Truth and Science
GA 3
VI. Epistemology Free of Assumptions and Fichte’s Principles of Science
[ 1 ] With what has been presented so far, we have clarified the idea of knowing. This idea is now given in human awareness without any mediation, insofar as it is limited to knowing itself. The ego (without mediation the center of awareness) is given external perception, internal perception, and perception of its own self-existence (sein eigenes Dasein). (It hardly needs to be said that we do not want the term "center" to be associated with a theoretical view of the nature of consciousness, but rather that we are only using it as a stylistic shorthand for the overall characteristic features of awareness.) The ego feels the urge to find more in what is given than what is immediately given. It goes beyond the given world to the second world of thinking, and it combines the two through a free decision (about possible reality) which we have settled on as the idea of knowing.
Herein lies a fundamental difference between (firstly) the way, in objective human awareness, in which concept and immediately-given show themselves bound together in total reality, and (secondly) that which has value regarding the remaining world-content. With every other part of the world picture, we must imagine that the connection is original and necessary from the outset. Only at the beginning of knowing does an artificial separation occur for knowing, which ultimately will again be uplifted (aufgehoben), by means of the appropriate recognition of the original nature of what is objective.
Things are different with human awareness. Here the connection is only present if it is carried out consciously in actual activity. With any other object, the separation has no meaning for the object, only for knowing does it have meaning. The connection is the first thing here, the separation is the derivative. The act of knowing only carries out the separation, because in its own way, it cannot take possession of the connection unless it has separated first. But the concept and the given reality of awareness are originally separate. The connection is what is derived, and that is why knowing is described here in this way.
Because in consciousness the idea and the given necessarily appear separately, the whole of reality is split into these two parts, and because consciousness can only bring about the combination of the two elements mentioned through its own activity, in this way it arrives at full reality through bringing to reality the act of knowing. The remaining categories (ideas) would necessarily be linked to the corresponding forms of the given, if they were not included in knowing; the idea of knowing can be united with the given related to it only through the activity of awareness. A real consciousness exists only when it realizes itself, when it brings itself to reality (sich selbst verwirklicht). I believe that I am sufficiently prepared to expose the fundamental error of Fichte's Principles of Science (Wissenschaftlehre) and at the same time to provide the key to understanding it.
Fichte is the philosopher who felt most vividly (among Kant's successors) that the foundation of all scientific thinking (Wissenschaft),65t/n In this sense science is consciously thinking about experiences with clarity and logic could only stand within a theory of consciousness, but he never realized why that was so. He felt that what we call the second step of epistemology, and to which we give the form of a postulate, must really be carried out by the ego. We see this for example, in his following words. “The Principles of Science (Wissenschaftslehre), insofar as it is intended to be a systematic science (just like all possible sciences insofar as they are intended to be systematic), arises through a stipulation of freedom, which here in particular stipulates the art of handling intelligence in raising it to consciousness at all.— Through this free handling (Handlung), the necessary action of intelligence, already itself a form, will now be taken up substantially as the new form of perception of experience (des Wissens) or aware existence (Bewußtseins)..." 66Fichte, Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten Philosophie, Collected Works, Berlin, 1845, Vol. I, p. 71. What is here understood by the art of handling of intelligence, expressing what is darkly felt in clear terms, is nothing other than fully bringing into awareness the idea of knowing. If Fichte had been fully aware of this, he would simply have had to formulate the above sentence like this: The Principles of Science (Wissenschaftslehre) must raise knowing, insofar as it is still an unconscious activity of the ego, into awareness-existence (Bewußtsein). It must show that the objectification of the idea of knowing is carried out in the ego as a necessary action.
[ 2 ] In his attempt to define the activity of the ego, Fichte concludes, "Whoever’s existence (essential being) consists solely in the fact that it assumes itself as being, that is the ego, as an absolute subject.” 67Ibid. Vol. I, p. 97. For Fichte, this positioning of the ego is the first unencumbered active handling that “lies at the basis of all other awareness of existence.” 68Ibid. Vol. I, p. 91. In Fichte's sense, the ego can only begin all its activity through an absolute decision. But for Fichte it is impossible to help this activity (which is absolutely done by the ego) to find any content for its actions. For it has nothing upon which to direct this activity, and by which it should determine itself. His ego is supposed to carry out an act, but what should it do? Because Fichte did not establish the concept of knowing that the ego should realize, he struggled in vain to find any progression from his absolute act to a further determination of the ego. Yes, he finally declares regarding such a progression, that the investigation into this lies outside the limits of theory. In deducing what the mental picture is, he assumes neither an absolute activity of the ego nor of the “non-ego”, but takes his start rather from something determined and at the same time determining, because nothing else is or can be contained directly in consciousness.
What determines this determination remains completely undecided in theory, and through this indeterminacy we are driven beyond theory into the practical part of scientific theory.69Ibid. Vol. I, p. 178. With this clarification, Fichte destroys knowing altogether. For the practical activity of the ego belongs to a completely different arena. Clearly, the postulate I made above can only be realized through a free action of the ego, but if the ego is to behave in a way of knowing, then it is important that the determination of the ego is to realize the idea of knowing. It is certainly true that the ego can do many other things of its own free will. But the epistemological foundation of all sciences is not based on a characteristic of the free ego, but rather on a characteristic of the knowing ego. However, Fichte allowed himself to be influenced too much by his subjective tendency to place the freedom of the human personality in the brightest light. Harms rightly remarks in his speech on Fichte's philosophy S.15, "His world view is predominantly and exclusively ethical, and his epistemology has no other character." Cognition would have absolutely no task if all areas of reality were given in their totality. But since the ego, so long as it is not integrated by thinking into the systematic whole of the world picture, is nothing other than something directly given, simply showing what it does is not sufficient. Fichte, however, is of the opinion that everything is already done for the ego by simply looking for it. “We must seek out the first principle (absolutely without presuppositions) of all human knowing. It cannot be proven or determined if it is to be the absolute first principle.” 70Ibid. Vol. I, p. 91.
We have seen that in proving and defining, only the content of pure logic is out of place, not required. The ego, however, belongs to reality, where it is necessary to determine the presence of this or that category in the given. Fichte didn't do that. And this is the reason why he gave his scientific theory such a wrong shape. Zeller notes 71Eduard Zeller (1814–1908), Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibnitz, History of German Philosophy Since Leibnitz, Munich, 1871–75, p. 605. that the logical formulas through which Fichte wants to arrive at the concept of the ego only poorly disguise the fact that Fichte wants to achieve the already preconceived purpose of getting to this starting point at all costs. These words refer to the first form that Fichte gave to his scientific theory in 1794. If we hold on to the fact that Fichte, based on the whole nature of his philosophizing, could have wanted nothing other than to have science begin through an absolute power decree, then there are only two ways in which this beginning appears understandable. One was to touch consciousness in some of its empirical activities and to crystallize the pure concept of the ego by gradually peeling away everything that does not originally follow from it. The other way, however, was to start with the original activity of the ego and to reveal its nature through self-reflection and self-observation. Fichte took the first path at the beginning of his philosophizing, but as his philosophizing coursed along, he gradually moved on to the second.
[ 3 ] Building on Kant's synthesis of “transcendental apperception”, Fichte found that all activity of the ego consisted in the assembly of the material of experience according to the forms of judgment. Judging consists in linking the predicate with the subject, which is expressed in a purely formal way by the sentence “a” = “a”. This proposition would be impossible if the unknown factor “x” that connects the first and second “a” were not based on an absolute ability to posit. Because the sentence does not mean: “a” is, but rather: if “a” is, then “a” is. There can be no question of postulating “a” absolutely. There is nothing left to arrive at something totally valid, other than to declare the positing itself to be absolute. While the “a” is conditional, the positing of the “a” is unconditional. But this setting is an act of the ego. The ego therefore can posit absolutely and unconditionally. In the sentence “a” = “a”, one “a” is only posited by presupposing the other; namely it is set by the ego. Fichte states, “If ‘a’ is posited in the ego, then it is posited.” 72Fichte, Sämtliche Werke, Collected Works, Berlin, 1845, Vol. I, p. 94. This connection is only possible under the condition that there is something in the ego that is always the same, something that moves from one “a” to the other. And the “x” mentioned above is based on this constant. The ego that posits one “a” is the same as that which posits the other. And that means “I” “I” This sentence expressed in the form of the proposition: “If I am, then so it is”, but this proposition has no meaning. The ego is not placed under the presupposition of another, but rather it presupposes itself. But that means it is absolute and unconditional.
