Riddles of the Soul
GA 21
IV-1. The Philosophical Validation of Anthroposophy
[ 1 ] Anyone who wishes his cognitive approach to be grounded in the philosophical thinking of the present day must justify epistemologically—to himself and to that thinking—the actual soul element referred to in the first chapter of this book. Of the people who recognize the real soul element from direct inner experience and who know how to distinguish it from soul experiences caused by the senses, few are asking for any such justification. Such justification often seems to them to be an unnecessary or even bothersome conceptual hairsplitting. Contrasting with their kind of aversion is the antipathy of philosophical thinkers. They want to regard our inner experience of the soul element as merely subjective, with no claim to scientific value. They therefore have little inclination, in the realm of their philosophical concepts, to seek the elements by which to approach anthroposophical ideas. This aversion, coming from both sides, makes understanding extraordinarily difficult. For, in our time, a scientific value can be ascribed to a cognitive approach only if this approach can validate its views before the same tribunal at which natural-scientific laws seek their justification.
For an epistemological justification of anthroposophical ideas, the essential point is to express in the most exact possible concepts the way these ideas are experienced. We can do this in the most varied ways. Let us attempt to describe two of these ways here. As to the first way, let us start with a consideration of memory. In doing so, we encounter at once a problematical point in modern philosophical knowledge. For, very few clear concepts about the nature of memory are operative there. I will take my start from ideas which, it is true, I have discovered on anthroposophical paths, but which can be thoroughly substantiated by philosophy and physiology. The space I can allow myself in this book, to be sure, is not sufficient for such a substantiation. I hope to present one in a future book. I believe, however, that anyone able to grasp the current findings of physiology and psychology correctly will find what I am going to say about memory to be well-founded.
The mental pictures stimulated by sense impressions enter the realm of unconscious human experience. From there, these pictures can be brought back up; they can be remembered. Mental pictures are of a purely soul nature; but consciousness of them in ordinary waking life is dependent upon the body. Furthermore, the soul bound to the body cannot, through the soul's own forces, lift these pictures out of their unconscious state into a conscious one. For this the soul needs the forces of the body. In ordinary memory the body must be active, just as it must be active in order for sensory pictures to arise in the processes of the sense organs. For me to see a sense-perceptible occurrence, a bodily activity must first develop within the sense organs; produced by them, a picture arises in the soul. For me to remember such a picture, an inner bodily activity (in delicate organs), which is the polar opposite of sense activity, must occur, and as a consequence, the remembered picture arises in the soul. This picture is connected to a sense-perceptible occurrence that stood before my soul in the past. I picture this occurrence through an inner experience that my bodily organization makes possible. Now focus on the nature of such a memory picture. For, through this one can grasp the nature of anthroposophical ideas. These ideas are not memory pictures; but they appear in the soul in the same way as memory pictures do. This is a disappointment for many people who would like to acquire pictures of the spiritual world in a more robust form. But one cannot experience the spiritual world in a form more substantial than that in which, in memory, one experiences a past sense-perceptible event that is no longer visible to one. Now this ability to remember such an event stems from the power of our bodily organization. This organization must play no part, however, in our experience of the actual soul element. Rather, the soul must awaken within itself the ability to accomplish with mental pictures what the body accomplishes with sensory pictures when it conveys the recollection of these sensory pictures. Such mental pictures—which are brought up from the depths of the soul entirely by the power of the soul just as memory pictures are raised from the depths of human nature by our bodily organization— are mental pictures that relate to the spiritual world. They are present in every soul. What must be acquired in order for us to become aware of their presence is the power, purely through the activation of our soul, to bring these mental pictures up from the depths of the soul. As remembered sensory pictures relate to a past sense impression, so these mental pictures relate to a connection—not present in the sense world—of the soul with the spiritual world. The human soul stands in the same relation to the spiritual world as a person ordinarily does to a forgotten reality; and the soul comes to know this world when it awakens powers within itself that are similar to the bodily powers which serve memory.
The essential point, therefore, in the philosophical justification of ideas about the true soul element, is to investigate our inner life in such a way that we find within it an activity which is purely of a soul nature but yet in a certain respect is similar to the activity unfolded in remembering.
