Riddles of the Soul
GA 21
3. The Abstractness of Our Concepts
[ 1 ] In this essay, I speak about the "laming" of our mental pictures when they merely copy sense-perceptible reality.
The real facts behind the working of abstraction in our cognitive process are to be sought in this laming. The human being forms concepts about sense-perceptible reality. For epistemology [the science that investigates our knowing activity] the question arises: How does what man retains in his soul as a concept of a real being or process relate to this real being or process? Is what I carry around in me as concept of a wolf equivalent to any reality, or is it merely a schema, formed by my soul, which I have made for myself by noting (abstracting) the characteristics of one or another wolf, but which does not correspond to anything in the real world? This question received extensive consideration in the medieval dispute between the Nominalists and the Realists. For the Nominalists, the only thing real about a wolf is the visible substance, flesh, blood, bones, etc., present in this one particular wolf. The concept “wolf” is “merely” a mental summation of characteristics common to the various wolves. The Realist replies to this: Any substance you find in a particular wolf is also present in other animals. There must be something else in addition that orders substance into the living coherency found in a wolf. This ordering real element is given through the concept.
One must admit that Vincenz Knauer, the outstanding expert on Aristotle and medieval philosophy, said something exceptional in his book The Main Problems of Philosophy (Vienna, 1892) when discussing Aristotelian epistemology:
A wolf, for example, does not consist of any material components different from those of a lamb; its material corporeality is built up out of the lamb flesh it has assimilated; but the wolf does not become a lamb, even if it eats nothing but lamb its whole life long. What makes it into a wolf, therefore, must obviously be something other than hyle, sense-perceptible matter; and indeed it must not and cannot be any mere thing of thought, although it is accessible only to thinking and not to the senses; it must be something working [productive] and therefore actual—something very real.
But how, in the sense of a merely anthropological investigation, could one wish to attain the reality indicated here? What is communicated to the soul by the senses does not produce the concept “wolf.” But what is present in ordinary consciousness as this concept is definitely not something “working” [productive]. Through the power of this concept, the assembling of the sense-perceptible materials united in a wolf could certainly not occur. The truth is that this question takes anthropology beyond the limits of its ability to know. Anthroposophy shows that along with the relation of man to wolf in the sense-perceptible realm, there exists another one as well. This other relation, in its own particular, direct nature, does not enter our ordinary consciousness. But this relation does exist as a living supersensible connection between man and the object he perceives with his senses. The living element that exists in man through this connection is lamed, reduced to a “concept” by his intellectual organization. The abstract mental picture is this real element—which has died in order to present itself to ordinary consciousness—in which man does live during sense perception, but whose living quality does not become conscious. The abstractness of our mental pictures is caused by an inner necessity of the soul. Reality gives man something living. He deadens that part of this living element which enters his ordinary consciousness. He does so because he could not achieve self-consciousness in his encounter with the outer world if he had to experience his actual connection to this outer world in its full vitality. Without the laming of this full vitality, man would have to recognize himself as one part within a unity extending beyond his human limits; he would be an organ of a greater organism.
The way man lets his cognitive process turn, inwardly, into the abstractness of concepts is not caused by something real lying outside of him, but rather by the developmental requirements of his own being, which demand that, in his process of perception, he dampen down his living connection with the outer world into these abstract concepts that provide the foundation upon which self-consciousness arises. The fact that this is so reveals itself to the soul after the development of its spiritual organs. Through this development, the living connection with a spiritual reality lying outside man is reestablished; but if self-consciousness were not already something acquired by ordinary consciousness, self-consciousness could not be developed within a seeing consciousness.1Das schauende Bewusstsein: i.e., a consciousness that not only thinks the spirit but sees it with spiritual organs as well. Translator. One can understand from this that a healthy ordinary consciousness is the necessary prerequisite for a seeing consciousness. Someone who believes himself able to develop a seeing consciousness without an active and healthy ordinary consciousness is very much in error. In fact, ordinary normal consciousness must accompany seeing consciousness at every moment; otherwise the latter would bring disorder into human self-consciousness and therefore into man's relation to reality. Anthroposophy, with its seeing knowledge, can have to do only with this kind of consciousness, but not with any dimming down of ordinary consciousness.e1Editor's addendum: On January 27, 1923, in Dornach, Rudolf Steiner had the following to say about "concepts" and the Scholastic “Realists”:
The Realists said: The ideas, concepts, and forms in which sense-perceptible matter is ordered are realities. To be sure, for the Schoolmen, these ideas and concepts had already become abstractions. But they considered these abstractions to be something real because their abstractions were descendants of earlier, much more concrete and substantial views. In an earlier age, human beings did not look merely upon the concept “wolf.” They looked upon the real group soul “wolf” present in the spiritual world. This was a real being. For the Schoolmen, this real being had grown insubstantial and become an abstract concept. But in spite of this, the Realistic Schoolmen still had the feeling that the concept was not empty of content, but rather contained something real.