The hypothetical form of the judgment, which belongs to all judgments without the presupposition of the absolute ego, is transformed here into the form of the absolute existential sentence: “I simply am”. Fichte also expresses this as follows: “The ego originally posits its own being.” 73Ibid. Vol. I, p. 98. We see that Fichte's entire derivation is nothing but a kind of pedagogical discussion to lead his readers to the point where the knowledge of the unconditioned activity of the ego dawns on them. The purpose is to make clear to his readers, that without this activity of the ego, there is no ego at all.
[ 4 ] We now want to look back at Fichte's train of thought. If you look more closely, it turns out that there is a crack in it, and one that calls into question the correctness of the view of the original act. What really is absolute in the positing of the I? The judgment is made: If “a” is, then “a” is. The “a” is placed by the ego. There can be no doubt about this setting. But even if it is unconditional as an activity, the ego can only set something. It cannot posit “activity in and of itself”, but only a specific activity. In short: the setting must have a content. But it cannot take this from itself, otherwise it could do nothing but set forever. There must therefore be something for the positing, for the absolute activity of the ego, which is realized through it. Without the ego taking hold of something given and positing it, it can posit nothing, and therefore cannot posit. This is therefore shown by a Fichte-like sentence that the ego posits its existence, this existence is a category. We are back to our statement: The activity of the ego is based on the ego positing the concepts and ideas of the given out of its own free decision. Only because Fichte unconsciously sets out to establish the ego as something that has existence does he reach his conclusion. If he had developed the concept of knowing, he would have arrived at the true starting point of the theory of knowing (epistemology), that the ego posits knowing. Since Fichte did not make it clear to himself what determines the activity of the ego, he simply described the positing of existence as the character of this activity. But in doing so he also limited the absolute activity of the ego. For if only the “existence-positing” of the ego is unconditional, then everything else that emanates from the ego is conditional. But every path to get from the unconditional to the conditional is also cut off. If the ego is unconditioned only in the direction indicated, then the possibility for it to posit something other than its own being through an original act immediately ceases. The need therefore arises to give the reason for all other activity of the ego. Fichte searched for one in vain, as we have already seen above.
[ 5 ] Therefore, he turned to the other path described above to derive the ego. As early as 1797 in his First Introduction to the Doctrine of Scientific Awareness he recommended self-observation as the right thing to do to recognize the ego by its very own character. “Pay attention to yourself, turn your gaze away from everything that surrounds you and peer into your inner self. This is the first demand that philosophy makes to its apprentices. There is no talk of anything outside of you, but only of yourself.” 74Ibid. Vol. I, p. 422. This way of introducing the Principles of Science (Wissenschaftslehre), however, has a great advantage over the other. For self-observation does not in fact deliver the activity of the ego one-sidedly in a certain direction, it does not merely show it as positing existence, but rather it shows it in its all-round development, how it tries to think and understand the immediately given content of the world. Introspection shows the ego how it builds its worldview from the combination of the given and the concept. But for anyone who has not gone through the consideration above, who does not know that the ego only comes to the full content of reality when it approaches the given with thinking, for him the process of knowing appears as the world spinning out of the ego. For Fichte, the worldview becomes more and more a construction of the ego. He increasingly emphasizes that what is important in scientific teaching is to awaken the sense that can overhear the ego constructing the world. Anyone who can do this appears to Fichte to be at a higher level of knowing than someone who only sees the constructed, the finished existence. Anyone who only looks at the world of objects, does not recognize that they are created by the ego. But whoever looks at the ego in its construing sees the basis of the finished world picture, and knows how it came about, for it appears to him due to certain given prerequisites. Someone with ordinary consciousness only sees what is posited, what is determined in this or that way. He lacks insight into the antecedents, into the reasons why it is set this way and not otherwise. According to Fichte, the conscious experience of perceiving with logic and clarity (das Wissen) is the task of a completely new sense. I find this most clearly expressed in his Introductory lectures on his Principles of Science (Wissenschaftslehre) that he read aloud in the fall of 1813 at the University of Berlin: “This doctrine presupposes a completely new inner sensory tool through which a new world is created that does not exist at all for the ordinary person." 75Ibid. Vol. I, p. 422. Also: “The world of the new sense (and thereby itself) is for the moment clearly determined. It is seeing the antecedents on which judgment is based. It is something that itself grounds the grounds of existence, which is exactly why, because it is this, is not itself again and is an existence.” 76J. G. Fichtes Nachgelassene Werke. Herausgegeben von J. H. Fichte, Bd. 1, Bonn 1834, S.4 und S.16.
[ 6 ] Here too, Fichte lacks a clear insight into the content of the activity carried out by the ego. He never got through to it. That is why his Wissenschaftslehre could not become what it otherwise would have had to become given its entire structure, which is a theory of knowing as basic philosophical science. Once it was recognized that the activity of the ego must be determined by the ego itself, it was obvious to think that it also receives its determination from the ego. But how can this happen other than by giving content to the purely formal actions of the ego. But if this is really to be introduced by the ego into its otherwise completely undetermined activity, then it must also be determined according to its nature. Otherwise, it could at most be realized by a “thing in itself” lying in the ego, whose tool is the ego, but not by the latter itself. If Fichte had attempted this definition, then he would have arrived at the concept of knowing, which is to be realized by the ego. Fichte's teaching of science is proof that even the most astute thinker will not succeed in having a fruitful impact in any field if one does not arrive at the correct thought form (category, idea), which when supplemented with what is given, gives reality. Such a thinker is the same as a person who listens to the most wonderful melodies, but doesn't hear them at all, due to having no feeling for melody. Consciousness, as a given, can only be characterized by someone who knows how to put himself in possession of the “idea of consciousness”.
[ 7 ] Fichte came quite close to the correct insight. In 1797 he found in his Introduction to the Principles of Science that there were two theoretical systems, dogmatism,77t/n The meaning of dogmatism here is unclear. Here it sounds like materialism, but with the recent growing acceptance of materialism, dogmatism has come to be seen as something like Bishop Berkeley’s spiritism. In the modern view (see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s article on idealism), idealism is often paired with its opposite realism, and materialism with its opposite spiritism. Anyone holding a specific world-view usually accuses those holding different views of being dogmatic, that is, holding beliefs that are unquestioned, undefended, and unsubstantiated. in which the ego is determined by things, and idealism, in which things are determined by the ego. In his view, both stand as possible worldviews. Both allow consistent implementation. But if we give in to dogmatism, then we must give up the independence of the ego and make it dependent on the thing-in-itself. We are in the opposite situation when we pay homage to idealism. Which of the systems one or the other philosopher wants to choose, Fichte simply leaves it up to the discretion of the ego. But if it wants to preserve its independence, it would suspend belief in things outside of us and surrender to idealism.
[ 8 ] All that Fichte had needed was to have considered that the ego cannot come to any real, well-founded decision and determination if it does not presuppose something that helps it to make one. All determination from the ego would remain empty and contentless if the ego does not find something full of content and thoroughly determined that makes it possible for it to determine what is given and thus also allows the choice to be made between idealism and dogmatism. But this thoroughly full-of-content world is the world of thinking. And determining what is given through thinking means knowing. We may linger on Fichte’s work wherever we want, but everywhere we will find that his train of thought immediately takes root when we think of the completely gray, empty activity of the ego as being filled and regulated by what we have called the process of knowing.
[ 9 ] The ego can put itself into activity through freedom, which makes it possible for it to make real the category of knowing through self-determination. In the rest of the world, the categories are linked to the given that corresponds to them through objective necessity. Investigating the nature of free self-determination will be the task of ethics and metaphysics based on our epistemology. This task will also have to discuss the question of whether the ego is also able to realize ideas other than knowing. it is already clear from the comments made above, however, that the realization of knowing occurs through freedom. For if what is immediately given and the associated form of thinking are united by the ego in the process of knowing, then the unification of the two elements of reality that otherwise always remain separate in consciousness can occur only through an act of freedom.
