene des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins. Mit dem hier über Brentano Gesagten habe ich noch ergänzen wollen das oben Seite 90 ff. in dieser Beziehung über ihn Ausgesprochene.
IV-6 The physical and spiritual dependencies of the human being
[ 1 ] I would now like to sketch out what I have discovered about the relationship between the soul and the physical body. I may well say that I am recording the results of thirty years of research in the humanities. It is only in the last few years that it has become possible for me to put into words the thoughts that come into question in such a way that I have been able to bring what I have striven for to a kind of provisional conclusion I would also like to take the liberty of presenting the results here only in outline. Their justification can certainly be given with the scientific means available today. This would be the subject of an extensive book, which circumstances do not allow me to write at this time.
[ 2 ] If one is looking for the relationship of the soul to the body, then one cannot take as a basis the division of mental experience into imagination, judgment and the phenomena of love and hate, as given by Brentano on page 86 ff. of this book. This division leads to such a displacement of all the relationships under consideration that it is impossible to arrive at appropriate results. In such a consideration one must proceed from the division into imagination, feeling and volition rejected by Brentano. If we now summarize all the mental aspects that are experienced as imagination and search for the bodily processes with which this mental aspect is to be related, we find the corresponding connection, in that we can largely follow the results of current physiological psychology. The physical counterparts to the soul of the imagination are to be seen in the processes of the nervous system with their outflow into the sense organs on the one hand and into the bodily inner organization on the other. However much one may have to think differently from the anthroposophical point of view than present-day science does, a foundation of an excellent kind is present in this science. This is not the case when one wants to determine the bodily counterparts of feeling and willing. In this respect one must first find the right path within the results of present-day physiology. Once we have arrived at this path, we find that we must relate feeling to that rhythm of life which has its center in respiratory activity and is connected with it, just as imagination is related to nervous activity. It must be borne in mind that in order to achieve the desired goal, the respiratory rhythm and everything connected with it must be pursued right down to the outermost peripheral parts of the organization. In order to achieve concrete results in this field, the experiences of physiological research must be pursued in a direction that is still often unfamiliar today. Only when this is accomplished will all the contradictions that initially arise when feeling and respiratory rhythm are brought together disappear. What initially provokes contradiction becomes proof of this relationship on closer inspection.
From the broad field that must be pursued here, only a single example should be highlighted. The experience of music is based on a feeling. The content of the musical image, however, lives in the imagination, which is conveyed through the perceptions of the ear. How does the musical emotional experience arise? The imagination of the sound image, which is based on the organ of hearing and the nervous process, is not yet this musical experience. The latter arises when the respiratory rhythm in its continuation into this organ meets in the brain with what is accomplished by the ear and nervous system. And now the soul does not live in what is merely heard and imagined, but it lives in the respiratory rhythm; it experiences that which is triggered in the respiratory rhythm by the fact that what is happening in the nervous system, as it were, pushes against this rhythmic life. One only has to see the physiology of the respiratory rhythm in the right light, then one will comprehensively come to the recognition of the sentence: the soul experiences feeling by relying on the respiratory rhythm in a similar way as it relies on the nervous processes in imagination.
And with regard to volition, we find that it relies in a similar way on metabolic processes. Again, we must consider all the branches and offshoots of the metabolic processes in the whole organism. Just as, when something is "imagined", a nervous process takes place on the basis of which the soul becomes conscious of what it has imagined, just as, when something is "felt", a modification of the respiratory rhythm takes place through which a feeling comes to life in the soul: so, when something is "willed", a metabolic process takes place which is the bodily basis for what is experienced as volition in the soul.
Now a fully conscious awake experience is present in the soul only for the imagination mediated by the nervous system. That which is mediated by the respiratory rhythm lives in ordinary consciousness with the same strength as dream images. This includes all feelings, all emotions, all passions and so on. The volition, which is based on metabolic processes, is not experienced consciously to any greater degree than in that very dull state which is present in sleep. On closer examination of what is in question here, it will be noticed that volition is experienced quite differently from imagination. One experiences the latter as one sees a surface covered with color; the volition as one sees a black surface within a colored field. One "sees" something within the surface on which there is no color precisely because, in contrast to the surroundings from which color impressions emanate, no such impressions come from this surface: one "imagines the volition" because within the imaginative experiences of the soul at certain points a non-imagining is inserted, which introduces itself into the fully conscious experience in a similar way to the interruptions of consciousness during sleep in the conscious course of life. These different types of conscious experience give rise to the diversity of mental experience in imagination, feeling and volition.