This real element, to be sure, was descended from earlier beings who were totally real. But one still sensed the kinship, in exactly the same way that Plato experienced his ideas—which also were much more alive and substantial than the medieval Scholastic ideas—as descended from the old Persian archangelic beings who, as Amshaspands, lived and worked in the universe. Those were very real beings. For Plato, they were already hazy, and for the medieval Schoolmen they were abstractions. That was the last stage at which the ancient clairvoyance had arrived. Certainly, medieval Realistic Scholasticism was no longer based on clairvoyance; but what it had preserved in its traditions as real concepts and ideas—living everywhere in stones, plants, animals, and physical human beings—was still regarded, in fact, as something spiritual, no matter how diluted that spiritual element had become. The Nominalists—because in fact the age of abstraction, of intellectualism, was approaching—had already become aware that they were no longer able to connect something real to ideas or concepts. For them, concepts and ideas were mere names to make categorization easier.
IV-3. Von der Abstraktheit der Begriffe
[ 1 ] Auf Seite 26 dieser Schrift spreche ich von der «Herablähmung» der Vorstellungen, wenn diese zu Nachbildnern einer sinnenfälligen Wirklichkeit werden.
In dieser «Herablähmung» ist die wirkliche Tatsache zu suchen, die dem Verfahren der Abstraktion im Erkenntnisprozeß zugrunde liegt. Der Mensch bildet sich über die sinnenfällige Wirklichkeit Begriffe. Für die Erkenntnistheorie entsteht die Frage, wie sich dasjenige, das der Mensch als Begriff von einem wirklichen Wesen oder Vorgang in seiner Seele zurückbehält, zu diesem wirklichen Wesen oder Vorgang verhält. Hat dasjenige, was ich in mir als den Begriff eines Wolfes herumtrage, irgend eine Beziehung zu einer Wirklichkeit, oder ist es bloß ein von meiner Seele geformtes Schema, das ich mir gebildet habe, indem ich von demjenigen absehe (abstrahiere), was diesem oder jenem Wolfe eigentümlich ist, dem aber in der Welt des Wirklichen nichts entspricht. Eine ausgedehnte Betrachtung erfuhr diese Frage in dem mittelalterlichen Streite zwischen Nominalisten und Realisten. Für den Nominalisten ist an dem Wolf nur wirklich die an diesem als einzelnem Individuum vorhandenen sichtbaren Stoffe, Fleisch, Blut, Knochen usw. Der Begriff «Wolf» ist «bloß» eine gedankliche Zusammenfassung der verschiedenen Wölfen gemeinsamen Merkmale. Der Realist erwidert darauf: irgend ein Stoff, den man am einzelnen Wolf findet, den trifft man auch bei andern Tieren an. Es muß etwas geben, das den Stoff in den lebendigen Zusammenhang hineinordnet, in dem er sich im Wolfe findet. Dieses ordnende Wirkliche ist durch den Begriff gegeben.
Man wird nun zugeben müssen, daß Vincenz Knauer, der hervorragende Kenner des Aristoteles und der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, in seinem Buche «Die Hauptprobleme der Philosophie» (Wien 1892) bei Besprechung der aristotelischen Erkenntnistheorie (Seite 137) etwas Vortreffliches sagt mit den Worten:
«Der Wolf zum Beispiel besteht aus keinen andern materiellen Bestandteilen als das Lamm; seine materielle Leiblichkeit baut sich aus assimiliertem Lammfleisch auf; aber der Wolf wird doch kein Lamm, auch wenn er zeitlebens nichts als Lämmer frißt. Was ihn also zum Wolf macht, das muß selbstverständlich etwas anderes sein als die Hyle, die sinnfällige Materie, und zwar kein bloßes Gedankending muß und kann es sein, obwohl es nur dem Denken, nicht dem Sinne zugängig ist, sondern ein Wirkendes, also Wirkliches, ein sehr Reales.»