[ 10 ] Through the preceding discussion, light will be thrown on critical idealism in a completely different way. To anyone who has studied Fichte's system in detail, it appears to be a matter close to the heart of this philosopher to maintain the principle that nothing can enter the ego from outside, nothing that is not originally posited by the ego itself. But this entails that no idealism will ever be able to derive from the ego that form of world content that we have described as the immediately given. This form can only be given, never construed from thinking. Just consider that even if we were given the rest of the color gamut, we would not be able to add even one shade of color purely from the ego. We can form a picture of the most distant areas of the country, areas that we have never seen, if we have experienced similar elements individually as given. We then combine these individual elements we have experienced into a picture based on the descriptions given to us. But we will strive in vain to spin out of ourselves even a single element of perception that never lay in the realm of the “given”. It is quite different to simply to become acquainted (kennen) with something in the given world. it is also different to recognize (erkennen) the essential nature of something or someone. The latter, although it is intimately linked to the content of the world, is not clear to us unless we build reality ourselves from what is given and from thinking. The actual “what” of the given is posited for the ego only by the ego itself. But the ego has absolutely no reason to put the essential nature of a “given” inside itself, for it sees the matter first in a totally unencumbered way. Therefore, what is posited by the ego as the essential nature of the world is not posited without the ego, but through it.
[ 11 ] It is not the first form in which reality confronts the ego that is its true form, but the last form that the ego makes out of it. That first form has no meaning at all for the objective world, and only has such a meaning as a basis for the cognitive process. Therefore, the shape of the world that theory gives to it is not the subjective one, but rather that which is first given to the ego. If one wants to continue along with Volkelt’s followers, who call this given world experience, one must say that scientific knowing completes the organization of our awareness that appears in subjective form as experience, as emerging world-picture as what it essentially is.
[ 12 ] Our epistemology provides the basis for an idealism that understands itself in the true sense of the word. It establishes the belief that the essence of the world is conveyed in thinking. The relationship between the parts of the world's content can be shown by nothing other than thinking, whether it is the relationship of the heat of the sun to the heated stone, or of the ego to the outside world. Thinking alone is the element that determines all things in their relationships to one another.
[ 13 ] The objection that Kantianism could still make would be that the essential determination of the given as characterized above is only one for the ego. In the spirit of our basic conception, we must reply to this that the split between the ego and the external world only exists within the given, and therefore that “for the ego” has no meaning when compared to the thinking observation that unites all opposites. The ego as something separated from the outside world is completely lost in the thinking world view, so it no longer makes any sense to speak of determinations solely for the ego.
VI. Die voraussetzunglose Erkenntnistheorie und Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre
[ 1 ] Mit den bisherigen Ausführungen haben wir die Idee der Erkenntnis festgestellt. Unmittelbar gegeben ist diese Idee nun im menschlichen Bewußtsein, insofern es sich erkennend verhält. Dem «Ich» als Mittelpunkt 28Es braucht wohl kaum gesagt zu werden, daß wir mit der Bezeichnung «Mittelpunkt» hier nicht eine theoretische Ansicht über die Natur des Bewußtseins verknüpft wissen wollen, sondern daß wir sie nur als stilistische Abkürzung für die Gesamtphysiognomie des Bewußtseins gebrauchen. des Bewußtseins ist die äußere und innere Wahrnehmung und sein eigenes Dasein unmittelbar gegeben. Das Ich fühlt den Drang, in diesem Gegebenen mehr zu finden, als was unmittelbar gegeben ist. Es geht ihm gegenüber der gegebenen Welt die zweite, die des Denkens auf, und es verbindet die beiden dadurch, daß es aus freiem Entschluß das verwirklicht, was wir als Idee des Erkennens festgestellt haben. Hierin liegt nun ein Grundunterschied zwischen der Art, wie sich im Objekt des menschlichen Bewußtseins selbst Begriff und Unmittelbar-Gegebenes zur totalen Wirklichkeit verbunden zeigen, und jener, die dem übrigen Weltinhalte gegenüber Geltung hat. Bei jedem andern Teil des Weltbildes müssen wir uns vorstellen, daß die Verbindung das Ursprüngliche, von vornherein Notwendige ist, und daß nur am Beginne des Erkennens für die Erkenntnis eine künstliche Trennung eingetreten ist, die aber zuletzt durch das Erkennen, der ursprünglichen Wesenheit des Objektiven gemäß, wieder aufgehoben wird. Beim menschlichen Bewußtsein ist das anders. Hier ist die Verbindung nur vorhanden, wenn sie in wirklicher Tätigkeit vom Bewußtsein vollzogen wird. Bei jedem andern Objekte hat die Trennung für das Objekt keine Bedeutung, sondern nur für die Erkenntnis. Die Verbindung ist hier das erste, die Trennung das Abgeleitete. Das Erkennen vollzieht nur die Trennung, weil es sich auf seine Art nicht in den Besitz der Verbindung setzen kann, wenn es nicht vorher getrennt hat. Begriff und gegebene Wirklichkeit des Bewußtseins aber sind ursprünglich getrennt, die Verbindung ist das Abgeleitete, und deswegen ist das Erkennen so beschaffen, wie wir es geschildert haben. Weil im Bewußtsein notwendig Idee und Gegebenes getrennt auftreten, deswegen spaltet sich für dasselbe die gesamte Wirklichkeit in diese zwei Teile, und weil das Bewußtsein nur durch eigene Tätigkeit die Verbindung der beiden genannten Elemente bewirken kann, deshalb gelangt es nur durch Verwirklichung des Erkenntnisaktes zur vollen Wirklichkeit. Die übrigen Kategorien (Ideen) wären auch dann notwendig mit den entsprechenden Formen des Gegebenen verknüpft, wenn sie nicht in die Erkenntnis aufgenommen würden; die Idee des Erkennens kann mit dem ihr entsprechenden Gegebenen nur durch die Tätigkeit des Bewußtseins vereinigt werden. Ein wirkliches Bewußtsein existiert nur, wenn es sich selbst verwirklicht. Damit glauben wir genügend vorbereitet zu sein, um den Grundfehler von Fichtes «Wissenschaftslehre» bloßzulegen und zugleich den Schlüssel zu ihrem Verständnis zu liefern. Fichte ist derjenige Philosoph, welcher unter Kants Nachfolgern am lebhaftesten gefühlt hat, daß eine Grundlegung aller Wissenschaften nur in einer Theorie des Bewußtseins bestehen könne; aber er kam nie zur Erkenntnis, warum das so ist. Er empfand, daß dasjenige, was wir als zweiten Schritt der Erkenntnistheorie bezeichnen, und dem wir die Form eines Postulates geben, von dem «Ich» wirklich ausgeführt werden müsse. Wir ersehen dies z. B. aus seinen folgenden Worten: «Die Wissenschaftslehre entsteht also, insofern sie eine systematische Wissenschaft sein soll, geradeso wie alle möglichen Wissenschaften, insofern sie systematisch sein sollen, durch eine Bestimmung der Freiheit, welche letztere hier insbesondere bestimmt ist, die Handlungsart der Intelligenz überhaupt zum Bewußtsein zu erheben; ... Durch diese freie Handlung wird nun etwas, das schon an sich Form ist, die notwendige Handlung der Intelligenz, als Gehalt in eine neue Form des Wissens oder Bewußtseins aufgenommen...» 29Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten Philosophie. Sämtliche Werke, Berlin 1845, Bd. I, S.71 f. Was ist hier unter Handlungsart der «Intelligenz» zu verstehen, wenn man das, was dunkel gefühlt ist, in klaren Begriffen ausspricht? Nichts anderes als die im Bewußtsein sich vollziehende Verwirklichung der Idee des Erkennens. Wäre Fichte sich dessen vollkommen klar bewußt gewesen, dann hätte er den obigen Satz einfach so formulieren müssen: Die Wissenschaftslehre hat das Erkennen, insofern es noch unbewußte Tätigkeit des «Ich ist, zum Bewußtsein zu erheben; sie hat zu zeigen, daß im «Ich» als notwendige Handlung die Objektivierung der Idee des Erkennens ausgeführt wird.