[ 2 ] A second way to form a concept of a purely soul element is this. One can focus upon the findings of anthropology when it observes a person exercising will (acting). To begin with, the mental picture of the deed underlies the intended will impulse. This mental picture is known physiologically to be dependent upon the bodily organization (the nervous system). A nuance of feeling, a feeling of sympathy with what is pictured, is connected with the mental picture, and causes the mental picture to provide the impulse for action. But then the soul experience loses itself in the depths and only the result arises again consciously. The human being sees how he moves his body in order to perform what he has pictured. (Th. Ziehen has presented all this with particular clarity in his physiological psychology.)
One can see from this how, when an act of will comes into question, our conscious life in mental pictures ceases with respect to the intermediary element of will. What is experienced in the soul as we will an action performed by the body does not enter our ordinary conscious life of mental pictures. But it is also obvious that such a will impulse realizes itself through the activity of the body. It is also not difficult to recognize that the soul unfolds a will activity when, following logical laws, it seeks truth by connecting mental pictures to each other; a will activity that physiological laws cannot encompass. Otherwise, an illogical connection of mental pictures—or even a merely a-logical one— could not be distinguished from one that takes a logically lawful course. (Dilettantish claims that logical deduction is merely a characteristic acquired by the soul through adaptation to the outer world is not worthy of serious consideration.) In this will activity, which runs its course purely within the soul, and which leads to logically grounded convictions, we can see a permeation of the soul with a purely spiritual activity. Our ordinary mental picturing knows as little what occurs in our outward directed will as a sleeping person knows about himself. But we are also not as fully conscious of the logical determining factors by which we form our convictions as we are of the actual content of our convictions. Anyone who knows, even anthropologically, how to observe inwardly is able, after all, in ordinary consciousness, to recognize the presence of logical determinants. He will realize that the human being knows this logical determination the way he knows something in dreams. One is totally justified in declaring the correctness of the paradox: ordinary consciousness knows the content of its convictions; but it only dreams the logical lawfulness that lives in the seeking of these convictions. We can see: in ordinary consciousness we sleep through the will element when unfolding will to act outwardly through the body; we dream through our will activity when seeking convictions through thinking. And we know, in fact, that in this latter case what we are dreaming cannot be of a bodily nature, for then logical laws would have to coincide with physiological laws. If we form the concept of a will activity living in a thinking quest for truth, then we are conceiving of something with real soul being.
From these two epistemological approaches to the concept of real soul being in an anthroposophical sense (other approaches are also possible), we can see how far removed this essential soul being is from anything in the nature of abnormal soul activity such as visionary, hallucinatory, or mediumistic states. For, the source of all such abnormalities must be sought in the physiological realm. The soul element described by anthroposophy, however, is not only of the same kind as our soul experiences in normal healthy consciousness; within the full waking consciousness of mental picturing, we can also experience this soul element in a way similar to that of remembering past events in our life, or of arriving at convictions that are logically determined. From this we can see clearly that anthroposophy's cognitive experience runs its course in mental pictures that retain the character of ordinary consciousness which is endowed with reality from the outer world; and to this ordinary consciousness anthroposophy adds abilities that lead into the spiritual realm; everything of a visionary, hallucinatory nature, on the other hand, lives in a consciousness that adds nothing to our ordinary one but that takes abilities away from this ordinary consciousness, causing our state of consciousness to sink below the level present in conscious sense perception. For those readers who know what I have written in other books about memory and recollection, I would like to add the following. The mental pictures that have entered our unconscious and can be recollected later are to be found—as mental pictures during the time they are unconscious— within that part of the human being which in those books is called the life body (etheric body). The activity, however, through which the mental pictures anchored in the life body are recollected belongs to the physical body. I add this comment so that those who are quick to jump to conclusions will not construe as a contradiction what is in fact a distinction demanded by the nature of the case.