In his book "Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie" (Guide to Physiological Psychology), Theodor Ziehen is led to meaningful descriptions of feeling and volition. In many respects, this book is exemplary for the current scientific approach to the relationship between the physical and the psychological. Imagination in its various forms is placed in a relationship to nervous life that must also be recognized from the anthroposophical point of view. But Ziehen says about feeling (compare the 9th lecture in his book mentioned above): "The older psychology almost without exception regards the affects as the manifestations of a special, independent faculty of the soul. Kant placed the feeling of pleasure and displeasure as a special faculty of the soul between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire and expressly emphasized that a further derivation of these three faculties of the soul from a common ground was not possible. On the other hand, our previous discussions have already taught us that the feelings of pleasure and displeasure do not exist in this independence, that they rather only appear as qualities or characteristics of sensations and ideas as so-called emotional tones."
This way of thinking therefore does not grant feeling any independence in the life of the soul; it sees it only as a property of the imagination. The consequence of this is that it allows not only the imaginative life but also the emotional life to be supported by the nervous processes. For them, the nervous life is the corporeal, to which the entire soul is assigned. But this way of thinking is basically based on the fact that it already thinks ahead in an unconscious way what it wants to find. It only accepts as mental that which is related to nervous processes, and for this reason must regard that which cannot be attributed to nervous life, feeling, as not existing independently, as a mere characteristic of imagination.
Whoever does not in this way misdirect himself with his concepts will, firstly, by an unbiased observation of the soul reveal the independence of the emotional life in the most definite way; secondly, the unprejudiced utilization of physiological knowledge will provide him with the insight that feeling is to be attributed to the respiratory rhythm in the manner indicated above.
The scientific way of thinking denies that volition has any independent essence in the life of the soul. It does not even regard it as a characteristic of imagination, as it does feeling. But this denial is also only based on the fact that one wants to attribute everything that is essential to the soul to nervous processes (compare the 15th lecture in Theodor Ziehen's "Physiological Psychology"). Now, however, volition in its particular character cannot be related to actual nervous processes. It is precisely when this is worked out with exemplary clarity, as Theodor Ziehen does, that one can be forced to the view that the analysis of the processes of the soul in their relationship to bodily life "gives no reason to assume a special volitional faculty". And yet: the unbiased observation of the soul forces the recognition of the independent life of the will; and the proper insight into the physiological results shows that the will as such must not be related to nervous processes, but to metabolic processes.
If one wants to create clear concepts in this field, then one must see the physiological and psychological results in the light that is demanded by reality; but not, as is often the case in contemporary physiology and psychology, in an illumination that stems from preconceived opinions, definitions, even theoretical sympathies and antipathies. Above all, the relationship between nervous activity, respiratory rhythms and metabolic activity must be brought into sharp focus. For these forms of activity are not juxtaposed, but interpenetrate and merge into one another. Metabolic activity is present in the whole organism; it permeates the organs of rhythm and those of nervous activity. But in rhythm it is not the bodily basis of feeling, in nervous activity not that of imagination; but in both it is to be attributed the volitional activity that permeates rhythm and nerves. What exists in the nerve as metabolic activity can only be related to imagination by a materialistic prejudice. An observation rooted in reality says something quite different. It must recognize that metabolism is present in the nerve insofar as volition permeates it. It is the same in the bodily apparatus for rhythm. What is metabolic activity in it has to do with the will present in this organ. We must associate volition with metabolic activity and feeling with rhythmic activity, regardless of the organs in which metabolism or rhythm manifest themselves. In the nerves, however, something quite different takes place than metabolism and rhythm. The bodily processes in the nervous system, which provide the basis for imagination, are difficult to grasp physiologically. For where nervous activity takes place, there is imagination of ordinary consciousness. However, the reverse is also true: where there is no imagination, there can never be found nervous activity, but only metabolic activity in the nerves, and rhythmic events to some extent.