[ 2 ] Fichte will die Tätigkeit des «Ich» bestimmen. Er findet: «Dasjenige, dessen Sein (Wesen) bloß darin besteht, daß es sich selbst als seiend setzt, ist das Ich, als absolutes Subjekt».30Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Sämtl. Werke 1, S.97. Dieses Setzen des Ich ist für Fichte die erste unbedingte Tathandlung, die allem übrigen «Bewußtseyn zum Grunde liegt». 31Sämtliche Werke I, S.91. Das Ich kann also im Sinne Fichtes auch nur durch einen absoluten Entschluß alle seine Tätigkeit beginnen. Aber für Fichte ist es unmöglich, dieser seiner vom Ich absolut gesetzten Tätigkeit zu irgendeinem Inhalte ihres Tuns zu verhelfen. Denn er hat nichts, worauf sich diese Tätigkeit richten, wonach sie sich bestimmen soll. Sein Ich soll eine Tathandlung vollziehen; aber was soll es tun? Weil Fichte den Begriff der Erkenntnis nicht aufstellte, den das Ich verwirklichen soll, deshalb rang er vergeblich, irgendeinen Fortgang von seiner absoluten Tathandlung zu den weiteren Bestimmungen des Ich zu finden. Ja, er erklärt zuletzt in bezug auf einen solchen Fortgang, daß die Untersuchung hierüber außerhalb der Grenzen der Theorie liege. Er geht in seiner Deduktion der Vorstellung weder von einer absoluten Tätigkeit des Ich noch des Nicht-Ich, sondern von einem Bestimmten aus, das zugleich Bestimmen ist, weil im Bewußtsein unmittelbar nichts anderes enthalten ist noch enthalten sein kann. Was diese Bestimmung wieder bestimmt, bleibt in der Theorie vollständig unentschieden; und durch diese Unbestimmtheit werden wir denn auch über die Theorie hinaus in den praktischen Teil der Wissenschaftslehre getrieben. 32Sämtliche Werke I, S. 178. Durch diese Erklärung vernichtet aber Fichte überhaupt alles Erkennen. Denn die praktische Tätigkeit des Ich gehört in ein ganz anderes Gebiet. Daß das von uns oben aufgestellte Postulat nur durch eine freie Handlung des Ich realisiert werden kann, ist ja klar; aber wenn das Ich sich erkennend verhalten soll, so kommt es gerade darauf an, daß die Entschließung desselben dahin geht, die Idee des Erkennens zu verwirklichen. Es ist ja gewiß richtig, daß das Ich aus freiem Entschluß noch vieles andere vollführen kann. Aber nicht auf eine Charakteristik des «freien», sondern auf eine solche des «erkennenden» Ich kommt es bei der erkenntnis-theoretischen Grundlegung aller Wissenschaften an. Fichte hat sich aber von seinem subjektiven Hange, die Freiheit der menschlichen Persönlichkeit in das hellste Licht zu stellen, allzusehr beeinflussen lassen. Mit Recht bemerkt Harms in seiner Rede über die Philosophie Fichtes (S.15): «Seine Weltansicht ist eine vorherrschend und ausschließlich ethische, und seine Erkenntnistheorie trägt keinen anderen Charakter.» Das Erkennen hätte absolut keine Aufgabe, wenn alle Gebiete der Wirklichkeit in ihrer Totalität gegeben wären. Da nun aber das Ich, solange es nicht vom Denken in das systematische Ganze des Weltbildes eingefügt ist, auch nichts anderes ist als ein unmittelbar Gegebenes, so genügt ein bloßes Aufzeigen seines Tuns durchaus nicht. Fichte jedoch ist der Ansicht, daß beim Ich mit dem bloßen Aufsuchen schon alles getan sei. «Wir haben den absolut-ersten, schlechthin unbedingten Grundsatz alles menschlichen Wissens aufzusuchen. Beweisen oder bestimmen läßt er sich nicht, wenn er absolut-erster Grundsatz sein soll.» 33Sämtliche Werke I, S.91. Wir haben gesehen, daß das Beweisen und Bestimmen einzig und allein dem Inhalte der reinen Logik gegenüber nicht am Platze ist. Das Ich gehört aber der Wirklichkeit an, und da ist es notwendig, das Vorhandensein dieser oder jener Kategorie im Gegebenen festzustellen. Fichte tat das nicht. Und hierinnen ist der Grund zu suchen, warum er seiner Wissenschaftslehre eine so verfehlte Gestalt gab. Zeller bemerkt,34Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz, München 1871 bis 1875, S.605. daß die logischen Formeln, durch die Fichte zu dem Ich-Begriff kommen will, nur schlecht den Umstand verhüllen, daß dieser eigentlich um jeden Preis den schon vorgefaßten Zweck erreichen wolle, zu diesem Anfangspunkte zu kommen. Diese Worte beziehen sich auf die erste Gestalt, die Fichte 1794 seiner Wissenschaftslehre gab. Wenn wir daran festhalten, daß Fichte in der Tat, der ganzen Anlage seines Philosophierens nach, nichts wollen konnte, als die Wissenschaft durch einen absoluten Machtspruch beginnen zu lassen, so gibt es ja nur zwei Wege, die dieses Beginnen verständlich erscheinen lassen. Der eine war der, das Bewußtsein bei irgendeiner seiner empirischen Tätigkeiten anzufassen und durch allmähliche Losschälung alles dessen, was nicht ursprünglich aus demselben folgt, den reinen Begriff des Ich herauszukristallisieren. Der andere Weg aber war, gleich bei der ursprünglichen Tätigkeit des «Ich» einzusetzen und dessen Natur durch Selbstbesinnung und Selbstbeobachtung aufzuzeigen. Den ersten Weg schlug Fichte am Beginne seines Philosophierens ein; im Verlaufe desselben ging er jedoch allmählich zum zweiten über.
[ 3 ] An die Synthesis der «transzendentalen Apperzeption» bei Kant anknüpfend, fand Fichte, daß alle Tätigkeit des Ich in der Zusammenfügung des Stoffes der Erfahrung nach den Formen des Urteils bestehe. Das Urteilen besteht in dem Verknüpfen des Prädikats mit dem Subjekte, was in rein formaler Weise durch den Satz ausgedrückt wird: \(a = a\). Dieser Satz wäre unmöglich, wenn das x, das beide a verbindet, nicht auf einem Vermögen schlechthin zu setzen beruhte. Denn der Satz bedeutet ja nicht: a ist, sondern: wenn a ist, so ist a. Also von einem absoluten Setzen des a kann nicht die Rede sein. So bleibt denn nichts, um überhaupt zu einem absoluten, schlechthin Gültigen zu kommen, als das Setzen selbst für absolut zu erklären. Während das a bedingt ist, ist das Setzen des a unbedingt. Dieses Setzen ist aber eine Tathandlung des Ich. Dem Ich kommt somit eine Fähigkeit zu, schlechthin und unbedingt zu setzen. In dem Satze a = a wird das eine a nur gesetzt, indem das andere vorausgesetzt wird; und zwar wird es durch das Ich gesetzt. «Wenn a im Ich gesetzt ist, so ist es gesetzt.» 35Sämtliche Werke I,S.94. Dieser Zusammenhang ist nur unter der Bedingung möglich, daß im Ich etwas sich immer Gleichbleibendes sei, etwas, was von einem a zum andern hinüberfahrt. Und das oben erwähnte x beruht auf diesem Gleichbleibenden. Das Ich, welches das eine a setzt, ist dasselbe wie jenes, welches das andere setzt. Das heißt aber Ich Ich. Dieser Satz in Form des Urteils ausgedrückt: Wenn Ich ist, so ist es - hat keinen Sinn. Das Ich wird ja nicht unter der Voraussetzung eines andern gesetzt, sondern es setzt sich selbst voraus. Das heißt aber: es ist schlechthin und unbedingt. Die hypothetische Form des Urteils, die ohne die Voraussetzung des absoluten Ich allem Urteilen zukommt, verwandelt sich hier in die Form des absoluten Existenzialsatzes: Ich bin schlechtweg. Fichte drückt dies auch noch folgendermaßen aus: «Das Ich setzt ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Sein.» 36Sämtliche Werke I , S.98. Wir sehen, daß diese ganze Ableitung Fichtes nichts ist als eine Art pädagogischer Auseinandersetzung, um seine Leser dahin zu führen, wo ihnen die Erkenntnis der unbedingten Tätigkeit des Ich aufgeht. Es soll denselben jene Handlung des Ich klar vor Augen gebracht werden, ohne deren Vollzug überhaupt gar kein Ich ist.