Doch wie will man im Sinne einer bloß anthropologischen Betrachtung der Wirklichkeit beikommen, auf die hiemit gedeutet wird? Was durch die Sinne der Seele vermittelt wird, das ergibt nicht den Begriff «Wolf». Was aber im gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein als dieser Begriff vorliegt, das ist sicher kein «Wirkendes». Aus der Kraft dieses Begriffes konnte doch gewiß nicht die Zusammenordnung der im Wolfe vereinigten «sinnfälligen» Materien entstehen. Die Wahrheit ist, daß Anthropologie mit dieser Frage an einem der Grenzorte ihres Erkennens ist. Anthroposophie zeigt, daß außer der Beziehung des Menschen zum Wolfe, die im «Sinnfälligen» vorhanden ist, noch eine andere besteht. Diese tritt in ihrer unmittelbaren Eigenart nicht in das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein ein. Aber sie besteht als ein lebendiger übersinnlicher Zusammenhang zwischen dem Menschen und dem sinnlich angeschauten Objekte. Das Lebendige, das im Menschen durch diesen Zusammenhang besteht, wird durch seine Verstandesorgarisation herabgelähmt zum «Begriff».
Die abstrakte Vorstellung ist das zur Vergegenwärtigung im gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein erstorbene Wirkliche, in dem der Mensch zwar lebt bei der Sinneswahrnehmung, das aber in seinem Leben nicht bewußt wird. Die Abstraktheit von Vorstellungen wird bewirkt durch eine innere Notwendigkeit der Seele. Die Wirklichkeit gibt dem Menschen ein Lebendiges. Er ertötet von diesem Lebendigen denjenigen Teil, der in sein gewöhnliches Bewußtsein fällt. Er vollbringt dieses, weil er an der Außenwelt nicht zum Selbstbewußtsein kommen könnte, wenn er den entsprechenden Zusammenhang mit dieser Außenwelt in seiner vollen Lebendigkeit erfahren müßte. Ohne die Ablähmung dieser vollen Lebendigkeit müßte sich der Mensch als Glied innerhalb einer über seine menschlichen Grenzen hinausreichenden Einheit erkennen; er würde Organ eines größeren Organismus sein. Die Art, wie der Mensch seinen Erkenntnisvorgang nach innen in die Abstraktheit der Begriffe auslaufen läßt, ist nicht bedingt durch ein außer ihm liegendes Wirkliches, sondern durch die Entwickelungsbedingungen seines eigenen Wesens, welche erfordern, daß er im Wahrnehmungsprozeß den lebendigen Zusammenhang mit der Außenwelt abdämpft zu diesen abstrakten Begriffen, welche die Grundlage bilden, auf der das Selbstbewußtsein erwächst. Daß dieses so ist, das zeigt sich der Seele nach der Entwickelung ihrer Geistorgane. Durch diese wird der lebendige Zusammenhang (in dem Sinne, wie das Seite 26 dieser Schrift dargestellt ist) mit einer außer dem Menschen liegenden Geist-Wirklichkeit wieder hergestellt; wenn aber das Selbstbewußtsein nicht bereits ein Erworbenes wäre vom gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein her: es könnte im schauenden Bewußtsein nicht ausgebildet werden. Man kann hieraus begreifen, daß das gesunde gewöhnliche Bewußtsein die notwendige Voraussetzung für das schauende Bewußtsein ist. Wer glaubt, ein schauendes Bewußtsein ohne das tätige gesunde gewöhnliche Bewußtsein entwickeln zu können, der irrt gar sehr. Es muß sogar das gewöhnliche normale Bewußtsein in jedem Augenblicke das schauende Bewußtsein begleiten, weil sonst dies letztere Unordnung in die menschliche Selbstbewußtheit und damit in das Verhältnis des Menschen zur Wirklichkeit brächte. Anthroposophie kann es bei ihrer schauenden Erkenntnis nur mit einem solchen Bewußtsein, nicht aber mit irgend einer Herabstimmung des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins zu tun haben.