Physiology will never arrive at concepts that are realistic for neuroscience as long as it does not realize that true nervous activity cannot be the subject of physiological sensory observation at all. Anatomy and physiology must come to the realization that they can only find nervous activity by a method of exclusion. That which is not sensually observable in nervous life, but of which the sensory results in the necessity of its existence and also the peculiarity of its activity, that is nervous activity. One arrives at a positive conception of nervous activity if one sees in it that material happening by which, in the sense of the first chapter of this writing, the purely spiritual-soulful essentiality of the living content of the imagination is paralyzed down to the inanimate imagination of ordinary consciousness. Without this concept, which must be introduced into physiology, it will be impossible to say what nervous activity is. Physiology has developed methods which at present conceal rather than reveal this concept. And psychology has also blocked the way in this field. Just look at how Herbartian psychology, for example, has worked in this direction. It has looked only at the life of imagination, and sees in feeling and willing only the effects of the life of imagination. But these efficacies melt away before cognition if one does not at the same time direct one's gaze impartially to the reality of feeling and willing. Through such distortion, one does not arrive at a realistic assignment of feeling and willing to bodily processes.
The body as a whole, not merely the nervous activity enclosed within it, is the physical basis of the life of the soul. And just as the latter can be described for ordinary consciousness by imagination, feeling and volition, so bodily life can be described by nervous activity, rhythmic events and metabolic processes.
The question immediately arises: how do the actual sensory perception, into which the nervous activity only flows, and the ability to move, into which the volition flows, fit into the organism? Impartial observation shows that both do not belong to the organism in the same sense as nervous activity, rhythmic events and metabolic processes. What happens in the senses is something that does not belong directly to the organism. The outside world extends into the senses, as in golf, into the essence of the organism. By encompassing the events taking place in the senses, the soul does not participate in an inner organic event, but in the continuation of the outer event into the organism. (I discussed these relationships critically in a lecture for the Bologna Congress of Philosophers in 1911.)
And in a process of movement we are not dealing physically with something whose essence lies within the organism, but with an effectiveness of the organism in the balance and power relations in which the organism is placed in relation to the outside world. Within the organism, only a metabolic process can be attributed to volition; but the event triggered by this process is at the same time an essential being within the relations of equilibrium and forces of the external world; and the soul, by volitional activity, transcends the realm of the organism and lives with its activity the events of the external world. The division of the nerves into sensory and motor nerves has caused great confusion in the consideration of all these things. As firmly anchored as this division appears in current physiological concepts, it is not based on unbiased observation. What physiology puts forward on the basis of the cutting up of the nerves, or the pathological elimination of certain nerves, proves not what results from experiment or experience, but something quite different. It proves that the difference that is assumed to exist between sensory and motor nerves does not exist at all. On the contrary, both kinds of nerves are essentially the same. The so-called motor nerve does not serve movement in the sense assumed by the doctrine of this division, but as the carrier of nervous activity it serves the inner perception of that metabolic process which underlies volition, just as the sensory nerve serves the perception of that which takes place in the sense organ. Until the theory of nerves works with clear concepts in this respect, a correct assignment of the life of the soul to the life of the body will not be possible.
[ 3 ] In a similar way that one can search psycho-physiologically for the relationships between the life of the soul, which proceeds in imagination, feeling and volition, and the life of the body, one can strive anthroposophically for knowledge of the relationships that the soul of ordinary consciousness has to spiritual life. And there, through the anthroposophical methods described in this and my other writings, one finds that there is a basis for the imagination in the spiritual as there is in the nervous activity of the body. The soul stands on the other side, facing away from the body, in relation to a spiritual entity which is the basis for the imagination of ordinary consciousness. However, this spiritual essence can only be experienced through visual cognition. And it is experienced in such a way that its content presents itself to the seeing consciousness as structured imaginations. Just as the imagination rests on nervous activity towards the body, so it flows from the other side out of a spiritual essence that reveals itself in imaginations. This spiritual entity is what is called in my writings the etheric or vital body. (Whereby, when I discuss it, I always point out that one should not be offended by the term "body" any more than by the other "ether", for what I explain clearly shows that what is meant should not be interpreted in a materialistic sense). And this life-body (in the 4th book of the 1st volume of the journal "Das Reich" I also used the expression "body of formative forces") is the spiritual, from which the imaginative life of the ordinary consciousness flows from birth (or conception) to death.