[ 4 ] Wir wollen nun auf Fichtes Gedankengang noch einmal zurückblicken. Bei schärferem Zusehen stellt sich nämlich heraus, daß in demselben ein Sprung ist, und zwar ein solcher, der die Richtigkeit der Anschauung von der ursprünglichen Tathandlung in Frage stellt. Was ist denn eigentlich wirklich absolut in dem Setzen des Ich? Es wird geurteilt: Wenn a ist, so ist a. Das a wird vom Ich gesetzt. Über dieses Setzen kann also kein Zweifel obwalten. Aber wenn auch als Tätigkeit unbedingt, so kann das Ich doch nur irgend etwas setzen. Es kann nicht die «Tätigkeit an und für sich», sondern nur eine bestimmte Tätigkeit setzen. Kurz: das Setzen muß einen Inhalt haben. Diesen kann es aber nicht aus sich selbst nehmen, denn sonst könnte es nichts weiter als ewig nur das Setzen setzen. Es muß also für das Setzen, für die absolute Tätigkeit des Ich etwas geben, das durch sie realisiert wird. Ohne daß das Ich zu einem Gegebenen greift, das es setzt, kann es überhaupt «nichts», folglich nicht setzen.» Das zeigt auch der Fichtesche Satz: Das Ich setzt sein Sein. Dieses Sein ist eine Kategorie. Wir sind wieder bei unserm Satze: Die Tätigkeit des Ich beruht darauf, daß das Ich aus eigenem freiem Entschlusse die Begriffe und Ideen des Gegebenen setzt. Nur dadurch, daß Fichte unbewußt darauf ausgeht, das Ich als «Seiendes» nachzuweisen, kommt er zu seinem Resultate. Hätte er den Begriff des Erkennens entwickelt, so wäre er zu dem wahren Ausgangspunkte der Erkenntnistheorie gekommen: Das Ich setzt das Erkennen. Da Fichte sich nicht klarmachte, wodurch die Tätigkeit des Ich bestimmt wird, bezeichnete er einfach das Setzen des Seins als Charakter dieser Tätigkeit. Damit hatte er aber auch die absolute Tätigkeit des Ich beschränkt. Denn ist nur das «Sein-Setzen» des Ich unbedingt, dann ist ja alles andere, was vom Ich ausgeht, bedingt. Aber es ist auch jeder Weg abgeschnitten, um vom Unbedingten zum Bedingten zu kommen. Wenn das Ich nur nach der bezeichneten Richtung hin unbedingt ist, dann hört sofort die Möglichkeit für dasselbe auf, etwas anderes als sein eigenes Sein durch einen ursprünglichen Akt zu setzen. Es tritt somit die Notwendigkeit ein, den Grund für alle andere Tätigkeit des Ich anzugeben. Fichte suchte nach einem solchen vergebens, wie wir oben bereits gesehen haben.
[ 5 ] Daher wandte er sich zu dem andern der oben bezeichneten Wege behufs Ableitung des Ich. Schon 1797 in der «Ersten Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre» empfiehlt er die Selbstbeobachtung als das Richtige, um das Ich in seinem ureigenen Charakter zu erkennen. «Merke auf dich selbst, kehre deinen Blick von allem, was dich umgibt, ab und in dein Inneres - ist die erste Forderung, welche die Philosophie an ihren Lehrling tut. Es ist von nichts, was außer dir ist, die Rede, sondern lediglich von dir selbst.» 37Sämtliche Werke 1, S.422. Diese Art, die Wissenschaftslehre einzuleiten, hat allerdings vor der andern einen großen Vorzug. Denn die Selbst-beobachtung liefert ja die Tätigkeit des Ich in der Tat nicht einseitig nach einer bestimmten Richtung hin, sie zeigt es nicht bloß Sein-setzend, sondern sie zeigt es in seiner allseitigen Entfaltung, wie es denkend den unmittelbar gegebenen Weltinhalt zu begreifen sucht. Der Selbstbeobachtung zeigt sich das Ich wie es sich das Weltbild aus dem Zusammenfügen von Gegebenem und Begriff aufbaut. Aber für denjenigen, der unsere obige Betrachtung nicht mit durchgemacht hat der also nicht weiß, daß das Ich nur dann zum ganzen Inhalte der Wirklichkeit kommt, wenn es mit seinen Denkformen an das Gegebene herantritt -, für den erscheint der Erkenntnisprozeß als ein Herausspinnen der Welt aus dem Ich. Für Fichte wird das Weltbild daher immer mehr zu einer Konstruktion des Ich. Er betont immer stärker, daß es in der Wissenschaftslehre darauf ankomme, den Sinn zu erwecken, der imstande ist, das Ich bei diesem Konstruieren der Welt zu belauschen. Wer dies vermag, erscheint ihm auf einer höheren Wissensstufe als derjenige, der nur das Konstruierte, das fertige Sein sieht. Wer nur die Welt der Objekte betrachtet, der erkennt nicht, daß sie vom Ich erst geschaffen werden. Wer aber das Ich in seinem Konstruieren betrachtet, der sieht den Grund des fertigen Weltbildes; er weiß, wodurch es geworden, es erscheint ihm als Folge, zu dem ihm die Voraussetzungen gegeben sind. Das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein sieht nur dasjenige, was gesetzt ist, was in dieser oder jener Weise bestimmt ist. Es fehlt ihm die Einsicht in die Vordersätze, in die Gründe: warum es gerade so gesetzt ist und nicht anders. Das Wissen um diese Vordersätze zu vermitteln, ist nach Fichte die Aufgabe eines ganz neuen Sinnes. Am deutlichsten ausgesprochen finde ich dies in den «Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Vorgelesen im Herbste 1813 auf der Universität zu Berlin»: «Diese Lehre setzt voraus ein ganz neues inneres Sinneswerkzeug, durch welches eine neue Welt gegeben wird, die für den gewöhnlichen Menschen gar nicht vorhanden ist.» Oder: «Die Welt des neuen Sinnes und dadurch er selbst ist vorläufig klar bestimmt: sie ist das Sehen der Vordersätze, auf die das Urteil: es ist etwas, sich gründet; der Grund des Seins, der eben darum, weil er dies ist, nicht selbst wieder ist und ein Sein ist.» 38J. G. Fichtes nachgelassene Werke. Herausgegeben von J. H. Fichte, Bd. 1, Bonn 1834, S.4 und S.16.
[ 6 ] Die klare Einsicht in den Inhalt der vom Ich ausgeführten Tätigkeit fehlt aber Fichte auch hier. Er ist nie zu derselben durchgedrungen. Deshalb konnte seine Wissenschaftslehre das nicht werden, was sie sonst, ihrer ganzen Anlage nach, hätte werden müssen: eine Erkenntnistheorie als philosophische Grundwissenschaft. War nämlich einmal erkannt, daß die Tätigkeit des Ich von diesem selbst gesetzt werden muß, so lag nahe, daran zu denken, daß sie auch vom Ich ihre Bestimmung erhält. Wie kann das aber anders geschehen, als indem man dem rein formellen Tun des Ich einen Inhalt gibt. Soll dieser aber wirklich durch das Ich in dessen sonst ganz unbestimmte Tätigkeit hineingelegt werden, so muß derselbe auch seiner Natur nach bestimmt werden. Sonst könnte er doch höchstens durch ein im Ich liegendes «Ding an sich», dessen Werkzeug das Ich ist, nicht aber durch letzteres selbst realisiert werden. Hätte Fichte diese Bestimmung versucht, dann wäre er aber zum Begriffe der Erkenntnis gekommen, der von dem Ich verwirklicht werden soll. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre ist ein Beleg dafür, daß es selbst dem scharfsinnigsten Denken nicht gelingt, auf irgendeinem Felde fruchtbringend einzuwirken, wenn man nicht zu der richtigen Gedankenform (Kategorie, Idee) kommt, die, mit dem Gegebenen ergänzt, die Wirklichkeit gibt. Es geht einem solchen Betrachter so, wie jenem Menschen, dem die herrlichsten Melodien geboten werden, und der sie gar nicht hört, weil er keine Empfindung für Melodie hat. Das Bewußtsein, als Gegebenes, kann nur der charakterisieren, der sich in den Besitz der «Idee des Bewußtseins» zu setzen weiß.