IV-1. Die philosophische Rechtfertigung der Anthroposophie
[ 1 ] Wer mit seiner Vorstellungsart in dem philosophischen Denken der Gegenwart wurzeln will, der hat nötig, erkenntnistheoretisch das Wesenhaft-Seelische, von dem der erste Abschnitt dieser Schrift spricht, vor sich selbst und vor diesem Denken zu rechtfertigen. Nach einer solchen Rechtfertigung verlangen viele Menschen nicht, die das wirklich Seelische aus unmittelbaren innerem Erleben kennen und es zu unterscheiden wissen von dem durch die Sinne bewirkten seelischen Erfahren. Diesen erscheint die Rechtfertigung oftmals als unnötige, ja unbequeme Begriffsspalterei. Ihrer so gearteten Abneigung steht der Unwille der philosophisch Denkenden gegenüber. Sie wollen die inneren Erlebnisse des Seelischen nur als subjektive Erfahrungen gelten lassen, denen ein Erkenntniswert nicht zuzuschreiben ist. Sie sind daher wenig geneigt, im Bereiche ihrer philosophischen Begriffe die Elemente aufzusuchen, durch die man an die anthroposophischen Ideen herankommt. Durch diese von beiden Seiten kommenden Abneigungen wird eine Verständigung außerordentlich erschwert. Sie ist aber notwendig. Denn in unserer Zeit kann einer Vorstellungsart nur dann Erkenntniswert zugeschrieben werden, wenn sie ihre Anschauungen vor eben derselben Kritik zur Geltung bringen kann, vor welcher die naturwissenschaftlichen Gesetze ihre Rechtfertigung suchen. - Für eine erkenntnistheoretische Rechtfertigung der anthroposophischen Ideen handelt es sich vor allem darum, die Art, wie sie erlebt werden, möglichst genau in Begriffen zu fassen. Man kann dieses in der verschiedensten Weise tun. Es seien hier zwei von diesen Weisen zu schildern versucht. Für die Schilderung der einen sei ausgegangen von der Betrachtung der Erinnerung. Man wird allerdings dabei sogleich an einen mißlichen Punkt der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Wissenschaft getrieben. Denn über das Wesen der Erinnerung herrschen in derselben wenig geklärte Begriffe. Ich werde hier von Vorstellungen ausgehen, die ich zwar auf den Wegen der Anthroposophie gefunden, die aber durchaus philosophisch und physiologisch zu begründen sind. Der Raum, den ich mir in dieser Schrift zumessen muß, reicht allerdings nicht aus, diese letztere Begründung hier zu geben. Ich hoffe sie in einer zukünftig erscheinenden Schrift zu liefern. Ich meine aber, was ich über die Erinnerung sagen werde, kann jeder begründet finden, der auf die heute vorhandenen Ergebnisse der physiologischen und psychologischen Wissenschaft mit richtigem Blicke zu sehen vermag.
Die durch Sinneseindrücke angeregten Vorstellungen treten in den Bereich des unbewußten menschlichen Erlebens. Sie können aus demselben wieder heraufgeholt, erinnert werden. Vorstellungen sind ein rein seelisch Wesenhaftes; ihr Bewußtsein im gewöhnlichen Wachleben ist leiblich bedingt. Auch kann sie die an den Leib gebundene Seele nicht durch ihre eigenen Kräfte aus dem unbewußten Zustande in den bewußten heraufheben. Sie bedarf dazu der Kräfte des Leibes. Für die gewöhnliche Erinnerung muß der Leib tätig sein, geradeso wie er für die Entstehung der Sinnesvorstellungen in den Vorgängen der Sinnesorgane tätig sein muß. Stelle ich einen Sinnesvorgang vor, so muß sich zuerst eine leibliche Tätigkeit in den Sinnesorganen entwikkeIn; in der Seele tritt als deren Ergebnis die Vorstellung auf. Erinnere ich eine Vorstellung, so muß eine der Sinnestätigkeit polar entgegengesetzte innere Leibestätigkeit (in feinen Organen) stattfinden, und in der Seele tritt als Ergebnis die erinnerte Vorstellung auf. Diese