The feeling of the ordinary consciousness rests on the rhythmic events on the bodily side. From the spiritual side it flows from a spiritual essence which is found within anthroposophical research through methods which I characterize in my writings as those of inspiration. (Whereby one should again bear in mind that within this term I understand only that which I have paraphrased, so that one should not confuse my designation with that which is often understood by the layman with this word). That which is inherent in man as a spiritual being beyond birth and death is revealed to the observing consciousness in the spiritual essence underlying the soul and which can be grasped through inspiration. It is in this area that anthroposophy conducts its spiritual-scientific investigations into the question of immortality. Just as the mortal part of the sentient human being reveals itself in the body through the rhythmic events, so does the immortal spiritual soul essence in the inspirational content of the seeing consciousness.
The volition, which is based on the metabolic processes in the body, flows out of the spirit for the seeing consciousness through what I call in my writings the true intuitions. That which reveals itself in the body through the lowest, so to speak, activity of metabolism, corresponds to a highest in the spirit: that which expresses itself through intuitions. Therefore imagination, which is based on nervous activity, is almost completely expressed in the body; volition has only a faint reflection in the metabolic processes associated with it in the body. The real imagination is the living one; the bodily conditioned one is the paralyzed one. The content is the same. The real volition, even that which realizes itself in the physical world, runs in the regions which are only accessible to intuitive vision; its bodily counterpart has almost nothing to do with its content. The spiritual essence that reveals itself to intuition contains that which extends from previous earthly lives into subsequent ones. And it is in the field under consideration here that anthroposophy approaches the questions of repeated earth lives and the question of destiny. Just as the body lives itself out in nervous activity, rhythmic events and metabolic processes, so does the spirit of man in that which reveals itself in imaginations, inspirations and intuitions. And just as the body in its sphere allows the essence of its external world to be experienced on two sides, namely in the processes of sense and movement, so the spirit on the one side, by experiencing the imaginative life of the soul also in ordinary consciousness imaginatively; and on the other side, by developing intuitive impulses in the will, which are realized through metabolic processes. If we look towards the body, we find the nervous activity that lives as the imaginative being; if we look towards the spirit, we see the spiritual content of the imaginations, which flows into this very imaginative being.
Brentano initially perceives the spiritual side of the imaginative life of the soul; he therefore characterizes this life as a pictorial life (imaginative event). But if not only an inner soul is experienced, but through the judgement something to be acknowledged or rejected, then a soul experience flowing from the spirit is added to the imagining, the content of which remains unconscious as long as it is only a matter of ordinary consciousness, because it consists in the imaginations of a spiritual beingness underlying the physical object, which only add to the imagination that its content exists. It is for this reason that Brentano divides the life of imagination in his classification into pure imagination, which only imaginatively experiences what exists internally; and judgment, which imaginatively experiences what is given externally, but only brings the experience to consciousness as recognition or rejection. In contrast to feeling, Brentano does not look at the basis of the body, the rhythmic events, but only brings into the sphere of his attention that which arises from unconscious inspirations in the realm of ordinary consciousness as love and hate. The wanting, however, is completely omitted from his attention, because this only wants to direct itself to phenomena in the soul, but in the wanting lies something that is not decided in the soul, but with which the soul co-experiences an external world. Brentano's classification of the phenomena of the soul is thus based on the fact that he organizes them according to points of view that experience their true illumination when one directs one's gaze to the spirit-core of the soul, and that he nevertheless wants to hit the phenomena of ordinary consciousness. With what I have said here about Brentano, I have wanted to supplement what has been said about him above on page 90 ff.