[ 7 ] Fichte ist einmal sogar der richtigen Einsicht ganz nahe. Er findet 1797 in den «Einleitungen zur Wissenschaftslehre», es gäbe zwei theoretische Systeme, den Dogmatismus, der das Ich von den Dingen, und den Idealismus, der die Dinge vom Ich bestimmt sein läßt. Beide stehen, nach seiner Ansicht, als mögliche Weltanschauungen fest. Der eine wie der andere gestatte eine konsequente Durchführung. Aber wenn wir uns dem Dogmatismus ergeben, dann müssen wir eine Selbständigkeit des Ich aufgeben und dasselbe vom Ding an sich abhängig machen. Im umgekehrten Falle sind wir, wenn wir dem Idealismus huldigen. Welches der Systeme der eine oder der andere Philosoph wählen will, das stellt Fichte lediglich dem Belieben des Ich anheim. Wenn dasselbe aber seine Selbständigkeit wahren wolle, so hebe es den Glauben an die Dinge außer uns auf und ergebe sich dem Idealismus.
[ 8 ] Nun hätte es nur noch der Überlegung bedurft, daß das Ich ja zu gar keiner wirklichen, gegründeten Entscheidung und Bestimmung kommen kann, wenn es nicht etwas voraussetzt, welches ihm zu einer solchen verhilft. Alle Bestimmung vom Ich aus bliebe leer und inhaltlos, wenn das Ich nicht etwas Inhaltsvolles, durch und durch Bestimmtes findet, was ihm die Bestimmung des Gegebenen möglich macht und damit auch zwischen Idealismus und Dogmatismus die Wahl treffen läßt. Dieses durch und durch Inhaltsvolle ist aber die Welt des Denkens. Und das Gegebene durch das Denken bestimmen heißt Erkennen. Wir mögen Fichte anfassen, wo wir wollen: überall finden wir, daß sein Gedankengang sofort Hand und Fuß gewinnt, wenn wir die bei ihm ganz graue, leere Tätigkeit des Ich erfüllt und geregelt denken von dem, was wir Erkenntnisprozeß genannt haben.
[ 9 ] Der Umstand, daß das Ich durch Freiheit sich in Tätigkeit versetzen kann, macht es ihm möglich, aus sich heraus durch Selbstbestimmung die Kategorie des Erkennens zu realisieren, während in der übrigen Welt die Kategorien sich durch objektive Notwendigkeit mit dem ihnen korrespondierenden Gegebenen verknüpft erweisen. Das Wesen der freien Selbstbestimmung zu untersuchen, wird die Aufgabe einer auf unsere Erkenntnistheorie gestützten Ethik und Metaphysik sein. Diese werden auch die Frage zu erörtern haben, ob das Ich auch noch andere Ideen außer der Erkenntnis zu realisieren vermag. Daß die Realisierung des Erkennens durch Freiheit geschieht, geht aber aus den oben gemachten Anmerkungen bereits klar hervor. Denn wenn das unmittelbar Gegebene und die dazugehörige Form des Denkens durch das Ich im Erkenntnisprozeß vereinigt werden, so kann die Vereinigung der sonst immer getrennt im Bewußtsein verbleibenden zwei Elemente der Wirklichkeit nur durch einen Akt der Freiheit geschehen.
[ 10 ] Durch unsere Ausführungen wird aber noch in ganz anderer Weise Licht auf den kritischen Idealismus geworfen. Demjenigen, der sich eingehend mit Fichtes System befaßt hat, erscheint es wie eine Herzensangelegenheit dieses Philosophen, den Satz aufrechtzuerhalten, daß in das Ich nichts von außen hineinkommen kann, daß nichts in demselben auftritt, was nicht ursprünglich von demselben selbst gesetzt wird. Nun ist aber außer Frage, daß kein Idealismus je imstande sein wird, jene Form des Weltinhaltes aus dem Ich abzuleiten, die wir als die unmittelbar gegebene bezeichnet haben. Diese Form kann eben nur gegeben, niemals aus dem Denken heraus konstruiert werden. Man erwäge doch nur, daß wir es nicht zustande brächten, selbst wenn uns die ganze übrige Farbenskala gegeben wäre, auch nur eine Farbennuance bloß vom Ich aus zu ergänzen. Wir können uns ein Bild der entferntesten, von uns nie gesehenen Ländergebiete machen, wenn wir die Elemente dazu als gegebene einmal individuell erlebt haben. Wir kombinieren uns dann das Bild nach gegebener Anleitung aus von uns erlebten Einzeltatsachen. Vergebens aber werden wir danach streben, auch nur ein einziges Wahrnehmungselement, das nie im Bereich des uns Gegebenen lag, aus uns herauszuspinnen. Ein anderes aber ist das bloße Kennen der gegebenen Welt; ein anderes das Erkennen von deren Wesenheit. Letztere wird uns, trotzdem sie innig mit dem Weltinhalte verknüpft ist, nicht klar, ohne daß wir die Wirklichkeit aus Gegebenem und Denken selbst erbauen. Das eigentliche «Was» des Gegebenen wird für das Ich nur durch das letztere selbst gesetzt. Das Ich hätte aber gar keine Veranlassung, das Wesen eines Gegebenen in sich zu setzen, wenn es nicht die Sache zuerst in ganz bestimmungsloser Weise sich gegenüber sähe. Was also als Wesen der Welt vom Ich gesetzt wird, das wird nicht ohne das Ich, sondern durch dasselbe gesetzt.
[ 11 ] Nicht die erste Gestalt, in der die Wirklichkeit an das Ich herantritt, ist deren wahre, sondern die letzte, die das Ich aus derselben macht. Jene erste Gestalt ist überhaupt ohne Bedeutung für die objektive Welt und hat eine solche nur als Unterlage für den Erkenntnisprozeß. Also nicht die Gestalt der Welt, welche die Theorie derselben gibt, ist die subjektive, sondern vielmehr jene, welche dem Ich zuerst gegeben ist. Will man nach dem Vorgange Volkelts u. a. diese gegebene Welt die Erfahrung nennen, so muß man sagen: die Wissenschaft ergänzt das infolge der Einrichtung unseres Bewußtseins in subjektiver Form, als Erfahrung, auftretende Weltbild zu dem, was es wesentlich ist.
[ 12 ] Unsere Erkenntnistheorie liefert die Grundlage für einen im wahren Sinne des Wortes sich selbst verstehenden Idealismus. Sie begründet die Überzeugung, daß im Denken die Essenz der Welt vermittelt wird. Durch nichts anderes als durch das Denken kann das Verhältnis der Teile des Weltinhaltes aufgezeigt werden, ob es nun das Verhältnis der Sonnenwärme zum erwärmten Stein oder des Ich zur Außenwelt ist. Im Denken allein ist das Element gegeben, welches alle Dinge in ihren Verhältnissen zueinander bestimmt.
[ 13 ] Der Einwand, den der Kantianismus noch machen könnte, wäre der, daß die oben charakterisierte Wesensbestimmung des Gegebenen doch nur eine solche für das Ich sei. Demgegenüber müssen wir im Sinne unserer Grundauffassung erwidern, daß ja auch die Spaltung des Ich und der Außenwelt nur innerhalb des Gegebenen Bestand hat, daß also jenes «für das Ich» der denkenden Betrachtung gegenüber, die alle Gegensätze vereinigt, keine Bedeutung hat. Das Ich als ein von der Außenwelt Abgetrenntes geht in der denkenden Weltbetrachtung völlig unter; es hat also gar keinen Sinn mehr, von Bestimmungen bloß für das Ich zu sprechen.