Vorstellung bezieht sich auf einen Sinnesvorgang, der vor Zeiten vor meiner Seele gestanden hat. Ich stelle ihn vor durch ein inneres Erlebnis, zu dem mich die Leibesorganisation befähigt. Man vergegenwärtige sich nun das Wesen einer solchen Erinnerungsvorstellung. Denn man kommt durch diese Vergegenwärtigung auf das Wesen dessen, was die anthroposophischen Ideen sind. Sie sind keine Erinnerungsvorstellungen; aber sie treten in der Seele so auf wie Erinnerungsvorstellungen. Dies ist für viele Menschen, die sich gerne in einer gröberen Art Vorstellungen über die geistige Welt verschaffen möchten, eine Enttäuschung. Aber man kann die geistige Welt auf keine derbere Weise erleben als in der Erinnerung ein in der Sinneswelt vor Zeiten erfahrenes, nicht mehr vor Augen stehendes Ereignis. Nun aber kommt die Fähigkeit, ein solches Ereignis zu erinnern, aus der Kraft der Leibesorganisation. Diese darf beim Erleben des Wesenhaft-Seelischen nicht mitwirken. Die Seele muß vielmehr in sich selbst die Fähigkeit erwecken, das mit Vorstellungen zu vollbringen, was der Leib mit den Sinnesvorstellungen vollbringt, wenn er deren Erinnerung vermittelt. Solche Vorstellungen, die aus den Tiefen der Seele heraufgeholt werden allein durch die Kraft der Seele, wie aus den Tiefen der Menschennatur durch die Leibesorganisation die Erinnerungsvorstellungen: dies sind Vorstellungen, welche sich auf die geistige Welt beziehen. Sie sind in jeder Seele vorhanden. Was erworben werden muß, um dieses Vorhandensein gewahr zu werden, ist die Kraft, durch rein seelische Betätigung, diese Vorstellungen aus den Seelentiefen heraufzuholen. Wie die erinnerten Sinnesvorstellungen sich auf einen vergangenen Sinnes-Eindruck beziehen, so diese Vorstellungen auf einen nicht in der Sinneswelt vorhandenen Zusammenhang der Seele mit der Geisteswelt. Die Menschenseele steht der geistigen Welt so gegenüber wie der Mensch im allgemeinen einem vergessenen Dasein gegenübersteht; und sie kommt zur Erkenntnis dieser Welt, wenn sie in sich Kräfte zum Erwachen bringt, welche jenen Leibeskräften ähnlich sind, die der Erinnerung dienen.—Es kommt also für die philosophische Rechtfertigung der Ideen vom wahrhaft Seelischen darauf an, das Innenleben so zu erforschen, daß man in demselben eine Betätigung findet, welche rein seelisch ist und doch in gewisser Beziehung gleichartig der beim Erinnern geübten Betätigung.
[ 2 ] Eine zweite Weise, vom rein Seelischen einen Begriff zu bilden, kann die folgende sein. Man kann ins Auge fassen, was durch anthropologische Beobachtang über den wollenden (handelnden) Menschen auszumachen ist. Einem auszuführenden Willensimpuls liegt zunächst die Vorstellung von dem zu Wollenden zugrunde. Diese Vorstellung kann physiologisch in ihrer Bedingtheit von der Leibesorganisation (dem Nervensystem) erkannt werden. An die Vorstellung gebunden ist ein Gefühlston, ein fühlendes Sympathisieren mit dem Vorgestellten, das bewirkt, daß diese Vorstellung den Impuls für ein Wollen liefert. Dann aber verliert sich das seelische Erleben in die Tiefen, und bewußt tritt erst wieder der Erfolg auf. Der Mensch stellt vor, wie er sich bewegt, um das Vorgestellte auszuführen (Th. Ziehen hat in seiner physiologischen Psychologie besonders klar dieses alles dargestellt). - Man kann nun ersehen, wie das bewußte Vorstellungsleben, wenn ein Willensakt in Frage kommt, in bezug auf das Zwischenglied des Wollens aussetzt. Was seelisch im Wollen einer durch den Leib ausgeführten Handlung erlebt wird, tritt nicht in das gewöhnliche bewußte Vorstellen ein. Aber es ist auch einleuchtend, daß