IV-3 On the abstractness of concepts
[ 1 ] On page 26 of this paper, I speak of the "paralysis" of concepts when they become imitators of a sensuous reality.
This "paralysis" is the real fact underlying the process of abstraction in the process of cognition. Humans form concepts about sensory reality. For epistemology, the question arises as to how that which man retains in his soul as a concept of a real being or process relates to this real being or process. Does that which I carry around in me as the concept of a wolf have any relation to a reality, or is it merely a schema formed by my soul, which I have formed for myself by abstracting from that which is peculiar to this or that wolf, but to which nothing corresponds in the world of reality. This question was considered at length in the medieval dispute between nominalists and realists. For the nominalists, the only real things about the wolf are the visible substances, flesh, blood, bones, etc. that are present in it as a single individual. The term "wolf" is "merely" a mental summary of the characteristics common to various wolves. The realist replies: any substance found in the individual wolf is also found in other animals. There must be something that organizes the material into the living context in which it is found in the wolf. This ordering reality is given by the concept.
You will now have to admit that Vincenz Knauer, the outstanding expert on Aristotle and medieval philosophy, says something excellent in his book "Die Hauptprobleme der Philosophie" (Vienna 1892) when discussing Aristotelian epistemology (page 137) with the words:
"The wolf, for example, consists of no other material constituents than the lamb; its material corporeality is built up from assimilated lamb meat; but the wolf does not become a lamb, even if it eats nothing but lambs throughout its life. What therefore makes him a wolf must of course be something other than the hyle, the sensuous matter, and indeed it must not and cannot be a mere thought-thing, although it is only accessible to thought, not to the senses, but an actual, therefore real, a very real thing.".
How, however, is one to approach the reality that is being pointed to in the sense of a merely anthropological view? What is conveyed through the senses of the soul does not result in the concept of "wolf". But what is present in ordinary consciousness as this concept is certainly not an "active agent". The power of this concept could certainly not give rise to the arrangement of the "sensible" substances united in the wolf. The truth is that with this question anthropology is at one of the limits of its knowledge. Anthroposophy shows that apart from the relationship of the human being to Wolfe, which is present in the "conspicuousness of meaning", there is another. This does not enter ordinary consciousness in its immediate nature. But it exists as a living supersensible connection between the human being and the sensually perceived object. The living, which exists in man through this connection, is paralysed down to a "concept" through his rationalization.
The abstract concept is the real that has died to visualization in ordinary consciousness, in which the human being lives in sense perception, but which does not become conscious in his life. The abstractness of ideas is brought about by an inner necessity of the soul. Reality gives man a living thing. He kills that part of this living thing which falls into his ordinary consciousness. He accomplishes this because he could not attain self-consciousness in the external world if he had to experience the corresponding connection with this external world in its full vitality. Without the paralysis of this full vitality, man would have to recognize himself as a member within a unity extending beyond his human limits; he would be an organ of a larger organism. The way in which man allows his process of cognition to flow inwards into the abstractness of concepts is not conditioned by something real lying outside him, but by the conditions of development of his own being, which require that in the process of perception he dampens the living connection with the outer world to these abstract concepts, which form the basis on which self-consciousness grows. That this is so is shown to the soul after the development of its mental organs. Through these the living connection (in the sense described on page 26 of this book) with a spirit-reality lying outside the human being is re-established; but if self-consciousness were not already an acquired thing from ordinary consciousness, it could not be formed in the seeing consciousness. One can understand from this that healthy ordinary consciousness is the necessary precondition for the seeing consciousness. Whoever believes that he can develop a seeing consciousness without the active healthy ordinary consciousness is very much mistaken. The ordinary normal consciousness must even accompany the looking consciousness at every moment, because otherwise the latter would bring disorder into human self-consciousness and thus into man's relationship to reality. Anthroposophy can only have to do with such a consciousness in its looking knowledge, but not with any downgrading of the ordinary consciousness.