VI The presuppositionless theory of knowledge and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre
[ 1 ] We have established the idea of cognition in our previous remarks. This idea is now directly given in human consciousness, insofar as it behaves in a cognitive way. The "I" as the center 28need hardly be said of consciousness is directly given external and internal perception and its own existence. The ego feels the urge to find more in this given than what is immediately given. The second world, that of thinking, opens up to it in relation to the given world, and it connects the two by freely realizing what we have established as the idea of cognition. Herein lies a fundamental difference between the way in which in the object of human consciousness itself the concept and the directly given are united to form total reality, and the way in which they are valid in relation to the other contents of the world. With every other part of the world-picture we must imagine that the connection is the original, necessary thing from the outset, and that only at the beginning of cognition has an artificial separation occurred for cognition, which, however, is finally abolished again by cognition, in accordance with the original nature of the objective. It is different with human consciousness. Here the connection only exists when it is carried out in real activity by consciousness. With every other object, the separation has no meaning for the object, but only for cognition. Here the connection is the first, the separation the derivative. Cognition only carries out the separation, because in its own way it cannot put itself in possession of the connection if it has not previously separated. But the concept and the given reality of consciousness are originally separate, the connection is the derivative, and that is why cognition is constituted as we have described it. Because the idea and the given necessarily appear separately in consciousness, therefore the whole of reality is divided into these two parts for it, and because consciousness can only bring about the connection of the two elements mentioned through its own activity, therefore it only arrives at full reality through the realization of the act of cognition. The other categories (ideas) would also necessarily be connected with the corresponding forms of the given if they were not included in cognition; the idea of cognition can only be united with the given corresponding to it through the activity of consciousness. A real consciousness only exists when it realizes itself. With this we believe we are sufficiently prepared to expose the fundamental error of Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre" and at the same time to provide the key to its understanding. Fichte is the philosopher who, among Kant's successors, felt most keenly that a foundation for all the sciences could only consist in a theory of consciousness; but he never came to realize why this was so. He felt that what we call the second step of the theory of knowledge, and to which we give the form of a postulate, must really be carried out by the "I". We see this, for example, from his following words: "The science of science, in so far as it is to be a systematic science, arises, therefore, just as all possible sciences, in so far as they are to be systematic, from a determination of freedom, which latter is here especially determined to raise to consciousness the mode of action of intelligence in general; ... Through this free action, something that is already form in itself, the necessary action of intelligence, is now taken up as content into a new form of knowledge or consciousness..." 29On the Concept of the Doctrine of Science or so-called Philosophy. Sämtliche Werke, Berlin 1845, Vol. I, p.71 f. What is to be understood here by the mode of action of "intelligence", if what is darkly felt is expressed in clear terms? Nothing other than the realization of the idea of cognition that takes place in consciousness. If Fichte had been fully aware of this, he would simply have had to formulate the above sentence as follows: The doctrine of science has to elevate cognition, insofar as it is still the unconscious activity of the "I", to consciousness; it has to show that in the "I" the objectification of the idea of cognition is carried out as a necessary action.
[ 2 ] Fichte wants to determine the activity of the "I". He finds: "That whose being (essence) consists merely in the fact that it sets itself as being, is the I, as absolute subject".30Foundation of the entire Wissenschaftslehre. Sämtl. Werke 1, p.97. For Fichte, this positing of the I is the first unconditioned act that "underlies all other consciousness". 31Sämtliche Werke I, p.91. Thus, in Fichte's sense, the ego can only begin all its activity through an absolute decision. But for Fichte it is impossible to help this activity, which is absolutely set by the ego, to any content of its action. For he has nothing towards which this activity should be directed, towards which it should determine itself. His ego is supposed to perform an action; but what is it supposed to do? Because Fichte did not establish the concept of cognition that the ego is to realize, he struggled in vain to find any progression from his absolute action to the further determinations of the ego. Indeed, he finally declares, with regard to such a progression, that the investigation of this lies outside the limits of theory. In his deduction of the imagination he proceeds neither from an absolute activity of the ego nor of the non-ego, but from a determination that is at the same time a determination, because nothing else is or can be directly contained in consciousness. What determines this determination again remains completely undecided in the theory; and it is through this indeterminacy that we are driven beyond the theory into the practical part of the doctrine of science. 32Sämtliche Werke I, p. 178. Through this explanation, however, Fichte destroys all cognition in general. For the practical activity of the ego belongs to an entirely different realm. It is clear that the postulate we have laid down above can only be realized through a free action of the ego; but if the ego is to behave cognitively, it is precisely a matter of its resolution to realize the idea of cognition. It is certainly true that the ego can accomplish many other things of its own free will. But it is not a characterization of the "free", but of the "cognizing" I that is important in the epistemological-theoretical foundation of all sciences. Fichte, however, allowed himself to be overly influenced by his subjective inclination to place the freedom of the human personality in the brightest light. Harms rightly remarks in his speech on Fichte's philosophy (p.15): "His view of the world is a predominantly and exclusively ethical one, and his theory of knowledge bears no other character." Cognition would have absolutely no task if all areas of reality were given in their totality. But since the ego, as long as it is not inserted by thinking into the systematic whole of the world view, is nothing other than an immediate given, a mere demonstration of its action is not at all sufficient. Fichte, however, is of the opinion that with the ego everything is already done with the mere searching. "We have to seek out the absolute-first, absolutely unconditional principle of all human knowledge. It cannot be proven or determined if it is to be the absolute first principle." 33Sämtliche Werke I, p.91. We have seen that proof and determination are out of place solely in relation to the content of pure logic. But the ego belongs to reality, and there it is necessary to establish the existence of this or that category in the given. Fichte did not do this. And this is the reason why he gave his Wissenschaftslehre such a misguided form. Zeller remarks,34Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz, München 1871 bis 1875, p.605. that the logical formulas through which Fichte wants to arrive at the concept of the I only poorly conceal the fact that he actually wanted to achieve the already preconceived purpose of arriving at this starting point at all costs. These words refer to the first form that Fichte gave to his Wissenschaftslehre in 1794. If we hold on to the fact that Fichte, according to the whole structure of his philosophizing, could indeed have wanted nothing more than to have science begin through an absolute power statement, then there are only two ways in which this beginning can be understood. One was to take hold of consciousness in any of its empirical activities and, by gradually peeling away everything that does not originally follow from it, to crystallize the pure concept of the ego. The other way, however, was to begin with the original activity of the "I" and to reveal its nature through self-reflection and self-observation. Fichte took the first path at the beginning of his philosophizing; in the course of it, however, he gradually moved on to the second.
[ 3 ] Following on from Kant's synthesis of "transcendental apperception", Fichte found that all activity of the ego consists in assembling the material of experience according to the forms of judgment. Judgment consists in linking the predicate with the subject, which is expressed in a purely formal way by the proposition \(a = a\). This sentence would be impossible if the x that links the two a's were not based on a capacity to set per se. For the proposition does not mean: a is, but: if a is, then a is. So there can be no question of an absolute positing of a. In order to arrive at an absolute, absolutely valid proposition, nothing remains but to declare the proposition itself to be absolute. While the a is conditional, the positing of the a is unconditional. But this positing is an act of the ego. The I thus has the ability to posit absolutely and unconditionally. In the proposition a = a, the one a is only posited by presupposing the other; namely, it is posited by the ego. "If a is posited in the I, then it is posited." 35Sämtliche Werke I,p.94. This connection is only possible on the condition that there is something in the ego that always remains the same, something that passes from one a to the other. And the x mentioned above is based on this constant. The I that posits the one a is the same as the one that posits the other. But that is called I I I. This sentence expressed in the form of the judgment: If I is, then it is - has no meaning. The I is not posited under the presupposition of another, but presupposes itself. This means, however, that it is absolute and unconditional. The hypothetical form of judgment, which is inherent in all judgment without the presupposition of the absolute I, is transformed here into the form of the absolute existential proposition: I am absolutely. Fichte also expresses this as follows: "The I originally posits its own being." 36Sämtliche Werke I , p.98. We see that this whole derivation by Fichte is nothing but a kind of pedagogical argument to lead his readers to the point where the realization of the unconditional activity of the I dawns on them. The action of the I is to be brought clearly before their eyes, without the accomplishment of which there is no I at all.
[ 4 ] We will now look back once again at Fichte's train of thought. A closer look reveals that there is a leap in it, one that calls into question the correctness of the view of the original act. What is really absolute in the positing of the ego? It is judged: If a is, then a is. a is posited by the ego. There can therefore be no doubt about this positing. But even if it is absolute as an activity, the I can only posit something. It cannot posit the "activity in and of itself", but only a certain activity. In short: the positing must have a content. But it cannot take this content from itself, for otherwise it could only ever posit positing. There must therefore be something for the positing, for the absolute activity of the I, which is realized through it. Without the I reaching for a given that it posits, it can posit "nothing" at all, consequently not." This is also shown by Fichte's sentence: The I posits its being. This being is a category. We are back to our proposition: The activity of the I is based on the fact that the I sets the concepts and ideas of the given out of its own free decision. Fichte arrives at his result only because he unconsciously sets out to prove the ego as "being". If he had developed the concept of cognition, he would have arrived at the true starting point of epistemology: The I posits cognition. Since Fichte did not clarify what determines the activity of the I, he simply described the positing of being as the character of this activity. In doing so, however, he also limited the absolute activity of the I. For if only the "positing of being" of the ego is unconditional, then everything else that proceeds from the ego is conditional. But every path is also cut off to get from the unconditioned to the conditioned. If the I is only unconditioned in the direction indicated, then the possibility for it to posit something other than its own being through an original act immediately ceases. Thus the necessity arises to give the reason for all other activity of the ego. Fichte searched in vain for such a ground, as we have already seen above.