sich ein solches Wollen durch eine Tätigkeit des Leibes verwirklicht. Unschwer wird man aber auch erkennen, daß die Seele, indem sie, logischen Gesetzen folgend, durch Verknüpfung von Vorstellungen die Wahrheit sucht, ein Wollen entwickelt. Ein Wollen, das nicht in physiologischen Gesetzen zu umfassen ist. Sonst würde sich eine unlogische Vorstellungsverknüpfung - oder auch nur eine alogische - nicht sondern lassen von einer, die in den Bahnen der logischen Gesetzmäßigkeit verläuft. (Auf dilettantenhaftes Gerede, als ob logische Folgerung nur in einer von der Seele durch Anpassung an die Außenwelt erworbenen Eigenschaft bestünde, braucht man wohl nicht im Ernste Rücksicht zu nehmen.) In diesem Wollen, das rein innerhalb der Seele verläuft, und das zu logisch gegründeten Überzeugungen führt, kann man ein Durchdrungensein der Seele mit einer rein geistigen Tätigkeit sehen. Von dem, was im Wollen nach außen vorgeht, weiß das gewöhnliche Vorstellen so wenig, wie der Mensch im Schlafe von sich weiß. Von dem logischen Bestimmtsein beim Bilden von Überzeugungen hat er aber auch nicht ein so volles Bewußtsein wie von dem Inhalte der Überzeugungen selbst. Wer innerlich wenn auch nur anthropologisch zu beobachten versteht, der wird über die Anwesenheit des logischen Bestimmtseins im gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein doch einen Begriff bilden können. Er wird erkennen, daß der Mensch von diesem Bestimmtsein so weiß wie er träumend weiß. Man kann durchaus die Richtigkeit des Paradoxons behaupten: das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein kennt den Inhalt seiner Überzeugungen; aber es träumt nur von der logischen Gesetzmäßigkeit, die in dem Suchen nach diesen Überzeugungen lebt. Man sieht: im gewöhnlichen Bewußtsein verschläft man das Wollen, wenn man durch den Leib ein Wollen nach außen entwickelt; man verträumt das Wollen, wenn man im Denken nach Überzeugungen sucht. Doch erkennt man, daß in letzterem Falle dasjenige, wovon man träumt, kein Leibliches sein kann, denn sonst müßten die logischen Gesetze mit den physiologischen zusammenfallen. Faßt man den Begriff des im denkenden Suchen nach der Wahrheit lebenden Wollens, so ist dieser Begriff der eines seelisch Wesenhaften.
Man kann aus den beiden Weisen (neben denen andere möglich sind), erkenntnistheoretisch sich dem Begriffe des Seelisch-Wesenhaften, im Sinne der Anthroposophie, zu nähern, ersehen, wie scharf dieses Seelisch-Wesenhafte sich absondert von allem, was abnorme Seelentätigkeit ist, wie das visionäre, halluzinatorische, mediale usw. Wesen. Denn von all diesem Abnormen muß der Ursprung im physiologisch Bestimmbaren gesucht werden. Das Seelische der Anthroposophie ist aber nicht nur ein solches, das seelisch nach Art des gewöhnlichen gesunden Bewußtseins erlebt wird, sondern ein solches, an dem in voller wacher Bewußtheit beim Vorstellung-Bilden so erlebt wird, wie man erlebt, wenn man sich an erfahrene Tatsachen des Lebens erinnert, oder wie man erlebt beim logisch bedingten Bilden von Überzeugungen. Man sieht wohl, daß das erkennende Erleben der Anthroposophie in Vorstellungen verläuft, welche den Charakter des gewöhnlichen von der Außenwelt mit der Wirklichkeit begabten Bewußtseins beibehalten, und zu diesem Fähigkeiten hinzufügen, die in das Geistgebiet hineinführen; während alles Visionäre, Halluzinatorische usw. in einem Bewußtsein lebt, das zu dem gewöhnlichen nichts hinzufügt, sondern von ihm Fähigkeiten wegnimmt, so daß der Bewußtseinsstatus unter den Grad heruntersinkt, der in dem bewußten Sinneswahrnehmen vorhanden ist.
Für die Leser meiner Schriften, welche dasjenige kennen, was ich an andern Orten über das Gedächtnis und die Erinnerung ausgeführt habe, bemerke ich das Folgende. Die in das Unbewußte gegangenen Vorstellungen, welche später erinnert werden, hat man, während sie unbewußt bleiben, als Vorstellungen in dem Gliede der menschlichen Wesenheit zu suchen, das in diesen Schriften als Lebensleib (Ätherleib) bezeichnet wird. Die Tätigkeit aber, durch welche die im Lebensleib verankerten Vorstellungen erinnert werden, gehört dem physischen Leib an. Ich mache diese Bemerkung, damit nicht mancher «schnellfertig mit dem Urteil» einen Widerspruch da konstruiert, wo eine durch die Natur der Sache geforderte Unterscheidung notwendig ist.
IV-1 The philosophical justification of anthroposophy
[ 1 ] Those who wish to root their way of thinking in the philosophical thinking of the present day need to justify epistemologically before themselves and before this thinking that which is essentially spiritual, of which the first section of this essay speaks. Many people who know the truly spiritual from direct inner experience and know how to distinguish it from the spiritual experience brought about by the senses do not require such a justification. For them, justification often appears to be an unnecessary, even uncomfortable division of concepts. Their aversion of this kind is countered by the unwillingness of philosophical thinkers. They only want to accept the inner experiences of the soul as subjective experiences to which no cognitive value can be attributed. They are therefore little inclined to seek out the elements in their philosophical concepts through which anthroposophical ideas can be approached. These aversions on both sides make communication extremely difficult. But it is necessary. For in our time a way of thinking can only be ascribed epistemological value if it can bring its views to bear before the same criticism before which the laws of natural science seek their justification. - For an epistemological justification of anthroposophical ideas, it is above all a question of conceptualizing the way in which they are experienced as precisely as possible. This can be done in many different ways. Two of these ways will be described here. For the description of one of them, let us start from the observation of memory. In doing so, however, one is immediately driven to an awkward point in contemporary philosophical science. For the nature of memory is not well understood. I shall start here from ideas which I have found on the paths of anthroposophy, but which can certainly be justified philosophically and physiologically. However, the space I have to give myself in this paper is not sufficient to provide this latter justification here. I hope to provide it in a future publication. However, I believe that what I will say about memory can be substantiated by anyone who is able to look at the results of physiological and psychological science available today with the right eye.
The ideas stimulated by sensory impressions enter the realm of unconscious human experience. They can be retrieved and remembered from this realm. Imaginations are a purely psychic entity; their consciousness in ordinary waking life is bodily conditioned. Nor can the soul, which is bound to the body, raise them from the unconscious state to the conscious state by its own powers. For this it needs the powers of the body. For ordinary memory the body must be active, just as it must be active in the processes of the sense organs for the emergence of sensory concepts. If I imagine a sensory process, a bodily activity must first develop in the sense organs; as a result of this, the imagination arises in the soul. If I remember an idea, then an inner bodily activity (in fine organs) polar opposite to the sensory activity must take place, and the remembered idea arises in the soul as a result. This imagination relates to a sensory process that took place before my soul some time ago. I imagine it through an inner experience that the organization of the body enables me to have. Now visualize the nature of such a memory. For through this visualization one arrives at the essence of what the anthroposophical ideas are. They are not ideas of memory; but they appear in the soul like ideas of memory. This is a disappointment for many people who would like to have a more general idea of the spiritual world. But one cannot experience the spiritual world in a coarser way than in the memory of an event that was experienced in the sensory world a long time ago and no longer stands before one's eyes. Now the ability to remember such an event comes from the power of the body's organization. This must not play a part in the experience of the essential soul. Rather, the soul must awaken in itself the ability to accomplish with ideas what the body accomplishes with the ideas of the senses when it mediates their memory. Such ideas, which are brought up from the depths of the soul solely through the power of the soul, just as the memory ideas are brought up from the depths of the human nature through the organization of the body: these are ideas which relate to the spiritual world. They are present in every soul. What must be acquired in order to become aware of this presence is the power to bring up these ideas from the depths of the soul through purely spiritual activity. Just as the remembered sense-images refer to a past sense-impression, so these ideas refer to a connection of the soul with the spiritual world that does not exist in the sense-world. The human soul faces the spiritual world in the same way as man generally faces a forgotten existence; and it comes to the realization of this world when it awakens forces within itself that are similar to those bodily forces that serve memory.—It is therefore important for the philosophical justification of the ideas of the truly spiritual to investigate the inner life in such a way that one finds in it an activity that is purely spiritual and yet in certain respects similar to the activity practiced in remembering.