[ 5 ] He therefore turned to the other of the above-mentioned ways of deriving the ego. As early as 1797, in the "First Introduction to the Theory of Science", he recommended introspection as the right way to recognize the ego in its very own character. "Pay attention to yourself, turn your gaze away from everything that surrounds you and into your inner self - this is the first demand that philosophy makes of its apprentice. It is not talking about anything outside yourself, but only about yourself." 37Sämtliche Werke 1, p.422. However, this way of introducing the doctrine of science has a great advantage over the other. For self-observation does not in fact present the activity of the ego in a one-sided way in a particular direction; it does not merely show it as a being-setter, but shows it in its all-round unfolding, as it seeks to comprehend the directly given content of the world through thinking. Self-observation shows the ego as it constructs its world view from the combination of the given and the concept. But for those who have not gone through our above consideration - for those who do not know that the ego only comes to the whole content of reality when it approaches the given with its forms of thought - the process of cognition appears as a spinning out of the world from the ego. For Fichte, the world view therefore becomes more and more a construction of the ego. He emphasizes ever more strongly that what matters in the doctrine of science is to awaken the sense that is capable of eavesdropping on the ego in this construction of the world. Those who are able to do this appear to him to be on a higher level of knowledge than those who only see the constructed, the finished being. Those who only see the world of objects do not recognize that they are first created by the ego. But he who looks at the ego in its construction sees the ground of the finished world picture; he knows how it came to be, it appears to him as a consequence for which the preconditions are given to him. Ordinary consciousness only sees what is set, what is determined in this or that way. It lacks insight into the presuppositions, into the reasons: why it is set just so and not otherwise. According to Fichte, imparting the knowledge of these presuppositions is the task of a completely new sense. I find this most clearly expressed in the "Introductory Lectures to the Theory of Science. Read aloud in the autumn of 1813 at the University of Berlin": "This doctrine presupposes a completely new inner sensory tool, through which a new world is given, which does not exist at all for the ordinary person." Or: "The world of the new sense and thus it itself is clearly determined for the time being: it is the seeing of the propositions on which the judgment: it is something, is based; the ground of being, which, precisely because it is this, is not itself again and is a being." 38J. G. Fichte's posthumous works. Edited by J. H. Fichte, vol. 1, Bonn 1834, p.4 and p.16.
[ 6 ] However, Fichte also lacks a clear insight into the content of the activity carried out by the ego. He never got through to it. For this reason, his Wissenschaftslehre could not become what it should otherwise have become according to its entire structure: a theory of knowledge as a basic philosophical science. For once it had been recognized that the activity of the ego must be set by the ego itself, it was obvious to think that it also receives its determination from the ego. But how can this be done other than by giving content to the purely formal activity of the ego? But if this content is really to be placed by the ego in its otherwise quite indeterminate activity, then it must also be determined by its nature. Otherwise it could at most be realized by a "thing in itself" lying in the ego, whose tool is the ego, but not by the ego itself. If Fichte had attempted this determination, however, he would have arrived at the concept of knowledge that is to be realized by the ego. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre is proof that even the most perceptive thinking does not succeed in having a fruitful effect in any field if one does not arrive at the correct form of thought (category, idea) which, supplemented with the given, gives reality. Such an observer is like a person who is offered the most marvelous melodies and does not hear them at all because he has no feeling for melody. Consciousness, as a given, can only be characterized by those who know how to put themselves in possession of the "idea of consciousness".
[ 7 ] Fichte once even comes very close to the correct insight. In 1797, in the "Introduction to the Theory of Science", he states that there are two theoretical systems, dogmatism, which separates the ego from things, and idealism, which allows things to be determined by the ego. In his view, both are established as possible world views. Both the one and the other allow a consistent realization. But if we surrender to dogmatism, then we must give up the independence of the ego and make it dependent on the thing in itself. We are in the opposite situation if we pay homage to idealism. Which of the systems the one or the other philosopher wants to choose, Fichte leaves merely to the discretion of the ego. But if the ego wants to preserve its independence, it should abandon its belief in things outside us and surrender to idealism.
[ 8 ] Now it would only be necessary to consider that the ego cannot arrive at any real, well-founded decision and determination if it does not presuppose something that helps it to do so. All determination from the ego would remain empty and devoid of content if the ego did not find something substantial, thoroughly determined, which makes it possible for it to determine the given and thus to choose between idealism and dogmatism. But this thoroughly substantive is the world of thought. And determining the given through thinking means recognizing. We may touch Fichte wherever we like: everywhere we find that his train of thought immediately gains hand and foot when we think of the completely gray, empty activity of the ego as filled and regulated by what we have called the process of cognition.
[ 9 ] The fact that the ego can set itself into activity through freedom makes it possible for it to realize the category of cognition out of itself through self-determination, while in the rest of the world the categories prove to be linked through objective necessity with the given that corresponds to them. Investigating the nature of free self-determination will be the task of ethics and metaphysics based on our epistemology. These will also have to discuss the question of whether the ego is also capable of realizing other ideas besides cognition. That the realization of cognition occurs through freedom, however, is already clear from the above remarks. For if the directly given and the corresponding form of thought are united by the ego in the process of cognition, then the unification of the two elements of reality, which otherwise always remain separate in consciousness, can only occur through an act of freedom.
[ 10 ] However, our explanations shed light on critical idealism in a completely different way. To anyone who has studied Fichte's system in depth, it appears to be a matter close to the heart of this philosopher to uphold the proposition that nothing can enter the ego from outside, that nothing occurs in it that is not originally posited by it. But now it is beyond question that no idealism will ever be able to derive from the ego that form of world-content which we have called the directly given. This form can only be given, never constructed out of thinking. Just consider that even if the whole of the remaining color scale were given to us, we would not be able to complete even one shade of color merely from the ego. We can form a picture of the most distant regions of the world, which we have never seen, if we have once experienced the elements individually as given. We then combine the picture according to given instructions from individual facts we have experienced. But we will strive in vain to spin out of ourselves even a single perceptual element that was never within the realm of what was given to us. Another, however, is the mere knowledge of the given world; another is the recognition of its essence. The latter, although it is intimately connected with the content of the world, does not become clear to us without our constructing reality from the given and thinking itself. The actual "what" of the given is determined for the ego only by the latter itself. But the ego would have no reason at all to place the essence of a given in itself if it did not first see the thing in a completely undetermined way. What is therefore posited by the I as the essence of the world is not posited without the I, but through it.
[ 11 ] It is not the first form in which reality approaches the ego that is its true form, but the last form that the ego makes of it. That first form is of no significance at all for the objective world and has such a form only as a basis for the process of cognition. Thus it is not the form of the world that the theory of it gives that is the subjective, but rather that which is first given to the ego. If, according to Volkelt and others, we want to call this given world experience, then we must say: science supplements the world picture that appears in subjective form, as experience, as a result of the establishment of our consciousness, to what it essentially is.
[ 12 ] Our theory of knowledge provides the basis for an idealism that understands itself in the true sense of the word. It establishes the conviction that the essence of the world is conveyed in thinking. Through nothing other than thinking can the relationship of the parts of the content of the world be shown, whether it is the relationship of the heat of the sun to the heated stone or of the ego to the outside world. In thinking alone is the element given that determines all things in their relations to each other.
[ 13 ] The objection that Kantianism could still raise would be that the determination of the essence of the given characterized above is only such for the I. To this we must reply, in the sense of our basic conception, that the division of the ego and the external world only exists within the given, so that this "for the ego" has no meaning in relation to thinking contemplation, which unites all opposites. The ego as something separate from the external world is completely lost in the thinking view of the world; it therefore no longer makes any sense to speak of determinations only for the ego.