[ 2 ] A second way to form a concept of the purely mental is as follows. One can consider what can be discerned through anthropological observation about the willing (acting) human being. A volitional impulse to be carried out is initially based on the idea of what is to be willed. This idea can be recognized physiologically in its conditionality of the body's organization (the nervous system). Attached to the imagination is a feeling tone, a feeling sympathization with the imagined, which causes this imagination to provide the impulse for volition. Then, however, the mental experience loses itself in the depths, and only success consciously reappears. Man imagines how he moves in order to carry out what he has imagined (Th. Ziehen has described all this particularly clearly in his physiological psychology). - We can now see how the conscious imaginative life, when an act of will comes into question, is suspended in relation to the intermediate element of will. What is experienced mentally in the volition of an act performed by the body does not enter into the ordinary conscious imagination. But it is also obvious that such a volition is realized through an activity of the body. But it is also easy to recognize that the soul develops a volition by seeking the truth through the combination of ideas in accordance with logical laws. A will that cannot be encompassed in physiological laws. Otherwise an illogical combination of ideas - or even just an alogical one - would not be distinguishable from one that follows the paths of logical regularity. (There is no serious need to take account of amateurish talk, as if logical inference consisted only in a quality acquired by the soul through adaptation to the external world). In this volition, which proceeds purely within the soul and which leads to logically founded convictions, one can see the soul being permeated with a purely spiritual activity. Ordinary imagination knows as little of what goes on outwardly in the volition as man knows of himself in sleep. Nor does he have as full an awareness of the logical determination involved in forming convictions as he has of the content of the convictions themselves. He who knows how to observe inwardly, even if only anthropologically, will nevertheless be able to form a concept of the presence of logical determination in ordinary consciousness. He will recognize that man knows of this determinacy as he knows dreaming. It is quite possible to maintain the correctness of the paradox: the ordinary consciousness knows the content of its convictions; but it only dreams of the logical regularity that lives in the search for these convictions. One sees that in ordinary consciousness one sleeps through the will when one develops a will outwardly through the body; one dreams through the will when one searches for convictions in thinking. But one recognizes that in the latter case that which one dreams of cannot be corporeal, for otherwise the logical laws would have to coincide with the physiological ones. If one grasps the concept of the will living in the thinking search for truth, then this concept is that of a spiritual being.
One can see from the two ways (besides which others are possible) of approaching the concept of the soul-being in the sense of anthroposophy, how sharply this soul-being separates itself from everything that is abnormal soul activity, such as the visionary, hallucinatory, mediumistic, etc., being. being. For the origin of all this abnormality must be sought in the physiologically determinable. The soul of anthroposophy, however, is not only that which is experienced in the soul in the manner of ordinary healthy consciousness, but that which is experienced in fully awake consciousness when forming ideas, just as one experiences when one remembers experienced facts of life, or as one experiences when forming logically conditioned convictions. It is easy to see that the cognitive experience of anthroposophy proceeds in conceptions which retain the character of the ordinary consciousness endowed with reality by the external world, and add to it faculties which lead into the spiritual realm; while everything visionary, hallucinatory, etc., lives in a consciousness which adds nothing to the ordinary, but takes away faculties from it, so that the state of consciousness sinks below the degree which is present in conscious sense-perception.
For the readers of my writings who are familiar with what I have said elsewhere about memory and recollection, I note the following. The ideas which have passed into the unconscious and which are later remembered, while they remain unconscious, are to be sought as ideas in that part of the human being which in these writings is called the vital body (etheric body). The activity, however, by which the ideas anchored in the vital body are remembered, belongs to the physical body. I make this remark so that some people do not construct a contradiction "hastily with judgment" where a distinction required by the nature of the matter is necessary.